LeCroy v. Hanlon
| Decision Date | 02 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. C-4745,C-4745 |
| Citation | 713 S.W.2d 335 |
| Parties | Wayne LeCROY, District Clerk, et al., Relators, v. Ben HANLON, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., F. Scott McCown, Dwight Martin, Mary F. Keller, Sarah Woelk, Austin, for relator.
Broadus Spivey, Dan F. Junell, Spivey, Grigg, Kelly & Knisely, Austin, for respondent.
We are called upon to decide whether sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Fee Bill (House Bill 1593, 69th Leg., 1985), which direct $40 of a litigant's district court filing fee to go to state general revenues, violate the Texas Constitution. The 237th District Court of Lubbock County held the act unconstitutional. The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Texas, appealed directly to this court. Tex.Gov.Code § 22.001(c) (Vernon's Pamphlet 1986). We affirm the district court's judgment, holding sections 31 and 32 violate the Texas Constitution's caption requirement, Article III, § 35, and open courts provision, Article I, § 13. 1
I. Facts.
The facts are undisputed. Ben Hanlon's truck was damaged in an automobile accident on March 2, 1985. Texas Wrecker Service towed the truck to its yard. Hanlon had automobile insurance, including towing coverage, on his truck from Northern County Mutual Insurance Company. Northern County Mutual refused to pay Hanlon's claim, and Texas Wrecker Service refused to release Hanlon's truck without payment.
On September 5, 1985, Hanlon attempted to file suit under the Texas Insurance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act against Northern County Mutual and Texas Wrecker Service with the Lubbock County District Clerk. He presented the district clerk with two checks totaling $98, the filing fee existing before September 1, 1985. The district clerk refused the petition, because Hanlon did not tender $173, the filing fee effective September 1, 1985 under House Bill 1593 §§ 31, 32. 2 Section 31 increased the district court filing fee from $25 to $75; Section 32 allocated $10 of the increase to the district clerk and the remaining $40 to the state's general revenue fund. Mr. Hanlon did not file an affidavit of inability to pay costs under Tex.R.Civ.P. 145.
Hanlon filed a petition for writ of mandamus and amended it to request a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Lubbock County District Clerk. Hanlon maintained that the fees he tendered were proper and that the new fee requirements were unconstitutional. After a hearing, the district court agreed. The court declared sections 31 and 32 unconstitutional on four state constitutional grounds: the unity of subject requirement in Article III, § 35; the caption requirement in Article III, § 35; the open courts provision of Article I, § 13; and the compensation of local officers and disposition of fees provisions in Article XVI, § 61. The court issued a mandamus directing the district clerk to file Hanlon's petition and enjoining the collection of the new fee. The Attorney General on behalf of the State appeals the declaratory judgment and the injunctive relief.
II. Article III, § 35.
Article III, § 35 reads:
No bill, (except general appropriation bills, which may embrace the various subjects and accounts, for and on account of which monies are appropriated) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed.
Article III, § 35 contains two requirements: (1) the unity of subject requirement; and (2) the caption requirement. When determining a statute's constitutionality, this court generally begins with a presumption of validity. Furthermore, we construe both Article III, § 35 requirements liberally to uphold validity, rather than construing them strictly to invalidate. Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1974); Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.1969). This liberal rule of construction, however, has limits:
The rule of liberal construction will not be followed to the extent that it will relieve the legislature of the necessity of disclosing the real subject of the act in the title thereof, nor will it be extended so as to hold the Acts valid, the titles of which are deceptive or misleading as to the real contents of the Act.
Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d at 658, quoting from Gulf Insurance Co. v. James, 143 Tex. 424, 185 S.W.2d 966, 970 (1945); see also Harris Co. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 55 v. Carr, 372 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.1963).
The Omnibus Fee Bill's caption reads:
An act relating to various fees collected by certain state and local agencies and to the imposition of new fees in connection with functions of certain state and local agencies.
The purpose of the unity of subject requirement is to prevent log-rolling, i.e., the inclusion in a bill of several subjects having no connection with each other in order to create a combination of various interests in support of the whole bill. Robinson v. Hill, 507 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex.1974). A bill satisfies the unity of subject requirement, even if it contains numerous provisions, however diverse, as long as these provisions relate directly or indirectly to the same general subject and have a mutual connection. Id. at 525; Phillips v. Daniels, 94 S.W.2d 1193, 1197 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1936, writ ref'd). Both increasing filing fees and allocating a portion to general revenue relate to the bill's general subject--the imposition of new fees. The Omnibus Fee Bill does not violate the unity of subject requirement.
The caption requirement's purpose "is to give notice of the title of the bill, not only to members of the legislature, but to the citizens at large, of the subject-matter of the projected law; and thereby to prevent the surreptitious passage of a law upon one subject under the guise of a title which expresses another." Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.1969), quoting Adams & Wickers v. San Angelo Water Works Co., 25 S.W. 605, 606 (1894). The test for whether a caption adequately expresses the bill's subject is:
The title must not only express the subject, but must fairly express, and point to, that which is dealt with in the body of the Act. Its sufficiency is determined by what the title says and not by what it was intended to say.
Harris Co. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 55 v. Carr, 372 S.W.2d at 525.
The issue here is whether "state and local agencies" adequately expresses that the Omnibus Fee Bill alters fees for the judiciary, not whether the legislature intended the caption to encompass that particular subject. Harris Co. Fresh Water Supply Dist. No. 55 v. Carr, 372 S.W.2d at 524, citing Adams & Wickers v. San Angelo Water Works Co., 25 S.W. at 606. The Attorney General argues that "state and local agencies" embraces the judiciary because each department of government--the legislative, the executive, and the judicial--is literally an agent of the state. "Agencies" are commonly defined as administrative divisions of government. Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1980). While the executive branch administrates, the judiciary does not--we adjudicate. "Agencies" simply does not fairly inform the reader that the bill affects the judiciary, which is a separate branch of government. The bill's caption is invalid.
When an act's caption does not adequately express its contents, Article III, § 35 states that "such Act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed." While "state and local agencies" does not express that judicial fees will be altered, it does indicate that executive branch fees will be affected. Only sections 31 and 32 are unconstitutional.
III. The Open Courts Provision.
The Attorney General also contends that the $40 tax allocated to state general revenues does not violate the open courts provision of Article I, § 13. We disagree.
While state constitutions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, state constitutions can and often do provide additional rights for their citizens. See, e.g., Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). The federal constitution sets the floor for individual rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling. Recently, state courts have not hesitated to look to their own constitutions to protect individual rights. Symposium: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 Texas L.Rev. 959 (1985); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bill of Rights, 9 U.Balt.L.Rev. 379 (1980); Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977). This court has been in the mainstream of this movement. Comment, Rediscovering State Constitutions for Individual Rights Protection, 37 Baylor L.Rev. 463, 474-75 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Rediscovering State Constitutions]. See, e.g., Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194 (Tex.1985) (); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1984); Haynes v. City of Abilene, 659 S.W.2d 638 (Tex.1983) (); Hajek v. Bill Mowbray Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 253 (Tex.1983) (Article I, § 8; free speech). 3
Like the citizens of other states, Texans have adopted state constitutions to restrict governmental power and guarantee individual rights. The powers restricted and the individual rights guaranteed in the present constitution reflect Texas' values, customs, and traditions. Our constitution has independent vitality, and this court has the power and duty to protect the additional state guaranteed rights of all Texans. Article V, § 1; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d at 923. See Note, Article I,...
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