Foss v. Department of Corrections

• Citation: 82 Wn.App. 355,918 P.2d 521
• Decision Date: 17 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 18747-7-II,18747-7-II
• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Parties: , 110 Ed. Law Rep. 855 Ronald C. FOSS; Richard E. Streeter; Wilfred O. Parsinen; and Daren Vom Steeg, Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS of the State of Washington, Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

Page 355

82 Wn.App. 355

918 P.2d 521, 110 Ed. Law Rep. 855

Ronald C. FOSS; Richard E. Streeter; Wilfred O. Parsinen and Daren Vom Steeg, Respondents/Cross-Appellants, v. The DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS of the State of Washington Appellant/Cross-Respondent.

No. 18747-7-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington Division 2.

May 17, 1996.

Publication Ordered June 28, 1996.

Martin E. Wyckoff, Assistant Atty. Gen., Corrections Div., Olympia, for Appellant.

Eric R. Hansen, Federal Way, for Respondents.

BRIDGEWATER, Judge.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) appeals a Clallam County Superior Court order granting summary judgment for four teachers denied access to the Clallam Bay Corrections Center. The teachers cross-appeal, contending the superior court erred because it failed to properly consider First Amendment principles when granting them summary judgment. Because the teachers have no cognizable claim against the DOC, we reverse and dismiss with prejudice all of the teachers' claims.

The DOC contracted with Peninsula College wherein the college provided the Clallam Bay Corrections Center with teachers. Under the DOC/College contract, the prison superintendent could pre-review teaching candidates for the upcoming year. Under the College/Faculty Association contract, denial of access to the prison was sufficient cause for discharge. Four non-tenured teachers who taught at the correctional facility were denied access to the prison by the prison's superintendent because the teachers contested the college's legal right to change "job descriptions and conditions" in their renewal contracts. The college notified the teachers that, because their access to the prison was denied, their contracts would not be renewed. The teachers filed a petition for review in superior court seeking to regain access to the prison, naming the DOC as a party, not the college, and alleging the DOC acted unconstitutionally, outside its authority, and arbitrarily and capriciously. The superior court, determining that the DOC had violated contractual and constitutional rights, granted summary judgment for the teachers.

Courts traditionally respond to the unique problems of penal environments by invoking a policy of judicial restraint. This policy is designed to give prison administrators wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

There are three potential avenues of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency. First, a specific statute may authorize appeal.... Second, any party may obtain review by a statutory writ of certiorari if the agency is "exercising judicial functions." RCW 7.16.040. Finally, the courts have inherent constitutional power to review "illegal or manifestly arbitrary and capricious action violative of fundamental rights". State ex rel. DuPont-Fort Lewis Sch. Dist. 7 v. Bruno, 62 Wash.2d 790, 794, 384 P.2d 608 (1963).

Pierce County Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wash.2d 690, 693, 658 P.2d 648 (1983).

The DOC contends the superior court had no subject matter jurisdiction to consider the teachers' petition for review. The DOC argues that the teachers had no statutory authority for appealing the DOC's decision, and failed to plead an illegal or manifestly arbitrary and capricious action violative of fundamental rights.

A dismissal for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if " 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts, consistent with the complaint, which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.' " Haberman v. WPPSS, 109 Wash.2d 107, 120, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987) (quoting Bowman v. John Doe, 104 Wash.2d 181, 183, 704 P.2d 140 (1985) (quoting Orwick v. Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 254, 692 P.2d 793 (1984))).

Bravo v. Dolsen Companies, 125 Wash.2d 745, 750, 888 P.2d 147 (1995).

I

A

The teachers had no statutory authority under the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to appeal the DOC's decision.

The provisions of the APA do not apply to "[t]he department of corrections ... with respect to persons who are in their custody or are subject to the jurisdiction of those agencies." RCW 34.05.030(1)(c). We hold that a teacher entering a correctional facility to perform services is subject to the jurisdiction of the DOC because teachers can affect order and discipline within an institutional prison. Thus, a DOC decision denying a teacher access to a correctional facility is not subject to review under the APA.

