Fla. Thoroughbred Breeders' Ass'n, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc.
| Decision Date | 25 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1D18-4674,No. 1D18-4660,1D18-4660 |
| Parties | FLORIDA THOROUGHBRED BREEDERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., d/b/a Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners' Association, Appellant, v. CALDER RACE COURSE, INC., and Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Appellees. Ocala Breeders' Sales Co., Inc., Appellant, v. Calder Race Course, Inc., Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, and Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' Association, Inc., d/b/a Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners' Association, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Donna E. Blanton and Brittany Adams Long of Radey Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' Association, Inc., d/b/a Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners' Association; Ben J. Gibson, Daniel Hernandez, and Rachel Nordby of Shutts & Bowen LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellant, Ocala Breeders' Sales Co., Inc.
Katherine E. Giddings, BCS and Melanie C. Kalmanson of Akerman, LLP, Tallahassee, and Tamara S. Malvin of Akerman LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee, Calder Race Course, Inc.; Ross Marshman, Chief Appellate Counsel, Department of Business & Professional Regulation, Tallahassee, for Appellee, Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering.
These appeals challenge a Final Order Granting a Declaratory Statement requested by Calder Race Course Inc. (Calder) and issued by The Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering (Division). The declaratory statement determined in part that pursuant to section 551.102(4), Florida Statutes, Calder could discontinue the operation of thoroughbred races and instead present a full schedule of live jai alai performances in order to maintain its "eligible facility" status to continue to conduct slot machine operations. The declaratory statement also determined that Calder was not required to conduct summer jai alai performances in the state fiscal year proceeding its operation of slot machines. We affirm as to all issues and specifically address one of appellants' challenges. We find the Division's interpretations of the constitutional amendment and statutes which would allow Calder to present jai alai games in order to continue to conduct slot machine operations are the most reasonable.
In 2004, Florida voters approved a new constitutional provision authorizing Miami-Dade and Broward Counties to hold countywide referenda on whether to authorize slot machines within existing licensed pari-mutuel facilities which had conducted live racing or games in that county during 2002 and 2003. See art. X, § 23, Fla. Const. (2018).1 On November 2, 2004, Florida voters approved the "Slots Amendment." Slot machines were approved in Broward County in 2004 and in Miami-Dade County in 2008.
In 2005 the Florida Legislature enacted chapter 551, Florida Statutes, entitled "Slot Machines," which governs the operation of slot machines at eligible facilities. A license to conduct slot machine gaming is tied to a pari-mutuel wagering permit-holder. See § 551.104(3), Fla. Stat. (2018).
Section 551.102(4) defines the term "eligible facility" for obtaining a slots permit as:
Any licensed pari-mutuel facility located in Miami-Dade County or Broward County existing at the time of adoption of s. 23, Art. X of the State Constitution that has conducted live racing or games during calendar years 2002 and 2003 may possess slot machines and conduct slot machine gaming at the location where the pari-mutuel permit-holder is authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering activities pursuant to such permit-holder's valid pari-mutuel permit provided that a majority of voters in a countywide referendum have approved slot machines at such facility in the respective county.
Calder Race Course, Inc., located in Miami-Dade County, has been a pari-mutuel permit holder for thoroughbred horse racing at its facility since 1971. As a pari-mutuel permit holder which conducted live racing during 2002 and 2003, Calder qualified for and obtained a permit authorizing it to have slot machine gaming at its pari-mutuel facility. Calder recently obtained a summer jai alai permit, and it intends to discontinue thoroughbred racing and begin conducting jai alai games if it continues to qualify for a slot machine permit after the change.
On July 31, 2018, Calder Race Course petitioned the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division), for a Declaratory Statement in regard to two questions related to its intent to terminate thoroughbred racing, and to clarify whether the underlying basis for its slot machine permit could be its jai alai permit, rather than its thoroughbred horse racing permit:
Question 1 was answered in the affirmative; Question 2 was answered in the negative.2
The issues in this case involve interpretation of the statutes under chapters 550 and 551, Florida Statutes. The de novo standard applies to this court's review involving statutory interpretation:
In interpreting a state statute or rule, a state court or an officer hearing an administrative action pursuant to general law may not defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of such statute or rule and must instead interpret such statute or rule de novo.
ANALYSIS
The issue before us is whether the Division erred by interpreting the statutory definition of "eligible facility" to allow Calder to continue its slot machine operation even if it ceases thoroughbred racing and operates jai alai instead.
The "polestar" of statutory interpretation is legislative intent; when a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the actual plain language of the statute represents the legislative intent. See McCloud v. State , 260 So. 3d 911, 914 (Fla. 2018) ; Whynes v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 240 So. 3d 867, 869 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). When a statute is clear and unambiguous, "courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." See, e.g. , Turbeville v. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 248 So. 3d 194, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting Borden v. East–European Ins. Co. , 921 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 2006) ).
Calder's thoroughbred horse racing facility satisfied the elements of an "eligible facility" under the statute for purposes of obtaining its slot machine license. Calder obtained its slot machine license as an "eligible facility" under section 551.102(4) because it qualified under the plain language of the referendum and the statutory definition:
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