Friends of the Forest Pres. v. N.Y.S. Adirondack Park Agency

• Decision Date: 03 May 2018
• Docket Number: 525165
• Citation: 75 N.Y.S.3d 681,161 A.D.3d 169
• Parties: In the Matter of ADIRONDACK WILD: FRIENDS OF THE FOREST PRESERVE et al., Appellants, v. NEW YORK STATE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

161 A.D.3d 169

75 N.Y.S.3d 681

In the Matter of ADIRONDACK WILD: FRIENDS OF THE FOREST PRESERVE et al., Appellants,

v.NEW YORK STATE ADIRONDACK PARK AGENCY et al., Respondents.

525165

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 22, 2018

Decided and Entered: May 3, 2018

Hannah Chang, Earthjustice, New York City, for appellants.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Loretta Simon of counsel), for respondents.

Before: Garry, P.J., McCarthy, Devine, Mulvey and Rumsey, JJ.

OPINION AND ORDER

Rumsey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Ceresia, J.), entered January 31, 2017 in Albany County, which, among other things, dismissed petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Department of Environmental Conservation approving a plan permitting the construction of a new snowmobile corridor.

In 2012 and 2013, the state acquired two tracts of land in the Adirondack Park—the 18,100–acre Essex Chain Lakes parcel and the 960–acre Indian River parcel—and incorporated them into the Forest Preserve. Adjacent areas of state-owned land were then reclassified and combined with the newly-acquired parcels to form the Essex Chain Complex Area (hereinafter the Complex Area). Thereafter, as required by Executive Law § 816, respondent Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC), in consultation with respondent Adirondack Park Agency (hereinafter APA), developed an individual management plan for the Complex Area. In November 2015, the APA determined that the final Essex Chain Lakes Management Complex Unit Management Plan (hereinafter the Complex Plan) complied with the Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan (hereinafter the Master Plan), and, in March 2016, DEC approved the Complex Plan.

Petitioners thereafter commenced a combined CPLR article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action to challenge the Complex Plan to the extent that it permits construction of a new snowmobile corridor in the Complex Area. Petitioners asserted four causes of action, specifically alleging that the Complex Plan (1) permits the construction of a new snowmobile bridge over a segment of the Cedar River that is designated as scenic, in violation of the Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers System Act (see ECL 15–2701 et seq. [hereinafter the Rivers System Act] ), (2) opens the Polaris Bridge to the public for snowmobiling over a segment of the Hudson River that is designated as scenic, in violation of the Rivers System Act, (3) allows public snowmobile use on the portion of Chain Lakes Road (South) that is located within an area where the Hudson River is designated as wild, in violation of the Rivers System Act and the Master Plan, and (4) calls for the construction and establishment of a new Class II snowmobile trail connecting the hamlet of Indian Lake, Hamilton County with the hamlet of Minerva, Essex County that duplicates an existing snowmobile route that connects the same two communities, in violation of a guidance document for the siting, construction and maintenance of snowmobile trails that was adopted by DEC in 2009 (hereinafter the 2009 Guidance). In January 2017, Supreme Court dismissed the petition, concluding that the first two causes of action were not ripe for judicial review and the remaining two causes of action failed on their merits.¹ Petitioners now appeal.

We first consider petitioners' argument that Supreme Court erred in finding that their first two causes of action were not ripe for judicial review. We have previously held that an administrative action is final and ripe for review only when "a pragmatic evaluation reveals that the decision-maker has arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury," and, therefore, that an administrative action is not ripe for review "if the claimed harm may be prevented or significantly ameliorated by further administrative action" ( Matter of Adirondack Council, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, 92 A.D.3d 188, 190, 936 N.Y.S.2d 766 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ).

