Franklin v. Berger

• Decision Date: 20 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13450,13450
• Citation: 560 A.2d 444,211 Conn. 591
• Parties: John FRANKLIN v. Robert BERGER et al.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 444

560 A.2d 444

211 Conn. 591

John FRANKLIN v. Robert BERGER et al.

No. 13450.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 12, 1989.

Decided June 20, 1989.

Carl J. Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were William J. McCullough, Asst. Atty. Gen., and, on the brief, Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., for appellant (respondent).

Allison Rutland Soulen, Certified Legal Intern, with whom were Miriam Berkman and, on the brief, Mary McCarthy, Stephen Wizner, J.L. Pottenger, Jr., Robert A. Solomon, New Haven, and Shelley Geballe, Stony Creek, for appellee (petitioner).

Steven M. Sellers, Asst. State's Atty., filed a brief for the Chief State's Atty., as amicus curiae.

Before ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

Certification was granted in this case limited to the question: "Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee's commitment to a mental hospital?" Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). The Appellate Court answered this question in the affirmative. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn.App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988). We disagree.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and have been set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court; id.; but can be briefly summarized as follows. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55. ¹ Although his bail, initially set at $100,000, was later reduced to $50,000, the petitioner was unable to post a bond and was confined in jail for 293 days prior to trial. In addition, he spent 378 days in a mental hospital while his competency to stand trial was determined. Id.

On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (repealed and replaced by General Statutes § 17-257a), ² the petitioner was sent to Norwich State Hospital for a psychiatric examination. On April 27, 1978, the trial court found the petitioner to be a danger to himself or others and ordered him committed to a mental institution for a term of ten years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47(b). See General Statutes § 17-257c(e)(1)(A). Thereafter, the state declined to credit the petitioner's pretrial jail time against the maximum term of his commitment set by the court.

On March 24, 1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial jail time was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. ³ The habeas court denied his petition finding no equal protection violation. On appeal, ⁴ the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the habeas court and held that the state's practice of denying jail time credits to insanity acquittees violated the petitioner's equal protection rights. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn.App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988).

At this point we note that "the concept of equal protection [under both the state and federal constitutions ⁵ has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985), Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 578, 512 A.2d 893 (1986). The "equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, at 577-78, 512 A.2d 893. Rather, a state may make classifications when enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on some reasonable ground. Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 18 S.Ct. 594, 42 L.Ed. 1037 (1898); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra; State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531, 473 A.2d 775 (1984). To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider "the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S.Ct. 995, 999, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an "inherently suspect" group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id., at 342, 92 S.Ct. at 1003; Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 345, 472 A.2d 328 (1984); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A.2d 1063 (1975). On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group "it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis." Laden v. Warden, supra, at 543, 363 A.2d 1063; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S.Ct. 1055, 1059-60, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161-62, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).

To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently. The petitioner in the instant case argues that by refusing to credit the time he spent in jail prior to his trial against the fixed maximum term of his commitment, the state is treating wealthy and poor insanity acquittees differently. Based on the premise that all acquittees are discharged at the expiration of the fixed maximum term of confinement set by the court at the commencement of commitment to a mental hospital under § 17-257c(e)(1)(A), the petitioner maintains that indigent acquittees who are held prior to trial because they are not able to afford bail will be confined for the full duration of the fixed maximum term in addition to the time they spend confined in jail prior to their trial, whereas those acquittees who are able to avoid confinement prior to their trial because they can afford bail will be confined only for the duration of the fixed maximum term set by the court. According to the petitioner, this alleged classification based on wealth that affects his fundamental liberty interest cannot be justified by a compelling state interest and, therefore, violates his guarantees of equal protection of the laws. A review of the statutory framework reveals, however, that the petitioner's reliance on the fixed maximum term as a measuring point for calculating an insanity acquittee's date of discharge from confinement is misplaced. When § 17-257a et seq. is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the discharge date of insanity acquittees cannot be calculated in days, but rather, is indeterminate, and dependent on the acquittee's ability to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others. ⁶ This being so, the state's denial of jail time credits to indigent acquittees such as the petitioner does not result in disparate treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees and, therefore, the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have not been violated.

General Statutes §§ 17-257a through 17-257w govern the treatment of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13. ⁷ Under § 17-257c(a), a person acquitted under § 53a-13 is automatically, upon a verdict, committed by the court to the custody of the commissioner of mental health for initial confinement and examination. After a psychiatric examination in a state hospital; General Statutes § 17-257c(b); ⁸ the court is required to hold a hearing in order to "make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee." General Statutes § 17-257c(e). On the basis of its findings and, "considering that its primary concern is the protection of society," the court, under § 17-257c(e), has two options. "If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and confined in a hospital for mental illness for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board [to review the status of the acquittee]." General Statutes § 17-257c(e)(1). If confined, "the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense." General Statutes § 17-257c(e)(1)(A). At this initial hearing, the court may also determine that based on its findings "the acquittee is a person who should be discharged" and, if so, order the acquittee's discharge. General Statutes § 17-257c(e)(2). The acquittee has the "burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a person who should be discharged." General Statutes § 17-257c(f).

If the acquittee is confined, he is under the sole jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board). General Statutes § 17-257c(h). Although the statute states that the acquittee "shall be immediately discharged at the expiration of the maximum term of commitment"; General Statutes § 17-257c(h); he may be confined for either more or less time than that originally set by the court under § 17-257c(e)(1)(A), depending on his dangerousness to himself or others. The acquittee will be discharged before the end of the term set by the court if, after periodic status review hearings ⁹ that are statutorily mandated during...