Foster v. Snyder

• Decision Date: 16 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. E023610.,E023610.
• Citation: 76 Cal.App.4th 264,90 Cal.Rptr.2d 207
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: David L. FOSTER, Jr., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ed SNYDER, as Acting Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

90 Cal.Rptr.2d 207

76 Cal.App.4th 264

David L. FOSTER, Jr., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ed SNYDER, as Acting Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

No. E023610.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2.

November 16, 1999.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Martin H. Milas, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sylvia M. Diaz, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Judith R. Seligman, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Appellant.

Luis Michael Bustillos, Encinitas, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

GAUT, J.

1. Introduction

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appeals the Riverside County Superior Court's judgment granting a petition for writ of administrative mandate in favor of plaintiff, David L. Foster, Jr. The judgment prohibited the DMV from suspending the driver's license of plaintiff, who was under the age of 21 with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) in excess of 0.01 percent when he drove an automobile. On appeal, the DMV first contends the trial court erroneously found the defense of duress applicable to an administrative per se¹ proceeding. Second, the DMV contends that, even if the defense applies in this non-criminal context, the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to support all the elements of duress.

In concluding that duress defense does not apply in the administrative per se proceeding conducted to review the suspension of plaintiffs driver's license, we reverse the trial court's grant of plaintiffs petition for writ of administrative mandate. In so holding, we need not address the DMV's second contention.

2. Factual and Procedural History

On October 4, 1997, Sergeant Knoteck observed plaintiff driving at excessive speeds (Veh.Code, § 22350²) and failing to stop at a limit line (Veh.Code, § 22450, subd. (a)). After detaining plaintiff for these violations, Sergeant Knoteck discovered, and plaintiff admitted, he recently consumed alcohol. A preliminary alcohol screening test revealed a BAC of .132 percent on the first test and .141 percent on the second test. Following his arrest for driving under the influence (Veh.Code, § 23136, subd. (a)), plaintiff submitted to a chemical test by using a breath test machine. The chemical test revealed a BAC of .12 percent and .10 percent. Officer Penneau confiscated plaintiffs driver's license and issued an "Under Age 21 Administrative Per Se Suspension/Revocation Order and Temporary Driver License."

Plaintiff requested, and the DMV held, an administrative per se hearing on January 27, 1998. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that on October 4th, he was at Jason Palmer's house, where an unknown guest threatened him with a knife or some kind of sharp object. When plaintiff attempted to leave the house, the unknown guest followed him outside. After a couple of the others present at the house calmed the unknown guest, they went back inside the house. Later, the unknown guest attacked plaintiff again, causing plaintiff to leave the house, get into his car, and drive away.

On January 28, 1998, the DMV issued a notice of findings and decision upholding the one-year suspension of plaintiffs driver's license. In response to plaintiffs request for a review of the DMV's decision, the DMV issued a notice of decision of departmental review upholding the suspension.

On February 27, 1998, plaintiff filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus with a request for an immediate stay of the suspension. The court granted plaintiffs petition.

3. Discussion

The DMV argues the equitable defense of duress is inapplicable in an administrative per se hearing conducted to review the suspension of plaintiffs driver's license. Plaintiff, however, contends that equitable principles, including the duress defense, apply to all areas of the law. Based on our analysis below, we conclude that in the context of an administrative per se hearing, while equity may apply, defenses including duress do not.

On appellate review, the superior court's factual findings are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 545, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 10.) Pure questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. (Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1217, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 42, citing Smith v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 499, 503, 81 Cal.Rptr. 800.)

Preliminarily, we note that equitable principles are not applicable when the relevant statutory scheme is unambiguous and comprehensive. (Timberline, Inc. v. Jaisinghani (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1361, 1368, fn. 5, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 4.) Further, equity cannot accomplish indirectly that which the law or its clear policy prohibits directly. (Ibid.)

