Fronk v. Fowler
| Decision Date | 21 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–P–298.,11–P–298. |
| Citation | 81 Mass.App.Ct. 326,962 N.E.2d 231 |
| Parties | Robert L. FRONK & others 1 v. John P. FOWLER & others.2 |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lawrence G. Green, Boston (Micael K. Sugrue with him) for the plaintiffs.
Stephen H. Oleskey (Elizabeth Kent Cullen with him), Boston, for the defendants.
Present: MILLS, KATZMANN, & MILKEY, JJ.
The central issue on appeal is whether a judge in the Superior Court may grant post judgment statutory interest on an award of attorney's fees and costs made pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 6F.3 This pure question of law is one of first impression. After many years of litigation, with the defendants prevailing on all counts, a Superior Court judge determined that “substantially all, if not all, of the plaintiffs' claims were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith.” The judge concluded that the defendants are entitled to recover postjudgment interest pursuant to G.L. c. 235, § 8,4 on an award of more than $1.23 million in attorney's fees and costs made pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 6F, from the date the award was entered on the docket until the date of execution. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the order.
Background. Robert Fronk, Jack Saltiel, and Maila L. Walter (plaintiffs) brought a civil action against Jeffrey A. Millman, Robert Lee Wolff, Jr., Maple Leaf Cambridge Corp., and the Cambridge Company, Inc. (defendants) in 2002. They asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of partnership opportunities. After a jury-waived trial in Superior Court, the defendants prevailed on all issues in a judgment issued on June 7, 2006, and subsequently affirmed by this court. Fronk v. Fowler, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 502, 883 N.E.2d 972 (2008) ( Fronk I ).
After the plaintiffs appealed the merits of this decision, the defendants filed a motion in Superior Court pursuant to § 6F seeking fees and costs. The trial judge granted the defendants' motion after finding that “substantially all, if not all, of the plaintiffs' claims were wholly insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith.” Fronk v. Fowler, 456 Mass. 317, 318, 923 N.E.2d 503 (2010) ( Fronk II ) (quoting Superior Court). The judge entered an award for $1.23 million in costs and fees. A single justice of this court vacated that award, but the Supreme Judicial Court ultimately reinstated it. Ibid.5
Following the trial court's receipt of the rescript, the defendants filed a motion in the Superior Court for the computation of statutory interest on the earlier Superior Court award of fees and costs. A different Superior Court judge ruled that regardless of its descriptive title, a § 6F award of attorney's fees and costs “qualifies as a ‘judgment for the payment of money.’ ” The judge allowed the motion and entered an order pursuant to G.L. c. 235, § 8, for postjudgment interest at the statutory rate of twelve percent per annum from February 26, 2007, the date the § 6F award had been docketed. The plaintiffs appealed this order to the single justice, who reported the case to a full panel of this court.
Discussion. The defendants contend that an award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to G.L. c. 231, § 6F, qualifies as a “judgment for the payment of money,” and that postjudgment interest on a § 6F award can be assessed pursuant to G.L. c. 235, § 8, which provides that “[e]very judgment for the payment of money shall bear interest from the day of its entry ... as provided for prejudgment interest in such award, report, verdict or finding.” Before considering the applicability of § 8, however, we first consider plaintiffs' argument that § 6F does not permit postjudgment interest on an award of attorneys' fees in these circumstances.
As both parties agree, § 6F does not explicitly provide for interest on an award of attorney's fees and costs to defendants who prevail against frivolous claims. The plaintiffs contend, however, that § 6F evinces an implicit intent to bar interest on the award by allowing enhanced interest in circumstances not present here. The plaintiffs argue that we should apply a principle of statutory construction known as “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” (to express one is to exclude others), arguing that the express provision for interest in one set of circumstances establishes the Legislature's intent to exclude interest in other circumstances. However, that the Legislature excluded enhanced interest on attorneys' fees and costs where a plaintiff asserts frivolous claims does not require a determination that the Legislature intended to exclude any interest on such an award. Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 425 Mass. 615, 620, 682 N.E.2d 624 (1997) (). Moreover, we presume that the Legislature was aware of § 8 when it enacted § 6F. 6 Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 130, 795 N.E.2d 521 (2003) (). Where, as here, another statute provided for interest, the Legislature was not required to provide a redundant provision ordering interest in awards under § 6F. Thus, plaintiffs' arguments pursuant to § 6F fail, and we turn to an analysis under § 8.
