Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone
| Decision Date | 04 September 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 95-SC-0268-D,95-SC-0478-DG,s. 95-SC-0268-D |
| Citation | 957 S.W.2d 195 |
| Parties | FRANKLIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY; Jim Boyd, in his official capacity as Franklin County Attorney; Bob Arnold, in his official capacity as Franklin County Judge-Executive; Robert Harrod, in his official capacity as former Franklin County Judge-Executive; and Jean Demerson, Carmello Benassi, Howard Dawson, Harold Robinson, Jennie Smither, and J.W. Luttrell, in their official capacity as members of the Franklin County Fiscal Court; and Robert R. Hicks, in his capacity as former member of the Franklin County Fiscal Court; and Hunter Hay, individually and in his official capacity as Franklin County Jailer, Appellants, v. Claudia F. MALONE, Successor Administratrix and personal representative of the Estate of Joseph R. Burns, Jr., Appellee. Dennis R. STOCKTON, Kentucky State Police Officer and A.B. Chandler III, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Appellants, v. Claudia MALONE, Successor Administratrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of Joseph R. Burns, Deceased and Jim Boyd, in his official capacity as Franklin County Attorney; Bob Arnold, in his official capacity as Franklin County Judge-Executive; Robert Harrod, in his official capacity as former Franklin County Judge-Executive; and Jean Demerson, Carmello Benassi, Howard Dawson, Harold Robinson, Jennie Smither, and J.W. Luttrell, in their official capacity as members of the Franklin County Fiscal Court; and Robert R. Hicks, in his capacity as former member of the Franklin County Fiscal Court; and Hunter Hay, individually and in his official capacity as Franklin County Jailer, Appellees. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
C. Thomas Hectus, R. Thaddeus Keal, Williams & Wagoner, Louisville, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.
Bryan N. Coomer, Roy H. Wyatt, Louisville, Richard M. Sullivan, Richard B. Taylor, Conliffe, Sandmann & Sullivan, Louisville, Richard B. Taylor, Conliffe, Sandmann, Gorman & Sullivan, Louisville, A.B. Chandler, III, Attorney General, Frankfort, for Appellee/Cross-Appellants.
This appeal is from a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed a summary judgment of the circuit court which dismissed all defendants in a wrongful death suit resulting from the suicide of Joseph R. Burns, Jr. following his arrest and transportation to the Franklin County Jail. The dismissal was based on the protection of sovereign immunity.
The issues presented are whether sovereign immunity bars any claim of negligence either against the county, county officials, the state, or the individual state trooper sued. Included in the resolution of such an issue must be considerations of personal liability and governmental sovereign immunity, as well as the role of insurance and self-insurance funds in connection with alleged waivers of sovereign and governmental immunity. Questions of the personal liability of the individuals involved must also be reviewed.
This case arises from the suicide of Joseph R. Burns, Jr., in the restroom of the Franklin County Jail while he was awaiting formal processing prior to being confined to that jail. Burns had been arrested and searched by Kentucky State Trooper Stockton and transported to the county jail where he killed himself with a 7 inch pocket knife which he had on his person. His estate brought a negligence action against the police officer, the state, the county and a number of county officials in their official and individual capacities.
The theory of the plaintiff's case was that Officer Stockton and jail employees knew or should have known that Burns was suicidal and that they were negligent in failing to detect and confiscate the knife and in failing to watch Burns more closely. The Commonwealth was said to be vicariously liable for Stockton's negligence and negligent itself in failing to train him properly. The county and its officials were charged with vicarious liability for the negligence of jail employees and with direct negligence for failing to provide adequate rules and training to insure the safety of an inmate.
The circuit court dismissed the entire complaint summarily on the grounds of sovereign and official immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and held that the sovereign immunity of the county had been waived to the extent of liability insurance purchased pursuant to KRS 65.150. The Court of Appeals also held that the action may proceed against the county and its officials in their official capacity but found no basis for action against the officials individually with the exception of the jailer. They also held that the sovereign immunity does not extend to the alleged personal negligence of an agent such as Trooper Stockton. This Court accepted discretionary review.
