Taylor v. Wallace
| Citation | 194 A.3d 343,184 Conn.App. 43 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | AC 40362 |
| Court | Appellate Court of Connecticut |
| Parties | David TAYLOR v. Anthony WALLACE |
184 Conn.App. 43
194 A.3d 343
David TAYLOR
v.
Anthony WALLACE
AC 40362
Appellate Court of Connecticut.
Argued April 19, 2018
Officially released August 7, 2018
David P. Taylor, self-represented, Edwardsburg, MI, the appellant (plaintiff).
Stephen R. Finucane, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Jane R. Rosenberg, solicitor general, and Terrence M. O'Neill, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
Alvord, Keller and Beach, Js.
BEACH, J.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his one count complaint sounding in legal malpractice against the defendant, Anthony Wallace. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in (1) dismissing the complaint; (2) concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert his claim of fraud; and (3) denying the plaintiff's motion for reargument. The defendant claims that the action was not ripe because the underlying conviction had not been vacated. We affirm the judgment.
The following facts and procedural history are pertinent to our decision. In a previous criminal case, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to murder under the Alford doctrine1 on September 12, 2001, and was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.2 In the following years, he has brought at least twelve petitions seeking posttrial relief and has included as grounds
for the relief claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.3 The defendant was appointed to represent the plaintiff in one of the habeas
proceedings; the representation occurred between February 16, 2011, and January 28, 2014.
In his present complaint alleging legal malpractice, dated April 18, 2016, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant provided deficient representation and used the plaintiff's name and circumstance to commit fraud against the state. On June 8, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the plaintiff's claims were barred by statutory immunity. At oral argument on the motion, the defendant claimed additionally that the plaintiff lacked standing to claim that the defendant had defrauded the state. After oral argument, the court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity as to the plaintiff's legal malpractice claim. The court also addressed the plaintiff's claim that the defendant committed fraud against the state, and concluded that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue that claim. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
We begin with generally applicable legal principles. "[In reviewing] the trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, we take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.... [A] motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded and invokes any record that accompanies the motion, including supporting affidavits that contain undisputed facts." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) May v. Coffey , 291 Conn. 106, 108, 967 A.2d 495 (2009).
"A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally
and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record....
"Subject matter jurisdiction [implicates] the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it.... [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction .... The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time ... [a]nd the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.... The requirement of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by any party and can be raised at any stage in the proceedings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London , 265 Conn. 423, 429–30, 829 A.2d 801 (2003).
I
The plaintiff's first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165. Specifically, he claims that the defendant is not entitled to immunity because "some of the defendant's actions were not only egregious, wanton and reckless, but were also performed outside the scope of his employment." The defendant maintains that the court properly decided the immunity issue
in favor of the defendant but also counters, for the first time on appeal, that the plaintiff's claim is not ripe for judicial review because the allegations in his complaint, if true, undermine or imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's criminal conviction, which has never been invalidated. We agree with the defendant that the controversy is not ripe, and do not reach the issue of immunity.
"[J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines ... [including ripeness].... A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.... [B]ecause an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review [of the ripeness of a claim] is plenary.... [T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements .... Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction , 310 Conn. 265, 270–71, 77 A.3d 113 (2013).
"In general, the plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action must establish: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney's wrongful act or omission; (3) causation; and (4) damages.... [T]he plaintiff typically proves that the defendant attorney's professional negligence caused injury to the plaintiff by presenting evidence of what would have happened in the underlying action had the defendant not been negligent." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lee v. Harlow, Adams & Friedman, P.C. , 116 Conn. App. 289, 297, 975 A.2d 715 (2009).
An issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even at the appellate level. See Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London , supra, 265 Conn. at 430, 829 A.2d 801. In this instance, the defendant raised the issue of jurisdiction in his brief to this court. The plaintiff did not file a reply brief. At oral argument, he forth-rightly conceded several times that he could not meet the standard set forth in Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1994).
In the present case, the plaintiff remains incarcerated as a result of his conviction of murder in 2001. He has
filed multiple habeas petitions; the defendant represented him in a consolidated habeas action between 2011 and 2014. Despite multiple attempts, the plaintiff has not invalidated his conviction, and, at the time of argument before this court, at least one habeas action alleging that the defendant provided ineffective assistance as habeas counsel was pending. See Taylor v. Warden , Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV-14-4006607-S.
In his brief, the defendant asserts that the case should be dismissed for lack of ripeness. Relying to a degree on Heck v. Humphrey , supra, 512 U.S. at 486–87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, the defendant suggests that this case is not ripe for adjudication because (1) a habeas corpus action is pending, and sound policy considerations militate against the possibility of inconsistent resolutions arising out of the same transaction; (2) the injury resulting from alleged professional negligence in this instance is incarceration,4 and, as the plaintiff remains
validly incarcerated in any event, any consideration of damages would invoke a hypothetical inquiry; and (3) the holding of Heck v. Humphrey , supra, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, should...
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...adopted at the appellate level in Connecticut, this court is of the opinion that it was adopted in the case of Taylor v. Wallace , 184 Conn. App. 43, 52, 194 A.3d 343 (2018), and, as a result, the motion to dismiss is granted." This appeal followed.On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the c......
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