Frias v. Demings

• Decision Date: 14 October 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 6:09–cv–2023–Orl–31KRS.
• Citation: 823 F.Supp.2d 1279
• Parties: Nereyda FRIAS, Plaintiff, v. Jerry L. DEMINGS in his capacity as Sheriff of Orange County and Gerald Cavis, Orange County Sheriff Deputy, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

823 F.Supp.2d 1279

Nereyda FRIAS, Plaintiff,

v.Jerry L. DEMINGS in his capacity as Sheriff of Orange County and Gerald Cavis, Orange County Sheriff Deputy, Defendants.

Case No. 6:09–cv–2023–Orl–31KRS.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida,Orlando Division.

Oct. 14, 2011.

Charles E. Taylor, Jr., Law Office of Charles E. Taylor, Jr., Orlando, FL, for Plaintiff.

Ian D. Forsythe, Hilyard, Bogan & Palmer, PA, Orlando, FL, for Defendants.

ORDER

GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court without oral argument on a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) filed by Defendants Jerry L. Demings, in his capacity as Sheriff of Orange County, Florida, (the “Sheriff's Dept.”) and Orange County Sheriff's Deputy Gerald Cavis (“Deputy Cavis” or “Cavis”); and the Response (Doc. 46) filed by Plaintiff Nereyda Frias (“Frias”).

I. Background

Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed. In 2009, Frias lived in Orange County with her boyfriend, Alex Isurieta (“Izurieta”) and his two children, a sixteen year old son (“John Alex”) and a thirteen year old son (“Cristian”). In the first week of July, 2009, Izurieta's father was visiting from out of state. On the day he was scheduled to leave, Frias returned home from work to take him to the airport and was informed that John Alex was leaving as well.¹ Frias did not consider this to be unusual because John Alex had lived with his grandfather for a period of time. She took the two to the airport, returned home and went to bed. Several hours later she was awoken by Cristian and Izurieta who were both curious about the whereabouts of John Alex. It is now clear that Izurieta did not know that John Alex was leaving, nor would he have approved. Izurieta's father had in fact, taken John Alex without permission. Izurieta quickly called 911 and informed the dispatcher that his son had been taken without permission by his grandfather, and that they may still be at the airport. By the time Deputy Cavis arrived at the house,² Frias and Cristian were sitting outside crying. Izurieta informed Cavis of the situation, that his father had taken John Alex, and that they may still be at the airport, but at no time did he actually blame Frias for these events. Cavis then turned to Frias and asked if she would answer a few questions, but Frias speaks only Spanish and Cavis speaks only English.³ Rather than respond to Deputy Cavis, she began yelling at Izurieta in Spanish, never responding to Deputy Cavis's repeated attempts at questioning.⁴ After a few moments of shouting, Frias turned to go back into the apartment.

The parties dispute what happened next. Frias claims that she and Cristian walked arm-in-arm past the deputy, and through the front door of the apartment. ⁵ Just as she was going through the door, she heard Cavis say “Police, Stop,” but at that point, she was already inside. Deputy Cavis followed her, and as she entered the apartment, the door closed quickly behind her as if it had been slammed. Apparently upset at Frias's refusal to cooperate, Cavis pursued her into the house and confronted her in the kitchen where she was getting a glass of water. Cavis asked her “are you going to hit me with that glass?” ⁶ Before Frais could respond, he grabbed her arms, handcuffed her, and took her outside to his patrol car. Deputy Cavis's recollection of events is slightly different. He recalls that Frias “had an aggressive demeanor because she was speaking loadly and she was using hand gestures in an aggressive manner.” (Doc. 42, at 7). Further, when Frias turned to go inside the house, she intentionally bumped him with her shoulder on his side as she passed, even though there was plenty of space to pass on the other side. Cavis told her several times in Spanish, “Police, Stop,” but she picked up speed and ran inside the house. He decided to follow her into the house after she attempted to slam the door in his face. When he reached the kitchen, he saw Frias visibly angry, and reaching into the refrigerator. Before he could tell what she was reaching for, Deputy Cavis handcuffed Frias and took her outside.

Frias filed suit in November, 2009, alleging, inter alia, a violation of her civil rights under § 1983 for the arrest and warrantless entry into her home, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Sheriff's Dept. and Deputy Cavis now move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

II. StandardsA. Summary Judgment

A party is entitled to summary judgment when it can show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 458 (11th Cir.1994). Which facts are material depends on the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Watson v. Adecco Employment Servs., Inc., 252 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1351–52 (M.D.Fla.2003). In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden, the court considers all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolves all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

When a party moving for summary judgment points out an absence of evidence on a dispositive issue for which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thereafter, summary judgment is mandated against the non-moving party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 322, 324–25, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Watson, 252 F.Supp.2d at 1352. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must rely on more than conclusory statements or allegations unsupported by facts. Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir.1985) (“conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value”) (citations omitted); Broadway v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 530 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir.1976).

B. False Arrest

Under the Fourth Amendment, an individual has a right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. An arrest is a seizure of the person. Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir.2007). A warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Constitution and provides a basis for a Section 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest constitutes an absolute bar to a Section 1983 action for false arrest. Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1326–27 (11th Cir.2009). In addition, qualified immunity protects officers who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present. Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1167 (11th Cir.2009). Whether a particular set of facts gives rise to probable cause or arguable cause for arrest depends on the elements of the crime. Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.2004). Where the facts are undisputed, whether probable cause existed is a question of law. Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.1990).

C. Warrantless Entry

The Fourth Amendment also protects an individual's home from warrantless entry. United States v. Walker, 390 Fed.Appx. 854, 857 (11th Cir.2010). “In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). Accordingly, a warrantless search of a person's home is presumptively unreasonable. United States v. Ramirez–Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 751 (11th Cir.2002). However, where law enforcement officers have probable cause to search, exigent circumstances may justify a warrantless intrusion into a home. United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). The government bears the burden of proving that the officers had both probable cause and that there was exigency. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Standridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir.1987); Washington v. Tobeck, 2011 WL 2555752 at *1–*2 (11th Cir.2011). Furthermore, “application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984).

D. Municipal Liability

A suit against a government official in their official capacity is treated as a suit against a municipality. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Palmer v. Johnson, 2011 WL 307620 at *7 (M.D.Fla.2011). Once a Constitutional violation is established, a plaintiff may be able to hold a municipality liable under certain circumstances. In Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of New York, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that municipalities can be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Instead, a Plaintiff is required to show that the Constitutional injury alleged was the result of a custom or policy. Id. Where no stated policy exists, a Plaintiff must show that there was a pattern of deliberate indifference that is “so widespread as to have the force of law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, ...