Franks v. State

• Decision Date: 14 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. S96A1943,S96A1943
• Citation: 486 S.E.2d 594,268 Ga. 238
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 2611 FRANKS v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 594

486 S.E.2d 594

268 Ga. 238, 97 FCDR 2611

FRANKS v. The STATE.

No. S96A1943.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 14, 1997.

Reconsideration Denied July 24, 1997.

Stanley W. Robbins, Robbins & McLeod, Gainesville, Joseph A. Homans, Thompson, Fox, Chandler, Homans & Hicks, Gainesville, for David Franks.

Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Gainesville, for State.

George P. Shingler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, Carlton Latain Kell, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for other party representation.

E. Angela Emerson, Waddell, Emerson & Buice, for Milledgville, amicus curaie appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The State seeks imposition of the death penalty against David Scott Franks for the murder of Deborah Wilson. We granted interim review to determine whether the question of how Franks injured his arm falls under the exception to Miranda ¹ for "routine booking questions."

Franks was arrested in Alabama for "unlawful flight to avoid prosecution" for fatally stabbing Wilson and assaulting her two children in Haralson County, Georgia. After unsuccessfully attempting to draw Franks out of his brother-in-law's house, a team of officers entered the house and found him hiding under a bed. Franks was brought outside and taken into custody by FBI Agent Gordon Snow, who was in charge of the investigation. Prior to Frank's arrest, Snow received teletypes stating that Franks had sustained a knife wound in connection with the crimes for which he was sought. Medical personnel at the scene treated an injury to Franks' forearm near the elbow. Although Snow was aware of the bandage, he did not ask anyone present about the injury.

Franks was read the Miranda warnings and declined to make a statement. A deputy drove Franks to the Alabama Detention Center where he was placed in a booking room with Snow and Special Agent Joe Magill for "processing." The procedure included fingerprinting and photographing Franks and collecting physical data; it did not require the completion of any standard form. Magill, who acted as coordinator of the manhunt for Franks, had sent the teletypes to Snow regarding Franks' arm injury and was aware of the circumstances of Franks' arrest. Snow did not discuss the bandage with Magill. Prior to fingerprinting, Magill asked Franks how he received the bandage on his arm. Franks replied that the bandage covered a stab wound. Magill did not inquire further about the injury and did not ask whether Franks required medical attention.

Franks filed a motion to exclude the admission regarding the stab wound. The trial court summarily denied Franks' motion, finding that the testimony of Snow and Magill "demonstrated" that the question regarding the bandage was a "routine booking question" under Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2650, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990).

The Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of any statement made by an accused during custodial interrogation, unless he has been advised of his rights and has voluntarily waived those rights. Miranda, supra. A well-established line of federal and state case law has created an exemption from the Miranda rule for questions attendant to arrest, ² because such questions are not related to the investigation of the case, and at the same time serve a legitimate administrative need. See, e.g., Muniz, supra; Edwards v. State, 220 Ga.App. 74, 76-77(2), 467 S.E.2d 379 (1996); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 506(10), 360 S.E.2d 578 (1987).

Georgia courts have confined the booking exception to requests for basic biographical data, such as the suspect's name, age, address, educational background, marital status, and other information required to complete an arrest form. Edwards, supra at 76, 467 S.E.2d 379; Baird v. State, 263 Ga. 868, 871 (1), 440 S.E.2d 190 (1994); Mincey, supra at 506, 360 S.E.2d 578; Lester v. State, 174 Ga.App. 886, 887(2), 332 S.E.2d 31 (1985). There is no per se exception to Miranda for questions asked during booking. See e.g., Muniz, supra at 602 n. 14, 110 S.Ct. at 2650 n. 14; Morris v. State, 161 Ga.App. 141(2), 288 S.E.2d 102 (1982); Price v. State, 160 Ga.App. 245(5), 286 S.E.2d 744 (1981). Like most federal and state courts, we are unwilling to create a broad exception to the Fifth Amendment for police questions asked during booking "without investigative intent" or pursuant to "administrative procedure" once an accused has invoked his rights. Police questioning during booking not requesting basic biographical data essential to the booking process must therefore be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis.

