Fletcher v. State
| Decision Date | 26 March 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. B--1165,B--1165 |
| Citation | 439 S.W.2d 656 |
| Parties | Oscar Neal FLETCHER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
H. E. Tarpley, Dallas, for appellant.
Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen., Larry J. Craddock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal, under the provisions of Article 1738a, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes. The appeal is from an order of the 116th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, in which Oscar Neal Fletcher, the appellant, was permanently enjoined upon petition of the appellee, the State of Texas, from administering lie detection examinations, from publicly professing to be a polygraph examiner (or lie detector operator) and from administering or offering to administer examinations of any type for the purpose of verifying the truth of statements, without first complying with the provisions of Article 2615f--2, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, 1 entitled the Polygraph Examiners Act.
The main contention of the appellant is that the trial court erred in not holding Article 2615f--2, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, unconstitutional, in that the title of the Act does not fully disclose the contents of the Act; and therefore, does not put the Legislature, which passed the Act, or the public on notice that the Act applies not only to polygraph examiners but also to all persons who use any divice or instrument for the purpose of verifying the truth of statements. The appellant argues specifically, that the title of the Act is insufficient under Article III, Section 35, of the Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St., 2 to support the definition of polygraph examiner which is set forth in Section 2(5) in the body of the Act, i.e., 'any person who uses any device or instrument to test or question individuals for the purpose of verifying truth of statements.'
The title to the Polygraph Examiners Act reads as follows: 'An act relating to the licensing of polygraph examiners; creating a Polygraph Examiners Board; granting certain powers to the Polygraph Examiners Board; establishing minimum instrumentation requirements; providing for penalties for violation of provisions of this Act; and declaring an emergency.' (Emphasis added.)
The case was tried before the court without a jury, upon the following stipulated facts:
'1. This injunction proceeding rests directly upon Article 2615f--2, Vernon's Civil Statutes, generally known as the Texas Polygraph Examiners Act. The applicability of Article 2615f--2, V.C.S., if any, to the activity of defendant as hereinafter set forth provides the sole basis on which the injunction is sought.
'2. Plaintiff, the State of Texas, has brought this action by and through Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas and those Assistant Attorneys General of Texas whose names appear of record, and this action was further brought at the specific instance and request of the Secretary of the Board of Polygraph Examiners of the State of Texas, and the Secretary in making such request was acting at the direction of a majority of the Board.
'3. Defendant, Oscar Neal Fletcher, has offered 'lie detection services' within the State of Texas for a continuing period in excess of ten years and was offering 'lie detection services' on the day upon which Article 2615f--2 became a portion of the law of this state and until the date upon which a temporary restraining order was issued in this cause, he derived a substantial portion of his total income from the sale of 'lie detection services' and (in all reasonable probability) he will continue to derive a substantial portion of his total income from the sale of 'lie detection services' in the future if the aforesaid temporary restraining order is lifted. Defendant does not use a polygraph, has not been issued a license by the Polygraph Examiners Board of the State of Texas; has not applied for such a license, and is not eligible for such a license by reason of either formal or informal education or experience in the use of polygraph equipment, nor does he hold a baccalaureate degree from a college or university accredited by the American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers nor has he passed an examination conducted by the Board or under its supervision to determine his competence to obtain a license to practice as a polygraph examiner.
'4. Defendant, Oscar Neal Fletcher, advertised for several years in the yellow pages of the Dallas telephone directory. In addition to a listing under 'Detective Agencies' he had in November 1965 and years prior thereto been listed under the heading 'Lie Detection Laboratories'. * * * In the November 1966 and November 1967 directories Fletcher Detective Agency was listed under the heading 'Polygraph Service'. * * * A cross reference is printed in the latest directory, being November 1967; as follows: 'LIE DETECTION LABORATORIES AND EQUIPMENT--See Polygraph Service'. * * * In this regard, testimony of representatives of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company would establish that defendant in fact applied for listing in the yellow pages inder the heading 'Lie Detection Laboratories' and that the listing was classified and published by the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company in the 1966 and 1967 directories under the heading 'Polygraph Service' Without either formal authorization or formal complaint from the defendant, save and except for a complaint made after this action was filed.
'5. Defendant, Oscar Neal Fletcher in connection with the sale of services (as heretofore described in paragraph 3 above) operates a device or instrument for the purposes of verifying truth of statements to-wit: a machine known as the 'B & W Lie Detector'.' (Emphasis added.)
This and other courts of Texas have been called upon many times to apply Article III, Section 35, of the Texas Constitution. It has been universally held, for example, that in determining its application, the caption of the act should be liberally construed so as to uphold its validity rather than giving the act a strict construction which would lead to striking down the act or a part thereof. Lee v. State, 163 Tex. 89, 352 S.W.2d 724, 725 (1962); Gulf Insurance Co. v. James, 143 Tex. 424, 185 S.W.2d 966 (1945). The latter decision, in recognizing the rule just stated, reaffirmed another recognized principle that the rule of liberal construction was subject to...
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LeCroy v. Hanlon
...uphold validity, rather than construing them strictly to invalidate. Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1974); Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.1969). This liberal rule of construction, however, has limits: The rule of liberal construction will not be followed to the exte......
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...an original enactment (Art. 2615f, § 2, V.A.C.S., 1965, Polygraph Examiner's Act), and found the Act unconstitutional. See Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.1969). In that case, the caption of the Act provided for the licensing of polygraph examiners and set up a polygraph examiner's b......
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