State v. Pauldo

• Decision Date: 16 June 2020
• Docket Number: S20A0191
• Citation: 844 S.E.2d 829,309 Ga. 130
• Parties: The STATE v. PAULDO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

309 Ga. 130

844 S.E.2d 829

The STATE

v.PAULDO.

S20A0191

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: June 16, 2020

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Cheryl Banks Hightower, Senior A.D.A., Louie Craig Fraser, District Attorney, Robert Brandon Faircloth, A.D.A., Dublin Judicial Circuit District Attorney's Office, P.O. Box 2029, Dublin, Georgia 31040, Attorneys for the Appellant.

Nicole Fegan, Fegan Law, LLC, PO Box 79094, Atlanta, Georgia 30357, Ryan Christopher Locke, Locke Law Firm LLC, 1355 Peachtree Street NE, Suite 1800, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Attorneys for the Appellee.

McMillian, Justice.

A Laurens County grand jury indicted Raekwon Letavius Pauldo on one count of malice murder, one count of felony murder, and three counts of aggravated assault in connection with the death of Jacquel Smith. The trial court granted Pauldo's motion in limine to exclude the portions of his custodial interview with police after he invoked his rights to remain silent and to counsel on the ground that police failed to honor Pauldo's invocation of those rights by continuing to interrogate him.¹ The State appeals that ruling.² Because we conclude that police did not continue the interrogation, that Pauldo reinitiated a conversation with police about the case, and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights before further interrogation began, we reverse.

1. We begin by setting out our standard of review. In general, this Court must accept a trial court's findings of fact on a motion in limine unless they are clearly erroneous. Dozier v. State , 306 Ga. 29, 33 (4), 829 S.E.2d 131 (2019). However, because Pauldo's interview was both audio- and video-recorded, "the recording is part of the record on appeal, and the parties point to no evidence beyond the recorded interview to support their arguments regarding the admissibility" of the statement, "we review de novo the trial court's determinations of both fact and law." Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Johnson v. State , 295 Ga. 421, 424 (2), 761 S.E.2d 13 (2014).

The record reflects that Pauldo's interview was conducted by a detective from the Dublin Police Department and attended by an agent from the department. The video recording of the interview shows that after making introductions, the detective told Pauldo that he would have to read Pauldo "[his] rights." Pauldo asked in response whether he was being arrested, and the detective replied, "Not at this time." After asking Pauldo for biographical information, the detective read to Pauldo from a waiver-of-rights form the rights set out in Miranda .³ Pauldo then unequivocally asserted his right to remain silent, explaining, "[M]y mom and my lawyer feel that I'm being more treated as ... not a victim and [as] a suspect .... So they told me it would just be best if I did not speak with you guys." The detective clarified, "Okay, so you don't want to talk to us?" Pauldo replied, "No, sir." The detective then wrote, "Ray does not wish to talk to us" on the waiver-of-rights form.

It is at this point in the interview that the trial court found that the officers failed to scrupulously honor Pauldo's invocation of his right to remain silent. While the detective was writing on the form, the agent prompted him about a gunshot residue test. Immediately thereafter, the detective asked Pauldo, "[D]o you mind giving us some gun residue – [w]e're going to do a gun residue test." Pauldo then asked something unintelligible about "gun residue." The detective replied, "To see if you shot a gun today[,]" and asked Pauldo if he minded submitting to the test. When Pauldo asked if he had to consent to the test, the detective told him he did not have to consent but explained, "I'm going to get a search warrant and do it anyway." Pauldo responded, "Alright."

