Rooney v. Tyson

• Citation: 697 N.E.2d 571,91 N.Y.2d 685,674 N.Y.S.2d 616
• Parties: , 697 N.E.2d 571, 13 IER Cases 1825, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 5171 Kevin ROONEY, Plaintiff, v. Michael G. TYSON, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 04 June 1998
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 616

674 N.Y.S.2d 616

91 N.Y.2d 685, 697 N.E.2d 571, 13 IER

Cases 1825,

1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 5171

Kevin ROONEY, Plaintiff, v. Michael G. TYSON, Defendant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 4, 1998.

Michael J. Coyle, New York City, for plaintiff.

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, L.L.P., New York City (Lawrence I. Weinstein, Charles B. Ortner and Kevin J. Perra, of counsel), for defendant.

Proskauer Rose, L.L.P., New York City (Stephen Rackow Kaye, Gregory S. McCurdy and Brian M. Cooper, of counsel), Barney's, Inc., amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

A precise issue in this Federal case is certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. We are asked to provide an authoritative statement on the threshold question of whether an oral personal services contract between a fight trainer and a boxer to last "for as long as the boxer fights professionally" provides a definite legally cognizable duration. Conversely, the problem can be framed as whether this temporal description constitutes an employment for an indefinite period, within the strictures of New York's at-will employment doctrine.

The Federal lawsuit is for an alleged breach of an oral agreement essentially between plaintiff, Kevin Rooney, and defendant, Michael Gerard Tyson. Rooney was to receive 10% of Tyson's boxing earnings as compensation for his personal training services. The case was tried in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York; a jury rendered a $4,415,651 verdict for Rooney. The Trial Judge granted Tyson's posttrial motion for judgment as a matter of law; the verdict was set aside and the lawsuit dismissed. Rooney appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. It certified the question to this Court in order to decide its appeal in accordance with governing New York substantive law. We narrowly answer the core question as posed, that this durational clause satisfies New York's standard with sufficient definitiveness.

I.

The undisputed facts are taken from the trial evidence and the certified statement. In 1980, at 14 years of age, Tyson was placed under the supervision of Cus D'Amato, a renowned boxing figure and manager. When Tyson's mother died in 1983, D'Amato also became his legal guardian. At the beginning of the young man's boxing career, Rooney and D'Amato agreed that Rooney would train Tyson without compensation until the fighter became a professional athlete. The two further agreed that when Tyson advanced to professional ranks, Rooney would be Tyson's trainer "for as long as [Tyson] fought professionally."

Rooney trained Tyson for 28 months without compensation. In March 1985, Tyson turned professional and began enjoying meteoric success. D'Amato died that same year. James Jacobs became Tyson's manager in 1986. When rumors started in some sports media that Rooney would be replaced as Tyson's trainer, Rooney queried Jacobs. To quell the speculation, Tyson allegedly authorized Jacobs to state publicly that "Kevin Rooney will be Mike Tyson's trainer as long as Mike Tyson is a professional fighter." Jacobs sent Rooney a copy of a press release to that effect. Thereafter, Rooney continued to train Tyson and was compensated for each of Tyson's professional fights until 1988.

In 1988, apparently in connection with Rooney's alleged comments regarding Tyson's divorce and other business-related litigation, Rooney allegedly read a newspaper article stating that Tyson would no longer train with Rooney. Tyson formally terminated his boxer-trainer relationship with Rooney later that year. The Federal lawsuit, claiming breach of the 1982 oral agreement, was begun in 1989.

The jury in Federal court in Albany returned its verdict in favor of Rooney in 1996. Tyson countered after the trial that the agreement was for an indefinite duration and was terminable at will under New York law and therefore unenforceable as a matter of law, regardless of the jury's verdict. The District Trial Court agreed with Tyson's legal position and granted him the posttrial victory. The Trial Judge reasoned that "under New York law, terms such as 'permanent employment', 'until retirement' or 'long term' do not state a definite term of employment as a matter of law"(956 F.Supp. 213, 216). The court concluded that "the alleged term of the employment contract, 'for as long as Tyson boxes professionally,' does not state a term of definite duration as a matter of law" (id., at 216). It finally declared that "the nature of the proof offered at trial cannot sustain a finding that the employment relationship was anything other than one at-will" (id., at 216).

