FLORIDA DEPT. OF CHILDREN AND FAM. v. FL
| Decision Date | 08 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. SC03-1602.,SC03-1602. |
| Citation | 880 So.2d 602 |
| Parties | FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, et al., Appellants, v. F.L., the Mother, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, John J. Rimes, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General, Lynn C. Hearn, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, FL; Dennis W. Moore, Guardian ad Litem Program, Kissimmee, FL, for Appellant.
Felicia Shaman, Fort Lauderdale, FL; Ryan Truskoski, Orlando, FL; and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellee.
Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2001), authorizes the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights "when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily." In F.L. v. Department of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), the Fourth District Court of Appeal declared this statutory section unconstitutional. For the reason discussed herein, we determine that section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional and reverse the decision of the Fourth District.1
The trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of F.L., the mother, to her seventh child, C.N., Jr.2 On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order of termination. The Department of Children and Families (DCF), joined by the child's guardian ad litem, appeals the Fourth District's decision.
F.L., the mother, has a long history with DCF. F.L. grew up in an abusive home. By the time she was in her late teens, F.L. had three children and was in an abusive relationship with C.N., Sr., an admitted drug dealer. In 1997, DCF filed a petition for dependency as to F.L.'s three children, alleging that F.L. was intoxicated while caring for the children, that the children were dirty, that F.L. had a history of domestic violence with the father, and that the home had no electricity or hot water and had an inoperable toilet. The three children were adjudicated dependent, and the court approved a reunification case plan. The plan consisted of assessments, participation in a parenting course, completion of a substance abuse course, completion of a domestic violence program, and maintaining stable housing and income.
In early 1998, while this dependency action was pending, F.L. prematurely gave birth to a fourth child. DCF immediately took custody of this child and filed a petition for dependency based on the child's low birth weight and F.L.'s lack of prenatal care, and based on the allegations made in the petition for dependency of F.L.'s other children. The trial court declared F.L.'s fourth child dependent and provided a case plan for reunification similar to F.L.'s previous plan. In October 1998, the trial court found that F.L. had completed none of the required tasks on her two case plans. The court ordered DCF to file a petition to terminate F.L.'s parental rights. DCF filed the petition in December 1998. In December 1999, F.L. signed voluntary surrenders of her parental rights to her first four children. The court entered a final judgment terminating her rights in January 2000.
During those proceedings, F.L. gave birth to a fifth child at the end of 1998. In February 1999, this child was sheltered by the trial court sua sponte. The child was adjudicated dependent, and the court gave F.L. a third reunification plan with the same conditions she had been given for reunification with her other four children. F.L.'s sixth child was born in March 2000. DCF took this child into custody based on F.L.'s medical neglect. The child weighed only three pounds at birth. F.L. failed to obtain necessary medical treatment or Medicaid services for this child. In June 2000, DCF filed a petition to terminate F.L.'s parental rights to her fifth and sixth children. In August 2000, F.L. signed a voluntary surrender of parental rights to her fifth child. At the same time, DCF gave F.L. a case plan for her sixth child.
In December 2000, the court entered a final order terminating F.L.'s rights to her sixth child. The order was based on the court's finding under section 39.806(1)(c) Florida Statutes (2000), that F.L. failed to substantially comply with her case plans and that her continued involvement in the parent-child relationship would threaten the child's welfare.
C.N., Jr., the child involved in this case, was born on January 3, 2002. Just before C.N., Jr.'s birth, in November 2001, the father C.N., Sr. was incarcerated for possession of cocaine; he was released on August 25, 2002. In early 2002, an investigator from the Broward County Sheriff's Office visited F.L.'s home several times. The investigator said that F.L. was providing C.N., Jr. with appropriate care and saw no danger to C.N., Jr. Also during this time, an Early Services Intervention counselor assigned by DCF met with F.L. and said that F.L. had bonded with C.N., Jr. and was providing adequate care. Nonetheless, in April 2002, the Broward County Sheriff's Office learned that F.L.'s rights to her sixth child had been terminated involuntarily. For this reason, the Sheriff's Office filed a petition to remove C.N., Jr. from F.L.'s care. On April 24, 2002, the trial court denied the petition, finding that C.N., Jr. was receiving adequate care.
