Murray v. Lopes, 13048

• Decision Date: 18 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 13048,13048
• Citation: 529 A.2d 1302,205 Conn. 27
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Glenn MURRAY v. Raymond M. LOPES, Commissioner of Correction, et al.

Page 1302

529 A.2d 1302

205 Conn. 27

Glenn MURRAY v. Raymond M. LOPES, Commissioner of Correction, et al.

No. 13048.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 11, 1987.

Decided Aug. 18, 1987.

Robert Graziano, Certified Legal Intern, with whom were Miriam Berkman and, on the brief, Stephen Wizner, John L. Pottenger, Jr., New Haven, Sally Zanger, Robert A. Solomon, New Haven, and Mary A. McCarthy, Law Student Intern, for appellant (petitioner).

Carl J. Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were L.D. McCallum, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, Atty. Gen., and Robert Statchen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (respondents).

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, SHEA, CALLAHAN, SANTANIELLO and GLASS, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the calculation of the petitioner's statutory good time credit. The petitioner has appealed from the judgment of the habeas court finding that, although statutory sentence reduction credit could be earned while confined at the Whiting Forensic Institute (Whiting), such credit could not be applied to gain early release while the petitioner was in the custody of the department of mental health pursuant to General Statutes § 17-245. We find error.

The relevant facts are undisputed. On February 6, 1985, the petitioner was arrested on a charge of risk of injury to a minor, in violation of General Statutes § 53-21. He was detained prior to trial in the Bridgeport Correctional Center until June 20, 1985, at which time he pleaded guilty to a substitute information charging him with the crime of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a(a). Prior to sentencing, the trial court, Moraghan, J., pursuant to General Statutes § 17-244(a), ordered the commissioner of mental health to conduct a mental examination of the petitioner at Whiting. Thereafter, in accordance with the report from Whiting and pursuant to § 17-245(c), the trial court, finding the petitioner to be mentally ill and a danger to himself or others, sentenced him as follows: "[H]e is ordered committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a period of two years, execution of that sentence is to be suspended after he has served eighteen months. Thereafter he is placed on probation for two years. In accordance with the findings, the place of confinement since he does need the care, custody and treatment of the institute, shall be the Whiting Forensic Institute." The petitioner's confinement was calculated to begin on the date of sentencing, August 19, 1985, and his release was scheduled for February 19, 1987. This calculation did not afford the petitioner credit for presentence jail time pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98d(a), presentence jail good conduct or "good time" pursuant to General Statutes § 18-98d(b), or prison good time pursuant to General Statutes § 18-7a(c). If all the foregoing statutory sentence reduction credit had been applied to the petitioner's sentence for all the time he was confined, he would have been discharged from his confinement at Whiting on March 26, 1986.

On May 23, 1986, the petitioner, while still confined at Whiting, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he had a statutory right to sentence reduction credit, and alternatively, that the state's practice of awarding good time and jail time credit to mentally ill convicts transferred from correctional facilities to Whiting pursuant to General Statutes §§ 17-194c through 17-194g and denying such credit to those convicts initially confined at Whiting, pursuant to § 17-245, denies him equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 1 and 20, of the Connecticut constitution. On July 3, 1986, the habeas court released its memorandum of decision holding that although the petitioner could earn prison good time credit while confined at Whiting, he could not use the credit to gain early release. The habeas court concluded that the accumulated sentence reduction credit could only be deducted from the petitioner's sentence, if, and when, he was transferred back to a correctional institution. The habeas court did not address the equal protection claim. This appeal followed.

The petitioner was released from Whiting pursuant to § 17-251(b), on August 18, 1986, prior to the filing of this appeal. All parties, ¹ however, urge this court to address the issue raised in this appeal notwithstanding any mootness concerns.

" 'It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.' Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22 (1944); McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Commission, 196 Conn. 218, 225, 492 A.2d 508 (1985); Accurate Forging Corporation v. UAW Local No. 1017, 189 Conn. 24, 26, 453 A.2d 769 (1983); State Farm Life & Accident Assurance Co. v. Jackson, 188 Conn. 152, 156, 448 A.2d 832 (1982); CEUI v. CSEA, 183 Conn. 235, 246, 439 A.2d 321 (1981). 'In the absence of an actual and existing controversy for us to adjudicate in any sense of the term, the courts of this state may not be used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law; Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586 [1867]; and where the question presented is purely academic, we must refuse to entertain the appeal. Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 459, 172 A.2d 190 [1961].' Connecticut Foundry Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 177 Conn. 17, 19, 411 A.2d 1 (1979)." Shays v. Local Grievance Committee, 197 Conn. 566, 571-72, 499 A.2d 1158 (1985).

The petitioner in this case was not released from Whiting unconditionally. The sentencing court released him to a two year period of probation, which will not be completed until August 18, 1988. Had the habeas court applied the statutory sentence reduction credit that the petitioner claims he is entitled to, he would have been released from confinement no later than May 26, 1986, and accordingly, would have completed his probation no later than May 26, 1988. Therefore, since our resolution of the issue presented in this appeal will affect his period of probation, the appeal is not moot.

General Statutes § 18-7a(c) ² provides: "Any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1983, may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence as such sentence is served...." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, General Statutes § 18-98d ³ provides "(a) Any person who is confined to a community correctional center ... shall, if subsequently imprisoned, earn a reduction of his sentence equal to the number of days which he spent in such facility.... (b) In addition to any reduction allowed under subsection (a), if such person obeys the rules of the facility he may receive a good conduct reduction...." (Emphasis added.) ⁴

In construing these provisions, the habeas court agreed with the petitioner's argument that time spent at Whiting was "imprisonment" for purposes of §§ 18-7a and 18-98d, and thus statutory good time credit could be earned by an individual sentenced in accordance with a conviction and confined at Whiting for custody, care and treatment pursuant to § 17-245(c). ⁵ On appeal, the petitioner does not claim error in this finding. ⁶ Rather, the petitioner claims that the habeas court erred in concluding that his accumulated sentence reduction credit should be withheld until he was returned to a correctional facility. We agree with the petitioner.

We have consistently held that if a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction. State v. James, 197 Conn. 358, 363, 497 A.2d 402 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 222, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Moscone v. Manson, 185 Conn. 124, 128, 440 A.2d 848 (1981). Once the habeas court had determined that an individual sentenced in accordance with a conviction, and then confined at Whiting, was "imprisoned" within the meaning of General Statutes § 18-7a, it was bound to apply the law as written; Orticelli v. Powers, 197 Conn. 9, 13, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985); Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980); and direct the commissioner of correction to deduct from the petitioner's sentence the statutory reduction credit he had earned. Instead, the court went beyond the plain language of these statutory provisions to conclude that the application of such credit to the sentence of a prisoner confined at Whiting would conflict with the purpose of General Statutes § 17-251, ⁷ which, in conjunction with § 17-250, ⁸ provides for periodic examinations of patients at Whiting by the director of the institute and as ordered by the court. The habeas court, reasoning that the emphasis in § 17-251 was the person's mental condition, stated that the patient cannot be "discharged from the institute prior to the expiration of his sentence unless the court finds that his mental condition warrants such discharge. 'Good time' would not be a valid consideration in making such a decision. If a person were to be released prior to the expiration of his sentence on the basis of 'good time,' it would defeat the purpose of ... Sec. 17-245, i.e., to provide treatment."

We agree that jail time and good conduct credit provisions are not valid considerations in determining whether a patient at Whiting should be discharged from the institute, pursuant to General Statutes § 17-251, prior to the completion of his sentence. This provision, however, provides for discretionary release or transfer from Whiting based...