We begin our analysis by discussing the availability of equitable principles in an administrative per se hearing. Citing Lentz v. McMahon (1989) 49 Cal.3d 393, 405, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310, 777 P.2d 83, plaintiff argues that equity applies to all administrative proceedings and therefore applies in this context. In Lentz, the court held that a recipient of welfare benefits may assert the equitable estoppel defense in the context of an administrative hearing of the Department of Social Services (DSS). (Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310, 777 P.2d 83.) The court further held that the statutory scheme contemplates the application of the equitable estoppel defense. (Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310, 777 P.2d 83.) The holding in Lentz does not stand for the all-encompassing conclusion that equitable principles apply to all administrative proceedings.

In Curtin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 481, 176 Cal. Rptr. 690, the court discussed equitable principles in the context of an administrative per se proceeding conducted to review the suspension of an individual's driver's license. There, the plaintiff had his driver's license suspended for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 13353. The plaintiff sought equitable relief based on a previous incident, in which the state erroneously suspended his driver's license. Before the DMV set aside the previous suspension, it had already been in effect for five months. The superior court, while finding no error in the DMV's decision as to the current suspension, ordered equitable relief, directing the DMV to give the plaintiff five months' credit. In reviewing the superior court's ruling, the appellate court reversed based on the lower court's failure to consider the possibility that the plaintiff was also serving a concurrent six-month suspension. (Curtin, supra, at p. 486, 176 Cal.Rptr. 690.) The appellate court, however, did not find fault with the superior court's application of equitable considerations. (Id., at pp. 485-486, 176 Cal.Rptr. 690.)

The court reasoned that, "[o]ne's entitlement to a writ of mandate is largely controlled by equitable principles. [Citations.] The same equitable principles will apply to administrative mandamus, as here, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. [Citations.] ... [¶] It is undeniably true that under any reasonable concept, right and justice would be defeated by the erroneous suspension of [the plaintiffs] driver's license. And it is a basic principle of our jurisprudence, at least in the absence of some transcendent public interest, that equity `"will assert itself in those situations where right and justice would be defeated but for its intervention."' [Citations.]" (Curtin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 485, 176 Cal.Rptr. 690.)

Although the court in Curtin concluded that equitable principles applied to the DMV's administrative proceedings reviewing the suspension of the plaintiffs driver's license, it is not necessary for this court to decide whether equity always applies in such circumstances. Rather, we need only decide whether the equitable defense of duress applies based on the nature of this case and the particular facts and circumstances involved. (See Curtin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 123 Cal. App.3d at p. 485, 176 Cal.Rptr. 690; Butler v. Holman (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 22, 26, 303 P.2d 573.)

We look first to the statutory language itself. Section 13353.2 provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) The department shall immediately suspend the privilege of any person to operate a motor vehicle for any one of the following reasons:

".......

"(3) The person was under 21 years of age and had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater, as measured by a preliminary alcohol screening test, or other chemical test."

Additionally, pursuant to section 13557, subdivision (b)(2), departmental review of the initial determination under section 13353.2 also requires the DMV to sustain the order of suspension if certain facts are established.³

Based on the language of the statute, the DMV has a mandatory, rather than discretionary, duty to suspend an individual's driving privileges. Similar provisions of the administrative per se law also involve a mandatory duty. (See, e.g., Pollack v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1985) 38 Cal.3d 367, 377, 211 Cal.Rptr. 748, 696 P.2d 141 [mandatory duty to suspend license of an individual with two drunk driving convictions within five years]; Baldwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1630, 1637, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 422 [revocation of driver's license for third offense required]; Vary v. Forrest (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1506, 1513, 247 Cal.Rptr. 873 [department has duty to revoke an individual's driver's license based on his convictions].)

The DMV's mandatory duty is triggered when the requirements of section 13557, subdivision (b)(2) are satisfied. As plaintiff concedes, the requirements of that provision have been fully satisfied in this case. Two cases cited by the DMV are instructive. In McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 653, 119 Cal.Rptr. 804, the court addressed whether a driver's ignorance of his abnormal...