Franklin v. State

• Decision Date: 08 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. SC14-1442,SC14-1442
• Citation: 258 So.3d 1239
• Parties: Arthur O'Derrell FRANKLIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

258 So.3d 1239

Arthur O'Derrell FRANKLIN, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC14-1442

Supreme Court of Florida.

November 8, 2018

Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent

PER CURIAM.

At the age of 17, Arthur O'Derrell Franklin committed a series of brutal crimes against women. In each case, the female victim testified that Franklin violently attacked her, kidnapped her, drove her to a secluded area and brutally battered, raped, and robbed her while evidencing an extraordinary cruelty and a perverse enjoyment of the suffering he was inflicting. In one case, "the physician who performed the sexual assault battery exam testified that the victim suffered the worst injuries the physician had ever observed." Franklin v. State , 141 So.3d 210, 215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Thomas, J., concurring). In each of three cases, Franklin was convicted of armed kidnapping, kidnapping, armed sexual battery, sexual battery, armed robbery, robbery, and aggravated assault, and was sentenced to three 1000-year concurrent sentences with parole. Id. at 213 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Parole Commission conducted Franklin's initial parole review and ten subsequent review hearings, and has calculated a presumptive parole release date of 2352. Following the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Franklin filed a motion to vacate his sentences pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, arguing that his sentences violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as delineated in Graham and requesting resentencing. However, the trial court denied the motion, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed on appeal. Franklin , 141 So.3d at 211. We accepted discretionary review,¹ and for the reasons explained below we now approve the First District's decision and hold that Franklin's sentences with the possibility of parole do not violate Graham , meaning that Franklin is not entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014-220, Laws of Florida.

In Graham , 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment categorically forbids a sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and required that any life sentence for a juvenile nonhomicide offender be accompanied by "some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" before the end of the sentence and during the offender's natural life. Notably, the Court did not require that the State actually release a juvenile offender during his natural life or guarantee his eventual freedom, as "those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be irredeemable" and "will remain behind bars for life." Id.

Later in Miller , 567 U.S. at 479, 132 S.Ct. 2455, the United States Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Graham and created another Eighth Amendment rule prohibiting the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. Miller did "not foreclose a sentencer's ability to [impose a life without parole sentence] in homicide cases," but required the sentencer to first "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at 480, 132 S.Ct. 2455.

Applying principles discussed in Graham and Miller , a majority of this court held in Atwell v. State , 197 So.3d 1040, 1048-50 (Fla. 2016), that a juvenile homicide offender's life with parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based largely upon a presumptive parole release date set far beyond Atwell's life expectancy. The decision below, finding no Eighth Amendment violation, despite a presumptive parole release date set far beyond Franklin's life expectancy, clearly conflicts with Atwell .²

However, instructed by a more recent United States Supreme Court decision, Virginia v. LeBlanc , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 198 L.Ed.2d 186 (2017), we have since determined that the majority's analysis in Atwell improperly applied Graham and Miller . See State v. Michel , 257 So.3d 3, 6, 2018 WL 3613383 (Fla. July 12, 2018) (explaining that LeBlanc made clear that it was not an unreasonable application of Graham "to conclude that, because the [state's] geriatric release program employed normal parole factors, it satisfied Graham 's requirement that juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide crime have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole")(quoting LeBlanc , 137 S.Ct. at 1729 ) ). As we held in Michel , involving a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years, Florida's statutory parole process fulfills Graham 's requirement that juveniles be given a "meaningful opportunity" to be considered for release during their natural life based upon "normal parole factors," LeBlanc , 137 S.Ct. at 1729, as it includes initial and subsequent parole reviews based upon individualized considerations before the Florida Parole Commission that are subject to judicial review, Michel , 257 So.3d at 6 (citing §§ 947.16-.174, Fla. Stat.).

As in Michel , because Franklin's sentences include eligibility for parole there is no violation of the categorical rule announced in Graham . Michel , 43 Fla. L. Weekly at S299-300, 257 So.3d at ––––.

CONCLUSION

We approve the First District's decision in Franklin and hold that Franklin's 1000-year sentences with parole eligibility do not violate the categorical rule of Graham .

It is so ordered.

CANADY, C.J., and LEWIS, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE and LABARGA, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., dissenting.

Arthur Franklin committed nonhomicide crimes at age 17 and received concurrent sentences of 1000 years. Now 51, he has spent his entire adult life in prison. Franklin has appeared before the Parole Commission 11 different times between 1987 and 2014. Yet, there is no indication that the Parole Commission has made the constitutionally required considerations regarding whether Franklin is entitled to release based on maturity and rehabilitation.

Most recently, when the trial court held a hearing to consider Franklin's motion for relief from his 1000-year sentences, Franklin was without counsel and no evidentiary hearing was held. At the very least, this case should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, where Franklin is represented by counsel, to determine whether the parole process, as applied to his case, provides Franklin the constitutionally required individualized consideration and a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 734-36, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016).

As the record stands, the earliest Franklin could be released from prison based on existing parole guidelines is 2352—369 years after his crimes. At his first parole review in 1987, the Parole Commission assessed 4400 months for the aggravating factors of his multiple offenses, giving Franklin a presumptive parole release date (PPRD) of 2350. The PPRD varied only a few years in his ten subsequent parole reviews. There is no indication that Franklin has even a chance of being released before the end of his natural life expectancy. Thus, Franklin has no "hope for some years of life outside prison walls." Id. at 737.

Perhaps even more salient than the defendant in Atwell³ or the defendant in Michel ,⁴ the operation of Florida's parole system in this case leaves Franklin with a sentence that is "guaranteed to be just as lengthy as, or the ‘practical equivalent of,’ a life sentence without the possibility of parole." Atwell , 197 So.3d at 1048. This case highlights how, contrary to the majority's suggestion, Florida's current parole system affords juvenile offenders no meaningful opportunity for release. As I have previously explained:

In Atwell , this Court concluded that "Florida's existing parole system, as set forth by statute, does not provide for individualized consideration of Atwell's juvenile status at the time of the murder." 197 So.3d at 1041. We further explained that Florida's "current parole process ... fails to take into account the offender's juvenile status at the time of the offense and effectively forces juvenile offenders to serve disproportionate sentences." Id. at 1042.

This Court could not have been clearer in its conclusion that "[p]arole is, simply put, ‘patently inconsistent with the legislative intent’ as to how to comply with Graham [v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010),] and Miller [v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) ]." Id. at 1049 (quoting Horsley [ v. State ], 160 So.3d [393,] 395 [ (Fla. 2015) ] ). As the Atwell Court noted, while the Legislature could have chosen "a parole-based approach" to comply with Miller and Graham , it chose instead to fashion a different remedy of resentencing under a new law, which explicitly considers the Miller factors. Id.

Specifically, Florida's current parole system does not provide juvenile offenders an opportunity to demonstrate that release is appropriate based on maturity and rehabilitation for several reasons. First, the Commission relies on static, unchanging factors, such as the crimes committed and previous offenses, when determining whether or not to grant an offender parole. See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 23-21.007. Under Graham , however, a juvenile's "meaningful opportunity to obtain release [must be] based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Graham , 560 U.S. at 75 .

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