Ford Motor Co. v. Broadway

• Decision Date: 14 February 1979
• Docket Number: No. 50783,50783
• Citation: 374 So.2d 207
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. William Maston BROADWAY.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 207

374 So.2d 207

FORD MOTOR COMPANY v. William Maston BROADWAY.

No. 50783.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Feb. 14, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1979. ^*

Watkins & Eager, John L. Low, IV, Hassell H. Whitworth, Jackson, for appellant.

Farese, Farese & Farese, John Booth Farese, Ashland, for appellee.

Before ROBERTSON, WALKER and BROOM, JJ.

ROBERTSON, Presiding Justice for the Court:

This is a strict products liability suit. William Maston Broadway filed suit in the Circuit Court of DeSoto County against Ford Motor Company and C. F. Seago, doing business as Seago Tractor Company, for damages sustained by him when hit by a 1958 model Ford tractor with a hay-baling machine attached. His left collarbone and right thigh bone were fractured.

After plaintiff had rested, both Ford Motor Company and Seago moved for directed verdicts. The motion of Seago was sustained; the motion of Ford Motor Company was overruled. After a full trial, Ford moved for a peremptory instruction, which motion was overruled. The jury returned a verdict for $200,000 for the plaintiff, a 61-year old dairy farmer.

On June 11, 1959, plaintiff's brother, Jordon Broadway, purchased a new 1958 model Ford tractor from Seago Tractor Company, the local Ford dealer in Coldwater, Mississippi. The tractor was used by Jordon Broadway and his two brothers, Maston and Turner Broadway, in their general farming and dairy farming operations without incident until September 27, 1969.

On that day, Maston and Turner Broadway were baling hay, using the 1958 model tractor to pull a hay-baling machine. The hay-baler was not functioning properly so Maston stopped the tractor and he and Turner worked on the hay-baler. In order to test the hay-baler, Maston stood on the ground on the right side of the tractor between the front and rear wheels and reached across the tractor to start it. The tractor started and moved forward; the wheel of the tractor ran over his right leg and the hay-baler struck his left shoulder. Maston testified that he thought he had the gear shift lever in "Park" which was the only position in which the tractor would start, it having an added safety switch mechanism which would keep it from starting if it were in gear. Later the plaintiff stated that the tractor must have been in gear, because two or three witnesses testified that after the accident the tractor would start in gear.

The plaintiff was injured on September 27, 1969, 10 years, 3 months, and 16 days after the initial sale of the tractor on June 11, 1959, to plaintiff's brother, Jordon Broadway.

On May 29, 1974, 4 years, 8 months and 2 days after the accident, Maston Broadway brought suit against Ford, the manufacturer of the tractor, and Seago, the local distributor, alleging as his principal ground the failure of the safety switch mechanism to work, thereby allowing the tractor to start while in gear. Suit was thus filed 14 years, 11 months and 18 days after the sale of the tractor by Seago to Jordon Broadway.

Ford's first assignment of error was that:

The Trial Judge erred in overruling Ford's demurrer and affirmative defense to the effect that the cause of action upon which suit was brought was barred by the expiration of the six-year limitation period applicable under § 15-1-49, Miss.Code Ann. (1972).

That Section reads:

"All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after."

This catch-all statute has been brought forward unchanged since 1880. The doctrine of strict products liability in tort was not accepted by this Court until July 8, 1966, when we decided State Stove Manufacturing Company, et al., v. Herbert H. Hodges, et ux., 189 So.2d 113. In 1880, when enacting the six-year statute of limitations, the Legislature did not contemplate nor take into consideration the fact that this Court some 86 years later would adopt the doctrine of strict products liability in tort.

We did apply the six-year statute: in Johnson v. Crisler, 156 Miss. 266, 125 So. 724 (1930), wherein we held that the cause of action accrued on the date a defective certificate of title was executed and not on the date damages were sustained; in Wilder v. St. Joseph Hospital, 225 Miss. 42, 82 So.2d 651 (1955), a medical malpractice suit where we again held that the cause of action accrued on the date of the negligence or omission and not on the date the negligence was finally discovered; and in M. T. Reed Construction Co. v. Jackson Plating Co., 222 So.2d 838 (Miss.1969), which involved only property damage when a roof and the roof decking collapsed over six years after the building had been accepted by the owner. In Reed, we also said:

"Insofar as the determination of the issues of negligence in this case is concerned, it is to be noted that we are not confronted with the issue in futuro of personal injury which has been sustained by management, employees or the public . . ." 222 So.2d at 839.

The Mississippi Legislature has now set up a special statute of limitations for medical and pharmaceutical malpractice suits. In 1976, this statute was enacted:

"(1) No claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, nurse or pharmacist for injuries arising out of the course of medical or surgical treatment unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered." (There are certain exceptions where the person injured is under disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind.) Section 15-1-36, Miss.Code Ann. (1978 Supp.).

Three of our sister states (Indiana, Georgia and Tennessee) have recently enacted special statutes of limitations to cover strict products liability in tort suits.

In 1978, Indiana enacted this statute:

"Sec. 5. Statute of Limitations. This section applies to all persons regardless of minority or legal disability. Notwithstanding IC 34-1-2-5, any product liability action must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues or within ten (10) years after the delivery of the product to the initial user or consumer; except that, if the cause of action accrues more than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years after that initial delivery, the action may be commenced at any time within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues."

Oklahoma was not quite so liberal. Oklahoma's statute of limitations in strict product liability cases provides that after July 1, 1978, any product liability action is barred if not filed within six years from the date of initial sale of the product.

The Supreme Court of Oregon enforced this statute of limitations:

"In no event shall any action for negligent injury to person or property of another be commenced more than 10 years from the date of the act or omission complained of. Or.S. 12.115(1),"

in Johnson v. Star Machinery Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974). In Johnson, plaintiff's decedent was killed in an industrial accident in 1970. The offending machine was purchased from the defendant by the decedent's employer in 1959, some eleven years prior to the date of the accident. The suit sounded in negligence and strict products liability. The Supreme Court of Oregon enforced the new limitations law as written, and held that plaintiff's action was barred because the product in question was manufactured and sold more than ten years prior to the date of the accident.

The statute of limitations in strict products liability cases should strike a balance between the necessity of providing the consumer with adequate time within which to discover a defect and institute an action, and the need to provide the manufacturer with a definite period of liability and a date on which his exposure to suit ends.

While there is some doubt that our catch-all six-year statute meets these tests, since Mississippi has no special statute of limitations in strict products liability in tort actions, we hold that the six-year statute applies and, in personal injury actions, the statute begins to run from the time that injuries are sustained. If our interpretation is not in accord with its views, it is the legislature's prerogative to change or amend the present statute or enact a new one applying specifically to strict products liability cases.

Ford's next assignment of error is:

The Trial Judge erred in overruling Ford's motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the appellee's case and in failing to grant a peremptory instruction for Ford in that there was no proof whatsoever of a defective condition in the particular tractor involved in this action, which condition was unreasonably dangerous to the user thereof.

In State Stove, supra, we said:

"(W)e conclude that the appropriate standards of responsibility are well stated in Section 402A of the American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts (Second), Which we adopt insofar as it applies to a manufacturer of a product and to a contractor who builds and sells a house with the product in it. It states:

Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer

(1) One who sells any product In a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,...