Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 11 February 1914
• Citation: 64 So. 504,67 Fla. 101
• Parties: FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. HAYES.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

64 So. 504

67 Fla. 101

FLORIDA EAST COAST RY. CO. v. HAYES.

Florida Supreme Court

February 11, 1914

Error to Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

Action by H. W. Hayes, as administrator, against the Florida East Coast Railway Company for wrongful death. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed conditionally.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Under the statute the damages that may be recovered by the administrator of a person for the wrongful death of the decedent do not include and have no relation to physical or other suffering of the decedent or his relatives, or to the claims of any one for present or future support or solatium. The administrator may recover only the present monetary worth of the decedent's life to an estimated prospective estate, to compensate for the estate that the decedent probably would have accumulated to leave at his death.

Where a finding of legal liability under the pleadings has substantial basis in competent evidence adduced at the trial but it is obvious that, in determining the amount of the verdict, the jury were not governed by the evidence or the proper charges of the court thereon, or by any reasonable estimates or computations, and the amount awarded is manifestly inadequate or excessive, it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial, that the error in the verdict may be remedied, and justice administered in due course of law. In proper cases a remittitur may be permitted.

In permitting a remittitur of the portion of the judgment for damages regarded as excessive, the court does not substitute its judgment for that of the jury, but merely indicates the amount the court would not pronounce excessive; and the privilege of a remittitur is given to avoid further litigation.

COUNSEL Alex St. Clair-Abrams, of Jacksonville, for plaintiff in error.

A. H. &amp Roswell King, of Jacksonville, for defendant in error.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This writ of error was taken to a judgment obtained by the administrator of M. S. Hayes, deceased, an infant, in an action brought under sections 3145 and 3146 of the General Statutes of Florida, to recover for the wrongful death of said infant 'such damages as the party * * * entitled to sue may have sustained by reason of the death of the party killed.'

The assignments of error predicated upon the overruling of a demurrer to the declaration, and upon the denial of a motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant below, are sufficiently covered by the discussion of similar questions in Florida East Coast Railway v. Hayes, 64 So. 274 decided at the last term.

The declaration alleges actionable negligence, and the demurrer thereto was properly overruled. As there is evidence upon which the jury could legally find for the plaintiff, the court correctly refused to give an affirmative charge for the defendant.

The jury returned a verdict of liability against the defendant and the finding of liability does not appear to be wholly without legal basis in the evidence. It is therefore necessary to determine the proper rule for the measure for damages recoverable under the statute in an action brought by an administrator as the legal representative of the estate of a deceased minor, in order to adjudicate the questions presented as to the propriety of the amount of the judgment. The object of the statute giving the right of action is compensation to those who have sustained damages or loss by reason of the death of a person caused by the fault of another. By the terms of the statute, giving a right of recovery that did not exist at common law, the administrator of the decedent cannot maintain an action, unless the decedent left no husband or wife and no minor child, and no other person dependent on him for support. A husband or wife, a minor child, and a dependent person each occupies his or her particular intimate personal relation of dependence during the life expectancy, and, by the wrongful death, such husband or wife, minor child, or dependent person sustains loss or damage that is not wholly monetary, but such as is peculiar to the relation that existed, and that is concurrent with the life expectancy. See Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338, 79 Am. St. Rep. 149. But the administrator, as the legal representative of the decedent's estate, can sustain no loss or damage by reason of the wrongful death, except the pecuniary value of the life to the prospective estate of the decedent, which damage or loss does not include, and has no relation to, physical or other suffering of the decedent or his relatives, or to claims of any one for present or future support or solatium. Such loss or damage to the estate is wholly monetary, and any compensation therefor, after the payment of debts, passes to the decedent's general heirs as of the end of his life expectancy, to compensate for the estate that the decedent probably would have accumulated to leave at his death to such general heirs. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Jones, 45 Fla. 407, 34 So. 246; Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451: Hively v. Webster County, 117 Iowa, 672, 91 N.W. 1041; McAdory v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 94 Ala. 272, 10 So. 507. Where the decedent was an infant, the loss or damage to the estate would not begin until after the time he would have become of age, since, under the statute, the father recovers for the loss of his minor child's service to the adult age, as well as for the mental pain and suffering of the parents caused by the infant's wrongful death. Florida East Coast Railway v. Hayes, supra; section 3147, Gen. Stats. of 1906.

Where the infant leaves no husband or wife, and no minor child, and no person dependent on him or her for a support, the administrator of the deceased infant's estate may, under the statute, maintain an action to recover 'such damages' as the estate 'may have sustained by reason of the' wrongful death; and the proper measure of such damages is the present worth of the decedent's life to an estimated prospective estate that he probably would have earned and saved after becoming of age and during his life expectancy to be left at his death. A determination of the proper amount of such damage requires a consideration of the contingency whether the decedent probably would have lived to become of age and to some given time afterwards, as well as an estimate of the value of the estate he probably would have earned and saved after he would have become of age, and would probably have left at the end of his life expectancy, and also an estimate of the present money value of the decedent's life to the estimated prospective estate. In making this determination, no exact rule of reasoning or computation is afforded by law, but the jury have no arbitrary discretion. The finding should be the result of a fair consideration of all the matters that should, under the circumstances of the particular case properly enter into the estimate and computation. Among other proper elements that may be considered are the age, mental capacity, habits of life, and industry, and thrift, means, business, earnings, health, probable duration of life, skill, and environments, and reasonable expectations of the decedent. If the jury find that the deceased infant probably would have lived to some given period after he would have become of age, and also find an estimated value of an estate he probably would have accumulated and left for distribution among his heirs at the end of his life expectancy, the present money value of the decedent's life to his estimated prospective estate may be ascertained with some degree of accuracy as a practical or mathematical proposition. In cases of this character, it is left for the jury, in the fair exercise of a sound discretion, in the light of all the information properly available, to ascertain and fix the probable amount of the damage sustained by the plaintiff, or by those whom he represents, 'reserving at all times the authority of the court to guard against manifest injustice by way of excessive estimates.' See Jacksonville Electric Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 451; Andrews v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 86 Iowa, 677, 53 N.W. 399; Wheelan v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 85 Iowa, 167, 52 N.W. 119; Walters v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 36 Iowa, 458; Sherman v. Western Stage Co., 24 Iowa, 515; 18 Cyc. 366. ...