Burns was arrested in 1989 for allegedly attempting to molest his stepdaughter. Officer Stockton and two other officers responded to the call and Stockton handcuffed Burns, informed him of his rights and explained the charge against him. Burns was then placed in the back seat of the police cruiser where Stockton performed a pat-down search of Burns' body and clothing. Stockton testified that during the search he felt objects he believed to be several keys and small baubles, a ring and two billfolds. He said he did not remove the objects for inspection because he believed that he had nothing in there that was going to create a danger to himself or to Burns. Burns was taken to the jail where he was processed by Stockton to the extent that the officer completed the uniform citation form, fingerprinted and interviewed Burns. Stockton testified that he did not observe any behavior by Burns which was suicidal or emotionally disturbed in any way. Stockton directed the booking officer at the jail and the pretrial release officer to take note of the section on the citation where he had reported the possible threat of suicide. Before leaving, Stockton testified that he told the jail booking officer to "read that one line for your information." He did not see the booking officer read the form. Stockton then left the jail. Jail officials did not search Burns again and while he was waiting to be finally processed Burns went into the restroom located in the waiting area of the jail where he committed suicide by stabbing himself twice in the neck and six times in the chest and slitting his wrist. He bled to death before he was discovered one hour later.
The Court of Appeals held that the jailer could be liable for the negligent actions of his employees. In this case, we must disagree. It has long been established that there is no vicarious liability on the part of a public official for acts of subordinates in which the official was not directly involved. The Burns Estate failed to produce any evidence that any deputy jailer had reason to believe that Burns might harm himself.
The circuit judge correctly held that a jailer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that harm does not occur, only if he has reason to believe that the prisoner might harm himself. Public officials are not individually liable for the negligent actions of employees unless they ratify or participate in the tortious act. Board of Trustees of the University of Kentucky v. Hayse, Ky., 782 S.W.2d 609 (1989). Public officials are responsible only for their own misfeasance and negligence and are not responsible for the negligence of those who are employed by them. Moores v. Fayette County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 412 (1967). In order to have negligence or fault attributed to a public official, there must be proof of personal wrongdoing. Here, the jailer, Hunter Hay, left the jail at approximately 5 p.m. on the day of the suicide. Burns was not arrested until approximately 7 p.m. on that same day and the suicide was discovered nearly two hours later. Thus the jailer could not have been guilty of personal wrongdoing. A jailer cannot be charged with negligence in failing to prevent what he could not reasonably anticipate. Cf. Lamb v. Clark, 282 Ky. 167, 138 S.W.2d 350 (1940). A jailer is not an insurer of the safety of the prisoners under his control. City of Lexington v. Greenhow, Ky., 451 S.W.2d 424 (1970). There was no evidence presented of any negligence or deliberate wrongdoing on the part of the official jailer.
The mere fact that Burns was not searched while waiting in the booking area before his admission to jail is not evidence of negligence. Pursuant to the applicable administrative regulation as promulgated by the Corrections Cabinet, 501 KAR 3-120, prisoners were not searched until after formal booking or admission to jail. A suspect is not considered admitted to jail until the person has been booked or processed by a booking officer in the jail. A search of inmates upon admission to jail is conducted after they have been booked. It was the policy of the jail to rely on the search conducted by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest until the prisoner was booked and admitted into the jail.
It was error for the Court of Appeals to hold that the jailer could be liable for the actions of his deputies pursuant to KRS 71.060(1). That statute provides that a jailer shall be liable on his official bond for the conduct of his deputies. The deputy shall have all the powers and be subject to the same penalties as the jailer. The official bond referred to in the statute is not an errors or omissions liability insurance policy, but rather relates to financial responsibility only. See OAG 83-35; Rider's Extrx. v. Sherrard's Guardian, 231 Ky. 112, 21 S.W.2d 147 (1929). The official bond of the jailer relates only to his financial responsibility in connection with disbursing public money handled by the jailer and his deputies. The plain meaning of this statute cannot impute vicarious liability to the jailer for personal injuries caused by deputy jailers.
A jailer has custody, rule and charge of the jail and all persons...
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