We first address whether the question at issue in this case is the sort of "routine booking question" to which Muniz refers. We conclude that it is not. The question of how a suspect received an obvious injury is distinguishable from questions asked to secure "biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services" in one essential respect: The former is more likely to elicit an incriminating response because the suspect's injury may be directly related to the crime he is suspected of committing. Since the rationale for creating an exemption to Miranda for questions asked during booking is that these questions are generally unrelated to the crime and are therefore unlikely to elicit an incriminating response, we reject the argument that the question of how a suspect was injured is automatically exempted from Miranda because asking about injuries is "routine procedure" for "identification purposes." ³ Our inquiry must extend further, to the determination of whether under the totality of the circumstances the question was equivalent to "custodial interrogation." Relevant factors include the context in which the question was asked, the officer's intention in asking the question, and the relationship of the question to the crime.

"[T]he definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). The focus of whether "interrogation" occurs is primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect and not the intent of the officer, although the officer's intent is relevant. Id. at 301, n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, n. 7. "This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police." Hibbert v. State, 195 Ga.App. 235, 236, 393 S.E.2d 96 (1990), quoting Innis, supra at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. Although the question in the present case was asked in a booking situation, the availability of the privilege against self-incrimination does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protections are invoked but upon the nature of the statement or admission it invites. From the suspect's perspective, the inquiry was conducted by officers who were aware of the potentially incriminating nature of the disclosure sought. Compare e.g., Edwards, supra at 76, 467 S.E.2d 379 (inquiry conducted by a jailer completing a standardized arrest form). Franks was therefore confronted with a "cruel trilemma" against which the Fifth Amendment protects. See Muniz, supra at 596-600, 110 S.Ct. at 2647-2650. As "the inherently coercive environment created by the custodial interrogation precluded the option of remaining silent," Franks was confronted with the choice of incriminating himself or lying to the agents. Id. at 599, 110 S.Ct. at 2649. We conclude that a reasonable person in Franks' position would have believed that he was subjected to "interrogation."

The State argues that Magill did not intend to elicit an incriminating response from Franks, because the question was prompted by his reasonable belief that Franks had been injured during his arrest and might later file a civil rights suit. The reasonableness of this belief is a factor in determining whether "interrogation" occurred, although it is not determinative. Innis, supra. As the coordinator of the manhunt, Magill sent teletypes to Snow regarding Franks' arm wound. On the other hand, Magill did not receive information from Snow, who had custody of Franks, or anyone else present at the scene, that Franks was injured during his capture and arrest. ⁴ When Magill questioned Franks at the detention center, the only evidence of any injury was the bandage on Franks arm. Notwithstanding Magill's subjective intent, we think Magill should have known that the bandage was reasonably likely to be covering the knife wound mentioned in these reports.

Finally, the relationship of the information sought to the crime is highly relevant in determining whether the question was equivalent to "interrogation." Booking questions generally have little to do with evidence adduced at trial. Whereas in the present case, the content and phrasing of the specific question appear designed to elicit a response which could scarcely have been more incriminating, since it tended to identify Franks as the perpetrator of the offenses which the agents suspected he committed.

Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that Franks was subjected to "interrogation" in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Under the circumstances of this case, the application of the booking exception would not serve its purpose, which is to exempt from Miranda, the "unforeseeable results" of routine questions during the booking process. Hibbert, supra at 236, 393 S.E.2d 96. Our resolution of this issue does not require that we decide the scope of possible questions, absent the procedural safeguards required by Miranda, that may be posed to a suspect during booking regarding possible injuries, and we emphasize that this holding should be confined to the peculiar facts of this case....