Fluker v. Semple, HHBCV185021850S

• Decision Date: 07 March 2019
• Docket Number: HHBCV185021850S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Tavorus FLUKER v. Scott SEMPLE et al.

Tavorus FLUKER v. Scott SEMPLE et al.

No. HHBCV185021850S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Britain, New Britain

March 7, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Morgan, J.

The plaintiff, Tavorus Fluker, an inmate at the Garner Correctional Institution, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Department of Correction Commissioner Scott Semple (Semple), former Department of Correction Commissioner Theresa Lantz (Lantz), and retired Warden Valerie Light (Light) of the Brooklyn Correction Center. In his revised complaint dated September 7, 2018 ^[1] the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated his state and federal constitutional due process rights and right of access to the courts when correctional officers intercepted and wrongfully hid and withheld from him and his defense counsel a letter from a fellow inmate named Helm which purportedly contained exculpatory information related to the crime for which the plaintiff is presently incarcerated. The plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.

The defendants, relying principally upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), move to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff has not previously invalidated his conviction through a habeas corpus proceeding and his claims are thus not ripe.^[2] The plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that his claims should not be dismissed because the relief he seeks does not include invalidation of his conviction.

"[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). "Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). Issues of justiciability implicate a court’s subject matter jurisdiction; Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265, 270, 77 A.3d 113 (2013); and "ripeness is a sine qua non of justiciability ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 812, 967 A.2d 1 (2009). If it becomes apparent to the court that the plaintiff’s cause of action is not ripe for adjudication, the cause of action must be dismissed. Id.

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held "that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose lawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit." (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted.) Heck v. Humphrey, supra, 512 U.S. 486-7. In so holding, the Court drew on the "strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Id., 484; as well as "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 486.

Subsequent jurisprudence clarified that Heck barred § 1983 actions premised on alleged defects in prison procedures where "the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessary to imply the invalidity of the judgment," even if the § 1983 challenge was not to the judgment itself. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). Ultimately, Heck and its progeny "taken together, indicate that a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)— no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)— if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." (Emphasis in original.) Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). See also Taylor v. Wallace, 184 Conn.App. 43, 51, 194 A.3d 343 (2018) ("We agree with the policy enunciated in Heck: if success in a tort action would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, the action is to be dismissed unless the underlying conviction has been invalidated").

In his revised complaint, the plaintiff alleges that prison officials violated his right to due process by withholding Helm’s allegedly exculpatory letter from the plaintiff and his defense counsel. These claims, if true, would constitute a violation of the prosecution’s duty to disclose all material exculpatory evidence it may have concerning a defendant. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Elsey v. Commissioner of Correction, 126 Conn.App. 144, 155, 10 A.3d 578 ("[t]he [s]tate’s duty of disclosure is imposed not only upon its prosecutor, but also on the [s]tate as a whole" [internal quotation marks omitted]), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 922, 14 A.3d 1007 (2011). Courts have unequivocally held that § 1983 claims premised on alleged Brady violations are barred by Heck, so long as the underlying conviction remains valid. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed. 233 (2011) ("[A] Brady claim, when successful post conviction, necessarily yields evidence undermining a conviction ... Accordingly, Brady claims have ranked within the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983 ..." [Internal citations omitted.]); Poventud v. New York, 750 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2014) ("[t]his court has emphatically and properly confirmed that Brady -based § 1983 claims necessarily imply the invalidity of the challenged conviction in the trial (or plea) in which the Brady violation occurred" [emphasis omitted]). Because the plaintiff has not invalidated his conviction, he cannot presently bring a § 1983 claim based on alleged Brady violations by the defendants.

The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants deprived him of his right of access to the courts by withholding Helm’s letter. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously held that claims for the denial of access to the courts premised on the withholding of exculpatory evidence "[i]n substance ... sound[ ] under [Brady ] ... and therefore [do] indeed call into question the validity of [a plaintiff’s] conviction." Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1999) See also Johnson...