B

Even were the decision not exempt from the provisions of the APA, the teachers in this case do not have standing under the APA to challenge the superintendent's decision. The APA provides that:

A person has standing to obtain judicial review of agency action if that person is aggrieved or adversely affected by the agency action. A person is aggrieved or adversely affected within the meaning of this section only when all three of the following conditions are present:

(1) The agency action has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice that person;

(2) That person's asserted interests are among those that the agency was required to consider when it engaged in the agency action challenged; and

(3) A judgment in favor of that person would substantially eliminate or redress the prejudice to that person caused or likely to be caused by the agency action.

RCW 34.05.530. The APA defines an agency action as

licensing, the implementation or enforcement of a statute, the adoption or application of an agency order, the imposition of sanctions, or the granting or withholding of benefits.

Agency action does not include an agency decision regarding (a) contracting or procurement of ... services, ... as well as all activities necessarily related to [that] function....

RCW 34.05.010(3) (emphasis added).

1.

It is clear from the terms of the College/Faculty Association contract that the teachers are employees of the college. The college hired the teachers. The college negotiated a contract with the faculty association. The college proposed the terms of the teachers' renewal contracts. The college terminated the teachers' employment. The superintendent's letter did not direct the college to terminate their teachers. In fact, the teachers assert only that the superintendent knew his decision "could result in the termination of their employment" and not "would result." Because the teachers did not have an employment contract with the DOC, the DOC's action concerns a contract for services, nothing more, and an appeal under the statutory provisions of the APA does not lie.

2.

In addition to the absence of an "agency action" subject to review, the teachers fail to show under subsection (2) of the APA standing provision that the DOC was required to consider the individual teachers' interests in continued access to the facility when it denied them access. Although the language in the College/Faculty Association contract indicates that the superintendent may deny a teacher access to the facility if the teacher is considered by the superintendent to be undesirable, the teachers have failed to show how that contract can bind the superintendent when he is not a party to the contract. Absent a contractual right or some other legally cognizable right to enter the prison, the teachers fail to show the superintendent was required by law to consider their interests before denying them access.

We hold that (1) because the DOC's decision was exempt by statute from review under the APA, and, in the alternative, (2) because the teachers lacked standing under the APA to challenge a decision that (a) was not an agency action and (b) involved a contract for services, the teachers were without statutory authority to petition the superior court for review of the DOC's decision.

II

Because the teachers do not have the statutory authority to seek review of the DOC's decision, we address whether any remaining avenues for appellate review were open to the teachers. The superintendent's decision was not quasi-judicial; therefore, no writ of certiorari lies. See Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 97 Wash.2d 215, 218-20, 643 P.2d 426 (1982). The only remaining basis for superior court jurisdiction, then, depends on a DOC action that was an "illegal or manifestly arbitrary and capricious action violative of fundamental rights." Bruno, 62 Wash.2d at 794, 384 P.2d 608.

Under article 4, section 6 of the Washington State Constitution superior courts possess constitutional and inherent power to review allegedly illegal or manifestly arbitrary and capricious nonjudicial administrative action violative of a "fundamental right." ...

....

the fundamental right limitation boils down to a rule which says that a complainant with standing has a fundamental right to have the agency abide by the constitution, statutes, and regulations which affect the agency's exercise of discretion.

Hough v. Personnel Bd., 28 Wash.App. 884, 887-88, 626 P.2d 1017 (1981) (quoting Wilson v. Nord, 23 Wash.App. 366, 373, 597 P.2d 914, review denied, 92 Wash.2d 1026 (1979)). The scope of the court's supervisory jurisdiction is "quite narrow." Williams, 97 Wash.2d at 221, 643 P.2d 426. "[T]he judiciary will only review the actions of an administrative agency to determine if its conclusions may be said to be, as a matter of law, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law." Williams, 97 Wash.2d at 221, 643 P.2d 426 (emphasis added) (quoting Helland v. King County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 84 Wash.2d 858, 862, 529 P.2d 1058 (1975); Reiger v. City of Seattle, 57 Wash.2d 651, 653, 359 P.2d 151 (1961)). The superior court is without inherent supervisory jurisdiction to consider the merits of a writ of petition when the petitioner fails to show the violation of a fundamental right. Williams, 97...