In the first and second causes of action, petitioners assert that construction of a bridge over a segment of the Cedar River designated as scenic and opening the Polaris Bridge over the Hudson River to snowmobile traffic in an area that is also designated as scenic would violate the Rivers System Act, which they contend prohibits all motorized open space recreational uses in scenic river areas. However, adoption of the Complex Plan was not alone sufficient to authorize construction of the Cedar River Bridge or use of the Polaris Bridge by snowmobiles. Rather, as Supreme Court correctly noted, permits and variances must be obtained through further administrative action before the proposed uses may be established. Specifically, permits are required to erect a bridge over a scenic river (see 6 NYCRR 666.13[E][5][b] ) or to construct a trail within a scenic river area (see 6 NYCRR 666.13[E][3] ). Moreover, variances are required for the use of motorized vehicles within scenic river areas (see 6 NYCRR 666.9 [d] ), and for construction of a Class II snowmobile trail, to the extent that it may exceed the maximum trail width of four feet that is permitted by regulation (see 6 NYCRR 666.3 [lll] ).² Permit and variance applications are governed by the Uniform Procedures Act (see ECL art 70), which imposes conditions related to the substantive relief sought and provides the opportunity for further public participation. No permit or variance may be granted unless the proposed use is consistent with the purpose of the Rivers System Act (see 6 NYCRR 666.8 [e]; 666.9[d] ), and conditions may be imposed as necessary to preserve and protect affected river resources or to assure compliance with the Rivers System Act (see 6 NYCRR 666.8 [g]; 666.9[c] ). Moreover, there is an opportunity for public comment on applications for a permit or a variance (see ECL 70–0107[3][c] ; 70–0109[2] ), and the granting of a permit or variance may be challenged through a CPLR article 78 proceeding. Thus, inasmuch as the harms upon which the first and second causes of action are based may be prevented or ameliorated by further administrative action, Supreme Court correctly concluded that the first and second causes of action are not ripe for judicial review.³

In the third cause of action, petitioners challenge DEC's determination that the Rivers System Act permits establishment of a snowmobile trail on a segment of Chain Lakes Road (South) that is located in a wild river area as continuation of a preexisting use. In that regard, petitioners assert that the Master Plan requires that wild river areas be managed in accordance with the guidelines for wilderness areas, which, in turn, prohibit the public use of motor vehicles and motorized equipment, regardless of whether such use previously existed. Although the Rivers System Act prohibits access by motor vehicles in wild river areas, except as necessary for forest management (see ECL 15–2709[2][a] ), it permits continuation of existing uses that are not altered or expanded (see ECL 15–2709[2] ). Petitioners contend that there is a conflict between the Master Plan and the Rivers System Act regarding continuation of preexisting motor vehicle use and that the conflict of laws provision in the Rivers System Act requires that the relevant terms of the Master Plan be applied because they are more restrictive (see ECL 15–2721 ).

The issue of whether there is a conflict between the Rivers System Act and the Master Plan presents a matter requiring interpretation of the language contained in each for which technical expertise or specialized knowledge is not required. Thus, we must give effect to the plain meaning of the relevant terms without deference to any interpretation made by DEC or the APA (see Matter of Madison County Indus. Dev. Agency v. State of N.Y. Auths. Budget Off., 151 A.D.3d 1532, 1535, 54 N.Y.S.3d 778 [2017], lv granted 30 N.Y.3d 913, 2018 WL 943543 [2018] ). We conclude that there is no direct conflict between the Rivers System Act and the Master Plan as it relates to continuation of preexisting motor vehicle use in wild river areas located on state-owned land. The Rivers System Act provides DEC with exclusive jurisdiction over river areas located on state-owned land within the Adirondack Park (see ECL 15–2705 ) and also provides that DEC shall administer river areas within its jurisdiction in accordance with the Rivers System Act (see ECL 15–2709[1] ). The Master Plan recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction that has been granted to DEC by statute by acknowledging that DEC has the authority to regulate the uses of river areas located on state land "independent of the [M]aster [P]lan " (emphasis added).

Having determined that the Rivers System Act, which permits continuation of preexisting uses, is controlling, we must consider whether there was a rational basis for the determination that the use of the one-mile segment of Chain Lakes Road (South) as a portion of the proposed snowmobile connector trail is a permissible continuation of a preexisting use, without alteration or expansion. As the administrative determination here was made where a hearing is not required, "[our] review is limited to whether the determination lacks a rational basis and is, thus, arbitrary and capricious. An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. If the agency's determination has a rational basis, it will be sustained, even if a different result would not be unreasonable. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency responsible for making the determination, and deference to the judgment of the agency, when supported by the record, is particularly appropriate when the matter under review involves a factual evaluation in the area of the agency's expertise" ( Matter of Fuller...