Forte Bros., Inc. v. State, Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1988
• Docket Number: Nos. 87-23-A,s. 87-23-A
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: FORTE BROTHERS, INC. v. STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. J.L. MARSHALL & SONS, INC. v. STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. , 87-338-A.

Page 1194

541 A.2d 1194

FORTE BROTHERS, INC. v. STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

J.L. MARSHALL & SONS, INC. v. STATE of Rhode Island, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION.

Nos. 87-23-A., 87-338-A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 3, 1988.

Peter L. Kennedy, Providence, for J.L. Marshall & Sons, Inc.

Michael A. Kelly, Providence, for Forte Bros.

James E. O'Neil, Atty. Gen., Richard B. Woolley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Justice.

These consolidated cases come before us on appeal by the defendant from an order issued in the Superior Court compelling arbitration of contract disputes that have arisen relating to a series of bridge and highway construction contracts that had been separately entered into between the plaintiffs and the defendant subsequent to July 1, 1967, but prior to July 2, 1986. The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in his retroactive application of an amendment to G.L. 1956 (1984 Reenactment) § 37-16-2(b). We affirm. The facts of this case may be briefly stated as follows.

Forte Brothers, Inc., had entered into several contracts to construct certain bridges and highways for the Department of Transportation, and J.L. Marshall & Sons had entered into a contract with the Department of Transportation to construct a bridge. A dispute had arisen between both plaintiffs and defendant concerning the amount due on the contracts. During the pendancy of this dispute, on July 2, 1986, the General Assembly by virtue of P.L. 1986, ch. 479, amended § 37-16-2(b) to read as follows:

"(b) Every contract for the construction, alteration, repair or painting or demolition of any public building, sewer, water treatment disposal project, highway or bridge one (1) party to which is the state, a city, a town, or an authority, a board, a public corporation or any similar body created by statute or ordinance or any committee, agency or subdivision of any of them which has a contract price of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or more and which is executed on or after July 1, 1967, shall contain a provision for arbitration of disputes and claims arising out of, or concerning the performance or interpretation of, the contract as follows: * * *." (Emphasis supplied in respect to words added by amendment.)

In short the sole purpose of the 1986 amendment was to expand the arbitration statute to provide arbitration in respect to contracts for the construction, alteration, repair, or painting or demolition of any highway or bridge in addition to contracts previously covered. It is highly significant that the amended statute provided (as before) for arbitration in regard to every contract "executed on or after July 1, 1967."

The defendant argues vigorously that under usual canons of construction, retroactive application of a statute is to be avoided absent a clear expression of intent by the General Assembly. However, the converse is also true--that an amendment to a statute may be applied retroactively if the intention of the Legislature to do so is clearly expressed either by the language of the statute or by a necessary implication. Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864, 869 (R.I. 1987); Dulgarian v. City of Providence, 507 A.2d 448, 453 (R.I. 1986); Spagnoulo v. Bisceglio, 473 A.2d 285, 287 (R.I. 1984).

In the case at bar, the amendment approved July 2, 1986, did no more than add another type of contract to those already included within the arbitration statute. It did not change the effective date of contracts to which arbitration would apply, namely, July 1, 1967. It thus appears clear beyond doubt that the General Assembly intended retroactive application of its arbitration requirement to any highway or bridge contract that had a price of $10,000 or more and which was executed on or after July 1, 1967. As we have frequently stated, when the words of a statute are clear, no canons of statutory construction are necessary to its interpretation. E.g., Lawrence v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 523 A.2d 864 (R.I. 1987); Quigley v. Town of Glocester, 520 A.2d 975 (R.I. 1987). We believe that the statutory mandate is clear.

The defendant also argues that this statute is substantive in that it deprives the department of its right to a judicial trial as opposed to a determination by an arbitrator. We are of the opinion that the provision for arbitration is procedural rather than substantive. However, this conclusion would not be dispositive in regard to the case at bar since "clear enunciation of a legislative choice overrides any constructional preference for prospective or retrospective application that might otherwise obtain." Raymond v. Jenard, 120 R.I. 634, 637, 390 A.2d 358, 359 (1978). The defendant also seems to argue that retroactive application of a provision for arbitration in these circumstances might give rise to constitutional difficulties. Any such suggestion is clearly without merit. The Rhode Island Constitution reposes all legislative power in the General Assembly by virtue of article 6, section 2. In addition, article 6, section 10, provides: "The general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution." The Rhode Island General Assembly has therefore been clothed with all legislative powers unless specifically forbidden by the constitution. See, e.g., Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936);...