Frank Bartel Transp. v. State, ex rel. Murray State Coll.

• Docket Number: 121252
• Decision Date: 19 December 2023
• Parties: FRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION, Inc. Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. MURRAY STATE COLLEGE, Defendant/Respondent,
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

2023 OK 121

FRANK BARTEL TRANSPORTATION, Inc. Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. MURRAY STATE COLLEGE, Defendant/Respondent,

No. 121252

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

December 19, 2023

THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

Christopher A. Barrow, Emily B. Kosmider, Barrow & Grimm P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Petitioner.

Tracy E. Neel, Kevin L. McClure, Oklahoma Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Respondent.

KUEHN, J.

¶0 Petitioner Frank Bartel Transportation, Inc., petitioned for writ of certiorari from an order granting partial summary judgment, which presented a claim of first impression under the Governmental Tort Claims Act. We granted the petition for writ of certiorari, reverse the trial court's decision, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

¶1 On March 27, 2019, a sedan owned by Murray State College and driven by a College employee hit head-on a semi truck and trailer owned by Frank Bartel Transportation (FBT). The College employee was killed. The FBT vehicle sustained damage and caught fire and its driver was hospitalized. FBT submitted a claim under the Government Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S. Sections 151 et seq., to the State of Oklahoma Risk Management Department of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services (OMES). OMES offered to settle the case for $25,000. FBT refused.

¶2 OMES maintains that the claim is for property loss only, and thus controlled by the $25,000 statutory cap in 51 O.S. Section 154(A)(1). FBT claims that, in addition to the direct property loss of its vehicle, it sustained consequential damages of $68,636.61, for towing, vehicle storage, and vehicle rental, and thus the claim is subject to the $125,000 statutory cap in 51 O.S. Section 154(A)(2). FBT moved for partial summary judgment, asking which statutory section controlled. On March 27, 2023, the district court determined that FBT's damages were all for loss of property and subject to the Section 154(A)(1) cap of $25,000. The district court certified that order for immediate appeal, as it affected a substantial part of the merits, and immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 12 O.S. § 952 (b)(3). This Court accepted certiorari and we now reverse.

Review of a Certified Interlocutory Order

¶3 The district court's order was made as the result of a motion for partial summary judgment. Reflexive application of Supreme Court Rule 1.50 would not permit review of a certified interlocutory order on a motion for summary judgment. Rule 1.50, Rules of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Title 12, ch. 15. app. 1. However, when applying Rule 1.50 we look at the contents of a pleading, not merely its title. See Purvey v. State, 1995 OK 103, ¶ 4, 905 P.2d 770, 771 (in GTCA case, pleading titled motion for summary judgment was substantively a motion to dismiss, and thus reviewable); Roach v. Jimmy D. Enterprises, 1996 OK 26, ¶ 3, 912 P.2d 852, 853-54 (motion for summary judgment was reviewable as a substantive request to decide legal issue of statutory interpretation). It is clear from the face of the order that the court's ruling settled a question of law. The trial court neither granted nor denied the motion for partial summary judgment. Rather, it found as a matter of law that FBT's damages resulted from loss of property under Section 154(A)(1), and ordered that FBT's damages were subject to the GTCA $25,000 cap. Because this legal determination -- an issue of first impression -- would affect any further proceedings on the merits, the trial court certified the order for immediate appeal. And that is why this Court granted certiorari: to settle a pure question of law involving statutory interpretation. Our review is de novo. Ghoussoub v. Yammine, 2022 OK 64, ¶ 11, 518 P.3d 110, 113.

Analysis

Statutory Language

¶4 The GTCA was enacted to settle questions of tort liability arising from the "multi-addered medusa" of state agencies which increasingly performed both governmental and proprietary functions. Vanderpool v. State, 1983 OK 82, ¶ 9, 672 P.2d 1153, 1154-55. It contains explicit and exclusive waivers of the State's immunity from suit. Barrios v. Haskell Cnty. Pub. Facilities Auth., 2018 OK 90, ¶ 8, 432 P.3d 233, 237. The portion of Section 154at issue states:

A. The total liability of the state and its political subdivisions on claims within the scope of The Governmental Tort Claims Act, arising out of an accident or occurrence happening after October 1, 1985, Section 151 et seq. of this title, shall not exceed

1. Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) for any claim or to any claimant who has more than one claim for loss of property arising out of a single act, accident, or occurrence

2. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, One Hundred Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($125,000.00) to any claimant for a claim for any other loss arising out of a single act, accident, or occurrence.

51 O.S. § 154 (A) (1), (2). This Court has recognized that, where a claim arises from a single accident or occurrence, it may be split into a claim for property damage and a claim for "any other loss". Grisham v. City of Oklahoma City, 2017 OK 69, ¶ 9, 404 P.3d 843, 847-48. However, those terms are not defined by the GTCA, and we have not until now explained their scope.

¶5 In interpreting the GTCA we look, first, to the plain language of the statute itself. I.T.K. v. Mounds Public Schools, 2019 OK 59, ¶ 20, 451 P.3d 125, 135. As we have previously explained,

The goal of any inquiry into the meaning of a statutory enactment is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. The law-making body is presumed to have expressed its intent in a statute's language and to have intended what the text expresses. If a statute is plain and unambiguous, it will not be subjected to judicial construction, but will receive the effect its language dictates. Only where the intent cannot be ascertained from a statute's text, as when ambiguity or conflict (with other statutes) is shown to exist, may rules of statutory construction be employed.

Yocum v. Greenbriar Nursing Home, 2005 OK 27, ¶ 9, 130 P.3d 213, 219. We may not add words that are not there. OKC Zoological Trust v. State ex rel. Pub. Employees Relations Bd., 2007 OK 21, ¶ 6, 158 P.3d 461, 464. If a statute omits a word or phrase, we will presume that is what the Legislature intended. Broadway Clinic v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 2006 OK 29, ¶ 16, ...