Garnett v. McClellan
Decision Date | 04 August 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 5D99-2558.,5D99-2558. |
Parties | Ethelene GARNETT, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Raymond McCLELLAN, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael P. Falkowski of Michael P. Falkowski, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Roberts J. Bradford, Jr., of Wyatt & Tolbert, P.A., Daytona Beach, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Ethelene Garnett appeals from an order granting a new trial to Raymond McClellan, the defendant below, in her personal injury action. The court granted the new trial because one of the jurors failed to disclose that he had been involved in an automobile accident. We agree with Garnett that the information was not material to jury service in this case. Accordingly we reverse the order granting a new trial and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict in favor of Garnett.
In June 1997, Garnett's automobile was rear-ended by McClellan's automobile. In June 1998, Garnett filed suit against McClellan for the injuries she sustained in the collision. Jury selection for the trial began on April 12, 1999.
During jury selection, the trial judge explained that the attorneys for both sides would ask questions to determine if any prospective juror's decision might be influenced by personal experience or special knowledge. The judge also briefly described the case. Plaintiff's counsel told the prospective jurors that the case involved an automobile accident and discussed accidents and injuries suffered by the prospective jurors. Defense counsel also questioned the prospective jurors about any accidents in which they had been involved.
Numerous prospective jurors, not including James Sweeney, stated that they had been in automobile accidents. Neither side had any objection to Sweeney and he was ultimately selected as one of the jurors.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Garnett for $20,426.52. McClellan filed a motion for new trial on several grounds, including possible juror misconduct. McClellan filed a motion to interview juror Sweeney, alleging that Sweeney may have been involved in an automobile accident which he failed to disclose during jury selection.
At the jury interview, Sweeney admitted that he had been involved in an accident at an intersection on July 7, 1998. According to Sweeney, there were no reports of injury and the insurance companies took care of the matter. Sweeney admitted that the other car had $10,000 to $12,000 in damages to its front hood and that its air bags deployed. Sweeney also had damage to the right rear of his automobile. Sweeney stated that his accident played no part in his decision in this case and that he did not recall any questions about accidents during jury selection.
In De La Rosa v. Zequeira, 659 So.2d 239 (Fla.1995), the Florida Supreme Court set forth a three-part test which must be considered in determining whether a juror's nondisclosure of information during voir dire warrants a new trial. The complaining party must establish that 1) the information is relevant and material to jury service in the case, 2) the juror concealed the information during questioning, and 3) the failure to disclose the information was not attributable to the complaining party's lack of diligence.
No "bright line" test for materiality has been established and materiality must be based on the facts and circumstances of each case. Leavitt v. Krogen, 752 So.2d 730 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). Nondisclosure is considered material if it is substantial and important so that if the facts were known, the defense may have been influenced to peremptorily challenge the juror from the jury. James v. State, 751 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). See also De La Rosa (plaintiff entitled to a new trial where juror failed to disclose that he was a defendant in at least six lawsuits; juror may sympathize with defendants or develop a bias against legal proceedings in general and the omitted information prevented counsel from making an informed judgment which in all likelihood would have resulted in a peremptory challenge); Bernal v. Lipp, 580 So.2d 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ( ); Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 537 So.2d 1100 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) ( ); Mobil Chemical Co. v. Hawkins, 440 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983),rev. denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla.1984) (...
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