Franks v. White Pine Copper Div., Copper Range Co.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1983
• Docket Number: Docket No. 63220
• Citation: 122 Mich.App. 177,332 N.W.2d 447
• Parties: Larry J. FRANKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WHITE PINE COPPER DIVISION, COPPER RANGE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant. 122 Mich.App. 177, 332 N.W.2d 447
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 447

332 N.W.2d 447

Larry J. FRANKS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WHITE PINE COPPER DIVISION, COPPER RANGE COMPANY Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 63220.

122 Mich.App. 177, 332 N.W.2d 447

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 13, 1982.

Decided Dec. 20, 1982.

Released for Publication May 6, 1983.

[122 MICHAPP 180] Wisti & Jaakelainen, P.C. (by Gordon J. Jaakelainen), Hancock, for plaintiff-appellee.

Vairo, Mechlin Tomasi, Johnson & Manchester (by Paul J. Tomasi), Houghton, for defendant-appellant.

Before WALSH, P.J., and ALLEN and CAVANAGH, JJ.

WALSH, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, White Pine Copper Division, Copper Range Company, appeals from the February 18, 1982, determination of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board that defendant is liable for payment of partial disability benefits to plaintiff, Larry J. Franks, in the weekly amount of $79.00 during periods of wage loss from May 24, 1971, until further order of the Workers' Compensation Bureau. M.C.L. Sec. 418.361(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(361)(1).

Plaintiff's employment with defendant mining company began in 1970. On March 7, 1971, he sustained a work-related injury to his right hand, which resulted in the amputation of four fingers.

Following his accident, plaintiff received 215 weeks of specific loss benefits pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 418.361(2)(h); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(361)(2)(h). He returned to work on May 24, 1971. Because of his injury, he was never again able to perform all of the jobs associated with his former position. With the exception of lay-off periods extending from January [122 MICHAPP 181] 4, 1976, to April 26, 1976, and November 13, 1976, to May 31, 1977, plaintiff worked for defendant until August 1, 1977, when he was permanently laid off. During all periods of lay-off, he received unemployment compensation benefits.

On appeal, defendant's principal challenge to the appeal board's decision concerns the board's refusal to reduce defendant's liability for workers' compensation benefits by the amount of unemployment compensation benefits which plaintiff had received. Defendant argues, inter alia, that the setoff was required because the unemployment benefits "constituted an earning capacity". M.C.L. Sec. 418.371(1); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(371)(1). The appeal board responded to this claim as follows:

"Credit for unemployment benefits received by plaintiff is requested by defendant * * * on the theory that such benefits represent a wage earning capacity that requires reimbursement by plaintiff. That plaintiff retains some residual capacity within the field of his skill does not diminish defendant's liability for payment of its entire obligation for partial disability benefits, despite plaintiff's corollary receipt of unemployment compensation while he remained willing and able to perform any available work, limited by his post-injury capacity."

We agree with the appeal board and further observe that the Legislature expressed an intent directly contrary to defendant's suggestion in M.C.L. Sec. 418.811; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(811), which, prior to 1982, provided in part:

"[B]enefits derived from any other source than those paid or caused to be paid by the employer as provided in [the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, shall not] [122 MICHAPP 182] be considered in fixing the compensation under this act * * *." ¹

Defendant also argues that M.C.L. Sec. 418.358; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(358) (hereinafter referred to as Sec. 358), applies to the instant fact situation. That statute, effective January 1, 1982, provides:

"Net weekly benefits payable under section 351, 361, or lump sum benefits under section 835, shall be reduced by 100% of the amount of benefits paid or payable to the injured employee under the Michigan employment security act, Act No. 1 of the Public Acts of the Extra Session of 1936, as amended, being sections 421.1 to 421.67a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, for identical periods of time and chargeable to the same employer."

The issue presented is whether this setoff provision applies to awards made to compensate employees for injuries predating the provision's effective date. The appeal board concluded that "the lack of any expressed retroactive effect for section 358's statutory adjustments renders its operation prospective only, thus inapplicable to plaintiff's 1971 injury. See Briggs v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry, 379 Mich 160, 164-166; 150 NW2d 752 (1967)".

Defendant first suggests that the statute clearly and unambiguously provides for the requested setoff. If this were so, further interpretation of the statute would be unnecessary. Owendale-Gagetown School District v. State Board of Education, 413 Mich. 1, 8, 317 [122 MICHAPP 183] N.W.2d 529 (1982); Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, 120 Mich.App. 135, 328 N.W.2d 15 (1982).

