Florida Ins. Guar. Ass'n, Inc. v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 30 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-648,86-648
• Citation: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 150,501 So.2d 32
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 150 FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Raymond COLEMAN and Sandra G. Coleman, Appellees, Cross-Appellants.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 32

501 So.2d 32

12 Fla. L. Weekly 150

FLORIDA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, Cross-Appellee, v. Raymond COLEMAN and Sandra G. Coleman, Appellees, Cross-Appellants.

No. 86-648.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Second District.

Dec. 30, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1987.

Raymond T. Elligett, Jr. and Charles P. Schropp of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings

& Evans, P.A., Tampa, for appellant, cross-appellee.

William N. Graham of William N. Graham, P.A., Tampa, for appellees, cross-appellants.

LEHAN, Judge.

An insurance company appeals from an order stacking uninsured motorist coverage for all vehicles on the insured's car sales lot. We reverse.

The insured, Sandra G. Coleman, who owns a used car sales lot, purchased automobile insurance from a company which later became insolvent. Her claim is now directed against the appellant, Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, Inc. (FIGA).

The insurance policy purchased by Mrs. Coleman was a garage policy. The declarations page of the policy shows the various coverages purchased. For example, the policy indicates that collision insurance was purchased for "owned autos only." In contrast, liability insurance and uninsured motorist coverage was purchased for "any auto." The policy later shows the amount of premium for each type of coverage. For uninsured motorist coverage, Item Ten of the policy states "Number of Plates--2" and "Rate Per Plate--7.00" and a premium of $14.00.

Mrs. Coleman's business had a varying number of used cars on the lot at any given time which could be operated by using up to fifty temporary paper license tags. Her business had two permanent dealer plates.

Mr. Coleman was injured in an automobile accident. The insurers of two other cars involved in the accident paid him the limits of their coverages for a combined total of $75,000. The Colemans then filed this claim against their insurer for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits.

The dispute between the Colemans and FIGA concerns how much UM coverage is available under the policy. The Colemans claim that because Mrs. Coleman, when purchasing the policy, did not make a knowing and informed rejection of higher limits, the available coverage is $100,000/$300,000 and that this coverage is applicable to every car that was titled in Mrs. Coleman's name on the day of the accident (a total of fifteen cars).

FIGA does not contest that there was no informed rejection by Mrs. Coleman but argues that the result is UM limits equal to the liability coverage purchased by Mrs. Coleman, i.e., $25,000, rather than the $20,000 UM coverage shown by the policy to have been purchased by Mrs. Coleman. FIGA further argues that the number of UM coverages available to Mrs. Coleman is the number she purchased as shown by Item Ten of the policy, i.e., two coverages.

The trial court determined the limits of UM coverage to be $25,000. The court then determined that UM coverage should be stacked on the basis of the number of motor vehicles for which liability coverage was extended. The court's order states that the policy clearly provided liability insurance for any car titled in the named insured and that, accordingly, the UM coverage should be extended to each of the fifteen cars owned by the named insured for a total of $375,000.

While we agree with the trial court's determination that the limits of UM coverage are $25,000, as explained below we do not agree with the basis on which the court stacked UM coverage. Mrs. Coleman paid for two UM coverages. We conclude that the number of UM coverages available to be stacked should be based upon the number of cars for which UM premiums were paid. See Tucker v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 288 So.2d 238 (Fla.1973). See also Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Pohlman, 485 So.2d 418 (Fla.1986); Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Prough, 463 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Furman, 341 So.2d 1056 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Accordingly, two UM coverages should have been stacked in this case.

The Colemans argue that because the limits of UM coverage are to be the same as the limits of liability insurance in the absence of an informed rejection of higher coverage and because the policy provides that its liability insurance applies to "any auto," the UM coverage applies to every car owned by them on the day of the accident. It is true that the Colemans would have had liability insurance covering them in any car being driven; the policy did not limit liability coverage just to the driving of any car which the Colemans owned. However, we conclude that the Colemans' argument cannot be accepted because it would lead to an irrational result. See Wakulla County v. Davis, 395 So.2d 540, 543 (Fla.1981). To conclude that the UM coverage to be stacked is coextensive...