Franklin v. Berger

• Decision Date: 28 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 6118,6118
• Citation: 544 A.2d 650,15 Conn.App. 74
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: John FRANKLIN v. Robert BERGER et al.

Page 650

544 A.2d 650

15 Conn.App. 74

John FRANKLIN v. Robert BERGER et al.

No. 6118.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 8, 1987.

Decided June 28, 1988.

Allison Rutland Soulen, Law Student Intern, with whom were Mary A. McCarthy and, on the brief, Miriam Berkman, New Haven, for appellant (petitioner).

Carl J. Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., William J. McCullough, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth A. Staugaard, Law Student Intern, for appellee (respondent).

Before DALY, NORCOTT and FOTI, JJ.

NORCOTT, Judge.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the court erred in concluding that the state had not violated the equal protection clauses of both the state and federal constitutions by declining to credit against the length of an insanity acquittee's commitment to a mental hospital the time spent in confinement prior to trial. We find error.

The facts of this case are not in dispute. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55. Bail for the petitioner was initially set at $100,000, but was later reduced to $50,000. The petitioner, however, was unable to post bond because of his indigency. The petitioner thereupon spent some 293 days in jail awaiting trial. In addition, the petitioner spent 378 days in a mental hospital prior to trial while his competency to stand trial was determined.

On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (repealed and replaced by General Statutes § 17-257a), the petitioner was sent to Norwich Hospital for psychiatric examination. On April 27, 1978, after the petitioner had been examined, the court ordered him committed to confinement in a mental institution for a maximum term of ten years. Thereafter, the state declined to credit the petitioner's pretrial confinement time against the maximum term of his commitment.

On March 24, 1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial confinement was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. ¹ The habeas court rejected this argument and found for the state on all claims.

The petitioner has since appealed to this court from the decision of the habeas court. While the petitioner's appeal was pending before this court, however, the maximum term of his commitment expired. The state has since taken steps to have the length of the petitioner's commitment extended.

Since the petitioner's maximum term of commitment has expired, we must first determine whether we have authority to hear the petitioner's claim that his pretrial jail time should have been credited against that term of commitment. " ' "It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow." Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 196 Conn. 218, 225, 492 A.2d 508 (1985); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981). "In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate in any sense of the term, the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law; Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586 [1867]; and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal. Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 459, 172 A.2d 190 [1961]." Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979),' Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, 197 Conn. 566, 571-72, 499 A.2d 1158 (1985)." Murray v. Lopes, 205 Conn. 27, 30-31, 529 A.2d 1302 (1987).

In Delevieleuse v. Manson, 184 Conn. 434, 437, 439 A.2d 1055 (1981), our Supreme Court reached the merits of a claim that an inmate was entitled to jail time credit even though the person had been released. In determining that the matter was not moot, the court noted that the issue raised was capable of repetition, yet evading review. A matter which is capable of repetition, yet evading review is reviewable on appeal if (1) the matter affects an ongoing program of the state's penal or civil system, (2) the matter could affect the petitioner in the future, and (3) the public importance of the matter makes it desirable to decide the issue. Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, 197 Conn. 566, 572-73, 499 A.2d 1158 (1985); Delevieleuse v. Manson, supra, 184 Conn. at 437, 439 A.2d 1055.

We find that the petitioner's claim is entitled to review under this standard. Because of the length of time required to file a petition for habeas corpus and then to seek relief via the appellate process, it is unlikely that an appellate court will be able to decide the issue presented in this case in time to afford the insanity acquittee practical relief. Second, the matter affects an ongoing program of the state's civil system. Third, the matter could affect the petitioner in the future if he is released and again commits a crime. Fourth, we find that this is a matter of great public importance and, therefore, should be reviewed at this time.

We begin our analysis of the substance of the petitioner's claim by noting that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." Similar protection is afforded persons in this state by article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 645, 410 A.2d 475 (1979). As this court has recognized, "[e]qual protection of the laws is a constitutional shield ... which prohibits unequal treatment by the law of those who are similarly situated. Henry v. White, 359 F.Supp. 969, 971 (D.Conn.1973); New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 218-19, 21 A.2d 383 (1941)." State v. Candito, 4 Conn.App. 154, 159, 493 A.2d 250 (1985). "[T]he equal protection clause does not reject the government's ability to classify or 'draw lines' in the creation and application of laws. Rather, it guarantees that those classifications will not be based on impermissible criteria." Al-Charles, Inc. v. Heintz, 620 F.Supp. 327, 335 (D.Conn.1985).

To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, we must consider the character of the classification, the individual interest affected by the classifications, and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L. Ed.2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an "inherently suspect" group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975). Furthermore, classifications impinging upon fundamental rights or suspect groups must be narrowly tailored to further the compelling state interest. " '[I]f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve [the state's interests] with a lesser burden or constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 ... [81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231].' Dunn v. Blumstein, [supra, 405 U.S. at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003]." Laden v. Warden, supra, 169 Conn. at 549, 363 A.2d 1063. On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis. Laden v. Warden, at 542-43, 363 A.2d 1063; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

The classification created by the state in this case does impact upon a fundamental right of those insanity acquittees who are confined prior to trial. As our Supreme Court noted in Laden v. Warden, supra, 169 Conn. at 544, 363 A.2d 1063, "[t]he refusal to credit the plaintiff with jail time affects the period of his confinement and directly impinges on his fundamental right of liberty. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068 [1072], 25 L.Ed.2d 368 [1970]; Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128, 138 (N.D.Cal. [1972]." ² Similarly, the refusal to credit the petitioner with any other time he spent in confinement prior to trial also affects the petitioner's period of confinement. Accordingly, the practice of subjecting one who is confined prior to trial to a longer period of confinement must be disavowed unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id.

The state claims that it was justified in refusing to credit the petitioner's pretrial confinement time against the maximum term of his insanity commitment because of the compelling interest the state has in the protection of society. We disagree.

At the outset, we acknowledge that the state does have a compelling interest in the protection of society. In particular, the state has a compelling interest in protecting society from those persons who have committed a crime and have been adjudged to be mentally ill and a...