On Rooney's appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified the question to this Court (127 F.3d 295, 298) pursuant to this State's Constitution and this Court's Rules of Practice (N.Y. Const, art. VI, § 3[b][9]; 22 NYCRR 500.17). The focus and role of this Court are confined by the precise and narrow question certified under the collaborative juridical arrangement. No plenary adjudicative authority is authorized or contemplated because the matter is not a case or controversy, as such, in the State court system.

II.

In New York, "[a]bsent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party" (Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 274, 657 N.E.2d 269 [emphasis added]; see, Matter of Hanchard v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 85 N.Y.2d 638, 641, 628 N.Y.S.2d 4, 651 N.E.2d 872; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86). The at-will presumption may be triggered when an employment agreement fails to state a "definite period of employment," "fix[ ] employment of a definite duration," "establish[ ] a fixed duration" or is otherwise "indefinite" (compare, Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 186, 188, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 535 N.E.2d 1311; Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 305, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, supra; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 460, 465-466, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441; Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416).

A sensible path to declare New York law starts with these two steps: (1) if the duration is definite, the at-will doctrine is inapplicable, on the other hand, (2) if the employment term is indefinite or undefined, the rebuttable at-will presumption is operative and other factors come into the equation (see, Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 466, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441, supra; see also, Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, supra; Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 186, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 535 N.E.2d 1311, supra ).

Initial consideration of the at-will presumption, as the threshold pivot to answer the certified question, bypasses the logical prerequisite and precedential preference to search out and resolve the definiteness aspect first (see, Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919, supra; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, supra ). That is a major difference of approach between the majority and the dissent.

Our ample previous precedents have not categorically delineated what may differentiate a "definite," "indefinite," or "fixed" employment term or duration utilized in various contractual formulations. That ellipsis prompted the certification to us from our Federal court counterpart with respect to this case and appeal in its court. The guidance we advisorily tender should be dispositive of the precise law query as transmitted to us (see, 22 NYCRR 500.17[a]; Retail Software Servs. v. Lashlee, 71 N.Y.2d 788, 790, 530 N.Y.S.2d 91, 525 N.E.2d 737; Karger, Powers of the New York Court of Appeals § 65, at 393-394 [3d ed.] ). Everything else--including especially the relevant application and actual decision of the case--is, of course, within the exclusive juridical competence of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

Notably, this Court has consistently reaffirmed the threshold determination that a definite employment duration does not implicate the at-will employment presumption (see, Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410, 633 N.Y.S.2d 274, 657 N.E.2d 269, supra; Wieder v. Skala, 80 N.Y.2d 628, 633, 593 N.Y.S.2d 752, 609 N.E.2d 105; Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, 73 N.Y.2d 183, 186, 538 N.Y.S.2d 771, 535 N.E.2d 1311,supra; Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 333, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919, supra; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 300, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, supra; Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 159, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297; Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 443-444, 164 N.E. 342; Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, supra ). This is not simply a chicken-or-egg-which-comes-first puzzle; it is the sensible, analytical progression.

When an agreement is silent as to duration, however, it is presumptively at-will, absent an express or implied limitation on an employer's otherwise unfettered ability to discharge an employee (see, Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 514 N.Y.S.2d 209, 506 N.E.2d 919, supra; O'Connor v. Eastman Kodak Co., 65 N.Y.2d 724, 725, 492 N.Y.S.2d 9, 481 N.E.2d 549; Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 305, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86, supra; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 465-466, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441, supra ). Only when we discern no term of some definiteness or no express limitation does the analysis switch over to the rebuttable presumption line of cases. They embody the principle that an employment relationship is terminable upon even...