Hutchinson v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

• Citation: 883 F. Supp. 379
• Decision Date: 26 April 1995
• Docket Number: No. C 93-4018.,C 93-4018.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Cheryl HUTCHINSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., A corporation, Defendant.

883 F. Supp. 379

Cheryl HUTCHINSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., A corporation, Defendant.

No. C 93-4018.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

April 26, 1995.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Dennis McElwain of Smith, McElwain & Wengert, Sioux City, IA, for plaintiff Cheryl Hutchinson.

Kenneth Butters of Dreher, Simpson & Jenson, P.C., Des Moines, IA, for UPS.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BENNETT, District Judge.

                                        TABLE OF CONTENTS
                I.   INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND .................................    382
                II.  STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .........................................    383
                III. FINDINGS OF FACT .......................................................    385
                     A. Undisputed Facts ....................................................    385
                     B. Disputed Facts ......................................................    386
                IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS ..........................................................    387
                    A. Disability Discrimination Under Federal Law ..........................    387
                       1. The Origins Of The ADA ............................................    387
                       2. Disability Discrimination Under The ADA ...........................    390
                          a.  Analytical framework for ADA claims                                393
                          b.  The prima facie case under the ADA                                 393
                       3. Hutchinson's Qualification For ADA Protection .....................    395
                    B. Per Se Violations Of The ADA .........................................    396
                       1.  What constitutes a per se violation of the ADA? ..................    396
                       2.  May Hutchinson assert a per se violation? ........................    397
                    C. Disability Discrimination Under Iowa Law .............................    399
                       1.  Protected disability .............................................    400
                       2.  Qualified for the position .......................................    401
                       3.  Remaining elements of the prima facie case .......................    402
                V.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................    402
                

Who may benefit from the protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., appears to this court to be the most frequently encountered question in the comparatively short life of the ADA. In this lawsuit, the plaintiff employee asserts that she is sufficiently disabled to pursue claims under the ADA as the result of a single restriction on her activities, or on the basis of the cumulative effect of several restrictions, while her employer asserts that the plaintiff currently has no impairment or combination of impairments precluding her from a broad range of employment opportunities, and thus is not sufficiently disabled to come within the ADA's protective umbrella.

In addition to consideration of the now-typical threshold question, "Is the plaintiff disabled enough to seek relief under the ADA?", this case presents the comparatively rare question, "Can the plaintiff challenge certain of the employer's policies and practices alleged to be per se violations of the ADA?" A related matter for the court to resolve is whether the answer for the plaintiff to the first question must be "yes" before the plaintiff even gets to ask the second question.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cheryl Hutchinson filed her complaint in this matter on February 10, 1993, against her employer, defendant United Parcel Service (UPS), alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Iowa Code § 216.6. Hutchinson was a package delivery car driver for UPS, and has never been terminated from that position. Hutchinson alleges that she suffered injuries on or about November 29, 1990, again on or about November 29, 1990, and a third time on or about June 3, 1991, as the result of which she was placed under certain restrictions by treating physicians. However, she alleges that since about August 10, 1992, she has offered her continued services to UPS, but UPS has refused to return her to active employment.

UPS answered Hutchinson's complaint on March 8, 1993, asserting as an affirmative defense that all of its actions with respect to Hutchinson's return to work were based on bona fide occupational requirements and business necessity. By consent of the parties, UPS amended its answer on February 7, 1994, but the answer was merely to conform to facts. UPS moved for summary judgment on January 3, 1995, and Hutchinson resisted the motion on February 21, 1995. UPS then filed a reply to Hutchinson's resistance on March 1, 1995.

UPS has moved for summary judgment on the ground that Hutchinson does not have a disability within the meaning of either the ADA or Iowa Code § 216.6. Specifically, UPS argues that Hutchinson has no impairment or combination of impairments that causes her to be substantially limited in any major life activity, or in the specific major life activity of "working." UPS also asserts that Hutchinson has received a medical release to return to work, but she has refused to do so, even though she has been offered reinstatement to her former position.

Hutchinson asserts that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment in this case. Hutchinson asserts that she is disabled within the meaning of both the ADA and Iowa Code § 216.6, and furthermore, that she has been prevented from returning to work by a UPS policy which requires her to be "100% healed" prior to a return to work. She asserts that such a policy is a per se violation of the ADA. Hutchinson also asserts that another UPS policy is a per se violation of the ADA, because it provides for accommodation of employees with "work-related" restrictions, but requires that employees with "non-work-related" restrictions be "100% healed" before they can return to the workforce. Thus, Hutchinson asserts that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether UPS has reasonably accommodated her disabilities.

The court held oral arguments on UPS's motion for summary judgment on April 20, 1995. Hutchinson was personally present at the oral arguments, and was represented by counsel Dennis McElwain of Smith, McElwain & Wengert in Sioux City, Iowa. UPS was represented at the oral arguments by counsel Kenneth Butters of Dreher, Simpson & Jenson, P.C., in Des Moines, Iowa. The oral arguments were animated, effective, informative, and of considerable assistance to the court in its deposition of this motion. In ruling on this motion, the court will first examine the standards for disposition of a motion for summary judgment, then turn to the merits of UPS's motion.

II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes "that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries." Wabun-Inini v. Sessions, 900 F.2d 1234, 1238 (8th Cir.1990). On the other hand, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have authorized for nearly 60 years "motions for summary judgment upon proper showings of the lack of a genuine, triable issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, "summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)); Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir.1992).

The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:

Rule 56. Summary Judgment

(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.

(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon.... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) & (c) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir.1994); Roth v. U.S.S. Great Lakes Fleet, Inc., 25 F.3d 707, 708 (8th Cir.1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1331 (8th Cir.1993); Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 (8th Cir.1990); Wabun-Inini, 900 F.2d at 1238 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).¹ A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, here Hutchinson, and give Hutchinson the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962)); Munz v. Michael, 28 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1994); Allison v. Flexway Trucking, Inc., 28 F.3d 64, 66 (8th Cir.1994); Johnson v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 994 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir.1993); Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 492 (8th Cir.1991); Coday v. City of Springfield, 939 F.2d 666, 667 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 416 (1992).

Procedurally, the moving party, here UPS, bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its...