Section 8 of G.L. c. 235 states that, “[w]hen judgment is rendered upon ... the finding of a justice, interest shall be computed upon the amount of the award ... from the time when made to the time the judgment is entered.” For the award of interest here to be authorized by § 8, the relevant § 6F award below must be considered a “judgment.” See Osborne v. Biotti, 404 Mass. 112, 114, 533 N.E.2d 1341 (1989). Without explicitly using the term “judgment,” § 6F provides that “the court shall award to each party against whom ... claims [found to be insubstantial, frivolous, and not advanced in good faith] were asserted an amount representing the reasonable counsel fees and other costs and expenses incurred in defending such claims.” As discussed in Osborne, supra, § 8 is silent as to the meaning of the term “judgment.” The court in Osborne, in analyzing whether an “award of costs was ‘a judgment for the payment of money’ within the meaning of § 8,” ibid., determined that “an award of costs bears interest from the date of entry to the date of execution.” Id. at 117, 533 N.E.2d 1341. We follow the Osborne court and also hold that a “judgment” is “the act of the trial court finally adjudicating the rights of the parties affected by the judgment” and starts the timetable for appellate review. Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(a), 365 Mass. 820 (1974). See id. at 114, 533 N.E.2d 1341; Ben v. Schultz, 47 Mass.App.Ct. 808, 811, 716 N.E.2d 681 (1999).
Like a formally titled “judgment,” an award of fees and costs pursuant to § 6F is subject to immediate appeal, starting the “timetable for appellate review.” G.L. c. 231, § 6G.7 Compare Mass.R.A.P. 4(a), 430 Mass. 1603 (1999) (appeals may be taken from entry of judgment). Whether a § 6F award of attorneys' fees and costs is “the final adjudicating act of the trial court” is a more complicated matter. This court has previously noted that “a motion brought under [ § 6F] is not part of the merits of the underlying action but is collateral to the judgment entered in that action.” Ben, 47 Mass.App.Ct. at 813, 716 N.E.2d 681. The collateral nature of § 6F motions means that, “any award granted [pursuant to § 6F] has no freestanding effect until all appeals of the underlying judgment are completed.” Id. at 814, 716 N.E.2d 681. In the case at bar, all appeals of the underlying judgment were completed in 2008 when the Supreme Judicial Court denied further appellate review of the decision. See Fronk v. Fowler, 451 Mass. 1107, 888 N.E.2d 955 (2008). The order granting the defendants' motion for interest on the § 6F award was decided in January, 2011. The plaintiffs' separate appeal of the § 6F award was also final at the time that interest was ordered. See Fronk II, 456 Mass. at 336, 923 N.E.2d 503. At the time that the trial court ordered interest on the attorneys' fees and costs, the § 6F award in this case was final. We conclude that when interest was ordered on the § 6F award, this award met the definition of “judgment” for the purposes of § 8.8,9 As the Supreme Judicial Court has stated, “[a] judgment will be treated on the footing of its substance and not of its name.” Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v. Zagami, 419 Mass. 220, 224, 643 N.E.2d 448 (1994) (citation omitted). See Gaulin v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 744, 746 & n. 6, 748 & n. 8, 505 N.E.2d 898, S.C., 401 Mass. 1001, 515 N.E.2d 583 (1987) ().
Relying on Patry v. Liberty Mobilehome Sales, Inc., 394 Mass. 270, 272, 475 N.E.2d 392 (1985), and Osborne, 404 Mass. at 116, 533 N.E.2d 1341, plaintiffs also argue that awarding interest on attorney's fees, as opposed to costs,10 is improper.11 We disagree. In Patry, the Supreme Judicial Court held that Patry, 394 Mass. at 272, 475 N.E.2d 392. Subsequent cases, however, have clarified that Patry was only commenting on the availability of prejudgment interest on attorney's fees, not the postjudgment interest on attorneys' fees that are at issue here. See International Totalizing Sys., Inc., v. PepsiCo, Inc., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 437, 560 N.E.2d 749 (1990); Nardone v. Patrick Motor Sales, Inc., 46 Mass.App.Ct. 452, 453 n. 3, 706 N.E.2d 1151 (1999).
Because we rule that this § 6F award of...
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