The detective then added "and the clothes that you have on, we're gonna have to take those. So, once you get out to the jail, once you take those off, we will take those as evidence." In response, Pauldo asked again whether he was being arrested, and the detective confirmed that he was, despite having told Pauldo minutes before that he was not being arrested. After Pauldo asked what he was being arrested for, the detective responded, "Homicide." Pauldo asked why, and the detective explained that they had talked to "a lot of people," and they had identified him as the shooter. Pauldo then started talking again, saying, "Sir," but the detective interrupted to say: "You've already told me that you wanted your lawyer here. They told you not to talk to me. Now, if you want to talk to me, that's up to you." Pauldo replied that he did not understand why he was being arrested and that he "did not do this," asking again, "Why am I being arrested?" In response, the detective asked, "Ray, do you want to talk to me?" Pauldo replied, "I mean, I will talk to you. I'm sitting here; I'm talking to you now. I'm telling you, like, why ...." The detective again interjected, "Do you want to talk to me about this incident?" Pauldo replied, "I will talk to you about this incident, sir[,]" first stating that he was not there, then correcting himself to say that he was there, but asserting that he was not responsible for the shooting. Pauldo then asked the detective, "What [do] you want to know?"

At that point, the detective stated that if Pauldo wanted to talk to the detective, he needed to sign the waiver-of-rights form. The detective again asked Pauldo, "So you're changing your mind, and you want to talk to me?" Pauldo replied, "I will talk to you, yeah, to benefit me, anything .... I don't want to be arrested for homicide." In response, the detective instructed Pauldo to sign the form under the detective's handwritten statement that "Ray has changed his mind and wishes to talk." Pauldo signed the form, the agent witnessed his signature, and the interrogation began. This entire exchange unfolded over approximately seven minutes on the video recording.

2. In reviewing the trial court's grant of Pauldo's motion in limine, which sought to exclude from evidence any statements he made after invoking his right to remain silent,⁴ we start with the general principle that "[p]olice must scrupulously honor a suspect's right to remain silent if the person clearly and unambiguously states that he wants to end a custodial interrogation." Brown v. State , 304 Ga. 435, 440 (2) (b), 819 S.E.2d 14 (2018) (citations omitted). See also Mack v. State , 296 Ga. 239, 243 (2), 765 S.E.2d 896 (2014) ("[T]he admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether ‘his right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’ by law enforcement authorities." (citing Michigan v. Mosley , 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) ) (other citations and punctuation omitted)). In determining whether police have scrupulously honored a defendant's right to remain silent, courts look to several factors, including the interrogating officers’ immediate response to the invocation of that right and the interval of time separating the invocation from "subsequent police-initiated questioning." Mack , 296 Ga. at 243 (2), 765 S.E.2d 896. Thus, "when a person in the custody of law enforcement officers unambiguously and unequivocally invokes his right to remain silent in connection with their investigation, the interrogation must cease immediately." Davidson v. State , 304 Ga. 460, 468-69 (4), 819 S.E.2d 452 (2018) (emphasis supplied; citation omitted).

Likewise, "a suspect who asks for a lawyer at any time during a custodial interrogation may not be subjected to further questioning by law enforcement until an attorney has been made available or until the suspect reinitiates the conversation." Dozier , 306 Ga. at 35 (4) (b), 829 S.E.2d 131 (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Edwards v. Arizona , 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (II), 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). This requirement, first established in Edwards , creates "a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers[.]" Oregon v. Bradshaw , 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion). However, where police cease interrogation and the suspect initiates the conversation regarding his case, no violation of the Edwards rule occurs. Id. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830.

Therefore, whether a suspect invokes the right to silence or the right to counsel, or both, the first step in determining whether police honored the suspect's invocation of his rights is to examine whether interrogation ceased after the invocation. The analysis of what constitutes "interrogation" is the same whether a suspect invokes the right to remain silent or the right to counsel, because "[b]oth [rights] protect the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by requiring an interrogation to cease when either right is invoked."⁵ Berghuis v. Thompkins , 560 U.S. 370, 381 (III) (A), 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (citations omitted).

"In this context, ‘interrogation’ is defined as ‘express questioning by law enforcement officers’ or its functional equivalent—any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." State v. Brown , 287 Ga. 473, 476-77 (2), 697 S.E.2d 192 (2010) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Menzies v. State , 304 Ga. 156, 164 (IV), 816 S.E.2d 638 (2018) ("Interrogation for the purposes of Miranda warnings encompasses express questioning and words and actions that officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject." (citation and...