Friday v. Ethanol Corp.
Decision Date | 30 December 1988 |
Citation | 539 So.2d 208 |
Parties | Rachel FRIDAY and Mike Neely v. ETHANOL CORPORATION and Southeastern Energy Corporation. 87-306. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Philip H. Butler of Robison & Belser, Montgomery, for appellants.
Lloyd W. Gathings of Gathings & Davis, Birmingham, for appellees The Ethanol Corp. and Southeastern Energy Corp.
Wesley Romine of Morrow, Romine & Pearson, Montgomery, for appellees/intervenors Alabama Oil Supply, et al.
Robert A. Huffaker and Holley C. Knowles of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, for amici curiae Alabama Farm Bureau Federation, John Dorrill, Sam J. Darwin, and F.B. Ellison.
The Alabama Legislature, in its 1987 Regular Session, enacted Act No. 87-277. This Act became law under Article V, § 125, Alabama Constitution of 1901, without approval by the Governor. This Act amended Ala.Code 1975, § 8-17-82, which had previously provided:
That Code section was amended by adding the following as subsection (c):
The Ethanol Corporation and Southeastern Energy Corporation, who market, distribute, and retail ethanol in the State of Alabama, filed this declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction against the enforcement of subsection (c) of Act No. 87-277, contending that subsection (c) violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Alabama and United States Constitutions.
The Attorney General of the State of Alabama and the Commissioner of the State of Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industry were defendants in the circuit court. The trial court permitted Rachel Friday and Mike Neely, Alabama citizens who use motor fuels in Alabama, to intervene as defendants.
A temporary restraining order was entered by the trial court, and all parties agreed to treat the hearing for the preliminary injunction as a final hearing on the merits for a permanent injunction. The testimony was heard ore tenus by the trial court over a period of three days. Thereafter, the trial court entered the following order:
The Attorney General and the intervenors, Friday and Neely, appealed to this Court. Subsequently, the Attorney General's appeal (87-305), was dismissed, pursuant to his motion for voluntary dismissal.
The first issue presented to us is whether the ore tenus standard of review applies.
This Court in Keeton v. Bank of Red Bay, 466 So.2d 937, 940 (Ala.1985), wrote:
"[I]t is fundamental law in Alabama that when the trial judge sits as the trier of fact, and hears ore tenus evidence, his resolution of the factual issues, based upon that evidence, is presumed correct and will be affirmed by this Court if, under any reasonable aspect, it is supported by any credible evidence."
If the ore tenus standard of review applies, we must presume that the following factual findings are correct:
(1) "[T]here are no discernible differences between gasoline ... and gasohol."
(2) "[T]he public is not in any greater danger by using gasohol than it is by using gasoline."
We have studied the excellent briefs submitted by the parties and the amici curiae and have reviewed the testimony and exhibits. The factual findings are supported by credible evidence. They are not plainly erroneous, for there is no error that is obvious to this Court's mind or senses or distinctly recognizable by this Court. The factual findings, while perceived by the appellants in their adversarial position as unjust, are not readily or instantly perceived by this Court as being so, so they are not manifestly unjust.
Likewise, the trial court used the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, which this Court has held is the proper standard to use when the constitutionality of an act is challenged; see Eagerton v. Exchange Oil & Gas Corp., 404 So.2d 1, 7 (Ala.1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 462 U.S. 176, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983), on remand, 440 So.2d 1031 (Ala.1983).
If the ore tenus standard is the correct standard of review, then we must test the constitutionality of Act No. 87-277, with the trial court's findings of fact as established facts and in doing so must find that the Legislature exercised its police power arbitrarily or capriciously and therefore the Act must be held to be unconstitutional. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 13, 18 So.2d 810 (1944), cert. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945); Reed v. Brunson, 527 So.2d 102, 116 (Ala.1988).
By using the ore tenus standard when the constitutionality of legislation is challenged, this Court would permit the findings of a single circuit judge, elected by the electors within a single circuit, to invalidate legislation enacted by the Legislature elected by the electorate throughout the State of Alabama and invested with the legislative power of the state by Article IV, § 44, Alabama Constitution of 1901, which legislation was permitted to become law by the Governor, who was elected by the electorate of the State of Alabama.
Article III, § 42, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides as follows:
"The powers of the government of the State of Alabama shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to...
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