We disagree with defendant's characterization of the statute. The statute does not clearly and unambiguously require setoff for unemployment compensation benefits when work-related injury predates the statute's effective date. The statutory language is significantly distinguishable from that in M.C.L. Sec. 418.801(5); M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(801)(5), which provides for 12% interest on workers' compensation awards and which this Court has ruled applicable to awards due prior to that statute's effective date. Selk v. Detroit Plastic Products, supra.

Defendant next argues that adherence to established principles of statutory interpretation requires retroactive application of the statute.

The primary object of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. All other rules of construction and interpretation "serve but as guides to assist the courts in determining such intent with a greater degree of certainty". Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 182, 189 N.W. 221 (1922); Van Antwerp v. State, 334 Mich. 593, 55 N.W.2d 108 (1952). In our judgment, the Legislature did not intend that Sec. 358 apply to awards made for injuries occurring before its effective date.

The statute was part of 1980 P.A. 357. Although it was approved by the Legislature on December 30, 1980, its effective date was postponed, by express provision of the Legislature, until January 1, 1982. 1980 P.A. 357, Sec. 3. This postponement is some evidence that the Legislature never intended the setoff provision to apply retroactively. Mulligan v. Murphy, 14 N.Y.2d 223, 250 N.Y.S.2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 496 (1964). Had the Legislature intended retroactive application, considerable administrative burden[122 MICHAPP 184] would have been avoided by simply giving the statute immediate effect. During 1980, there were certainly employers who voluntarily paid workers' compensation benefits and who, pursuant to the 1981 version of M.C.L. Sec. 418.811; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(811), made no adjustment for unemployment compensation benefits. In postponing the statute's effective date, the Legislature surely indicated its intention that those employers, and employers in defendant's position, not benefit from the setoff provision.

In addition, Sec. 358 cannot be considered in isolation from 1981 P.A. 192-203, which were approved on December 30, 1981 and became effective on January 1, 1982. We are persuaded that, by postponing the effective date of Sec. 358, the Legislature indicated its intent that the section's applicability be effective concurrently with the adjustments mandated by the 1981 public acts. Of particular interest is 1981 P.A. 203, which provides for coordination of weekly worker's compensation benefits with benefits from various sources, including self-insurance plans, wage continuation plans, disability insurance policies provided by the employer, social security old-age insurance, and other pension or retirement plans. M.C.L. Sec. 418.354; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(354). The Legislature has expressed its intent that 1981 P.A. 203 "was not designed to disrupt benefits which were already being received by an employee prior to the effective date of this act or benefits resulting from injuries incurred prior to the act's effective date", and that the coordination of benefits provided for in the act is "not to be applied retroactively to those receiving worker's disability compensation payments or those injured prior to the effective date of this act". Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 575, adopted by the [122 MICHAPP 185] Senate April 1, 1982 (1982 Senate Journal, p. 705), adopted by the House of Representatives May 18, 1982 (1982 House Journal, p. 1262). (For text of resolution, see 1982 Senate Journal, p. 626). Although legislative resolutions are not binding, they are entitled to respectful consideration. Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich. 282, 296, 260 N.W. 165 (1935). We are persuaded that the Legislature intended the entire coordination-of-benefits reform to apply only to injuries incurred after the effective dates of those reforms. We can perceive no reason why the Legislature's intent concerning Sec. 358 would have differed from that concerning 1981 P.A. 203.

Our holding comports with the general rule that statutes are to be applied only prospectively unless the Legislature expressly or impliedly indicates its intention to give retroactive effect. Hughes v. Judges' Retirement Bd., 407 Mich. 75, 85 282 N.W.2d 160 (1979). ² No such intention is in the case of Sec. 358. In addition, prospective application of Sec. 358 is consistent with the principle that the law in effect at the time of injury controls an employee's rights to workers' compensation benefits. Tarnow v. Railway Express Agency, 331 Mich. 558, 50 N.W.2d 318 (1951).

Exclusively prospective application of Sec. 358 does not violate the principle that purely "remedial" or "procedural" statutes are to be given retroactive effect. Ballog v. Knight Newspapers, Inc., 381 Mich. 527, 533-534, 164 N.W.2d 19 (1969); Hansen-Snyder Co. v. General Motors Corp., 371 Mich. 480, 124 N.W.2d 286 (1963). Adoption of Sec. 358 did not effect a...