In mid-May 2002, DCF assigned a new case worker to the case. The case worker first met with F.L. on May 16. Five days later, DCF removed C.N., Jr. from F.L. and filed a request for an emergency hearing. In June 2002, DCF filed a petition to terminate F.L.'s parental rights to C.N., Jr. This petition alleged two separate and distinct grounds for termination: (1) a substantial risk of imminent harm to C.N., Jr. based on F.L.'s history of domestic violence, neglect of her children, and failure to comply with her case plans, justifying termination under section 39.806(1)(c);3 and (2) the prior involuntary termination of F.L.'s rights to her sixth child, a justification for termination under section 39.806(1)(i).4
In October 2002, the trial court terminated F.L.'s parental rights. The court found that DCF had given F.L. referrals for parenting counseling, substance abuse evaluation, and domestic violence counseling, but that F.L. had not substantially complied with any of these plans. Specifically, the court found clear and convincing evidence that F.L. had failed to complete a domestic violence program despite four referrals. The court found that F.L. was most recently involved in a domestic violence incident with C.N., Sr. on September 5, 2002, shortly after his release from jail on August 25, but that F.L. failed to file for a restraining order as the responding officer recommended. The court also found that F.L. underwent a substance abuse evaluation by Dr. Kathleen Rhodes, at F.L.'s attorney's referral, but that F.L. failed to give Dr. Rhodes accurate information about her substance abuse history. F.L. also refused to provide a court-ordered hair follicle for testing. In addition, despite a case plan which required completion of a thirty-six-week parenting program, the only parenting program F.L. ever completed was a twelve-week in-home program. Finally, the court found that F.L. missed some scheduled supervised visits with C.N., Jr., never paid child support, and did not have a stable residence or employment for six months after C.N., Jr.'s birth.
In the trial court's conclusions of law, the court said that the grounds for termination had been met as set forth in both sections 39.806(1)(c) and 39.806(1)(i). The court found that F.L. "made a minimal effort prior to the hearing to avoid termination of her parental rights, but even then she missed appointments, stopped going to sessions, failed to reschedule and follow through." The court also found that F.L. "failed to come forward with evidence that the circumstances or pattern of conduct that led to the involuntary termination of her parental rights to the other child cannot serve as a predictor of her conduct with this child." Ultimately, the court concluded that F.L. "demonstrated a continued unwillingness and inability ... to parent her child." Based on the risk to C.N., Jr.'s safety and health, the court concluded that it was in the manifest best interest of the child to terminate F.L.'s parental rights.
The Fourth District reversed, holding that DCF had failed to prove the requirements to terminate F.L.'s parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or section 39.806(1)(i). F.L. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 849 So.2d 1114, 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). Further, the Fourth District declared section 39.806(1)(i) facially unconstitutional, reasoning that the statute impermissibly shifts the burden to the parent to show that her past conduct does not predict that the current child is at risk. 849 So.2d at 1123.
As the appellants, DCF and the guardian ad litem argue that section 39.806(1)(i) is constitutional both facially and as applied in this case. Further, they argue that substantial competent evidence supports the termination of F.L.'s parental rights under either section 39.806(1)(c) or section 39.806(1)(i).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 39.806(1)(i)
Section 39.806(1)(i), Florida Statutes (2002), provides:
We review de novo a district court decision declaring a statute unconstitutional. State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So.2d 297, 301 n. 7 (Fla.2001). When a statute impinges on a fundamental liberty interest, we analyze the statute's constitutionality under a strict scrutiny standard. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1276 (Fla. 1996). Parents have a...
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