Ford Motor Co. v. D'AMARIO

• Decision Date: 31 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-02540., No. 97-02429
• Citation: 732 So.2d 1143
• Parties: FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant, v. Karen D'AMARIO, individually, and on Behalf of Clifford Harris, a minor, and Clifford Harris, individually, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

732 So.2d 1143

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant, v. Karen D'AMARIO, individually, and on Behalf of Clifford Harris, a minor, and Clifford Harris, individually, Appellees.

Nos. 97-02429, 97-02540.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 31, 1999.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1999.

Wendy F. Lumish and Jeffrey A. Cohen of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Miami, and Ronald E. Cabaniss, of Cabaniss, McDonald, Smith & Wiggins, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.

Joel D. Eaton of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefsberg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, and Florin, Roebig, Walker, Huddlestun, Rogers & Brown, P.A., Clearwater, and Wagner, Vaughan & McLaughlin, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.

WHATLEY, Acting Chief Judge.

Ford Motor Company appeals an order granting Karen D'Amario, individually, and on behalf of Clifford Harris, a minor, and Clifford Harris, individually (appellees), a new trial following a defense verdict. We reverse.

Clifford Harris was a passenger in a 1988 Ford Escort LX driven by his friend, Stanley Livernois. Livernois was driving without the adult supervision his drivers' license required. He was also speeding and intoxicated when the car collided with a tree. A witness to the crash circled the car twice and noticed a fire in the engine area. Some minutes later, the fire spread and an explosion occurred, engulfing the car in flames. Harris was severely injured, losing three limbs and suffering burns to much of his body. On the facts in this crash-worthiness case, the appellant properly raised an apportionment defense. See Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).

The appellees' theory of liability was that a relay switch failed, thus preventing it from disrupting the flow of power to the fuel pump. The appellees presented experts who testified that gasoline continued to be pumped after the impact and caused the fire. The appellant's experts countered that the relay switch and fuel pump properly worked and that the crash caused an oil pan to burst, which resulted in an oil-based fire. The appellant pointed to the slow spreading nature of the fire in support of its theory.

After the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the appellant, the appellees hired an investigator to do a background check on the jurors solely based on the adverse verdict.¹ This investigation was limited to a public records search. We would note that our courts have approved this type of post-verdict investigation without requiring a reasonable suspicion of juror misconduct. See De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla.1995). However, an investigation of this type is limited to matters that are not an invasion of a juror's private affairs. Zequeira v. De La Rosa, 627 So.2d 531, 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (Baskin, J., dissenting), overruled, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla.1995) (approving and adopting Judge Baskin's dissent). Anything beyond a public records search would appear to be invasive of a juror's private affairs and would invade the sanctity and finality essential to a jury verdict. In State, Department of Transportation v. Rejrat, 540 So.2d 911, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), this court stated: "There are strong public policies supporting the secrecy and sanctity of the jury's verdict. The jurors' right of privacy should not be lightly disregarded."

In the present case, the appellees asserted that their investigation revealed several alleged instances of juror misconduct. All allegations centered on jurors Glennedda Leslie and Christine Warwick and their alleged failure to disclose information in the juror questionnaires and during voir dire.

In De La Rosa, 659 So.2d 239, the Florida Supreme Court set forth the factors that must be considered in determining whether to grant a new trial based on the nondisclosure of a juror during voir dire:

In determining whether a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial, courts have generally utilized a three-part test. First, the complaining party must establish that the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case. Second, that the juror concealed the information during questioning. Lastly, that the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence.

659 So.2d at 241 (citations omitted).

As to Juror Leslie, the appellees contend that she failed to disclose prior litigation and that she failed to disclose her employer's use of twenty-five Ford vehicles. We conclude that the failure to disclose this information did not meet the test set forth in De La Rosa. As to the prior litigation claim, the applicable question on the juror questionnaire was, "Have you or any member of your immediate family been a party to any lawsuit?" Leslie answered, "No." Her response was truthful. Her husband had been involved in a lawsuit, but it occurred in 1986 before the Leslies were married. Requiring a potential juror to disclose matters in a juror questionnaire relating to family members before they became family would...