Fuhrmann v. State, 87-1419

• Citation: 433 N.W.2d 720
• Decision Date: 21 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-1419,87-1419
• Parties: Joachim Siegfried FUHRMANN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 720

433 N.W.2d 720

Joachim Siegfried FUHRMANN, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 87-1419.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 21, 1988.

Raymond E. Rogers, Acting Appellate Defender, and James F. Whalen, Asst. Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Sarah J. Coats, Asst. Atty. Gen., E.A. Westfall, Co. Atty., and Tim Markel, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and SCHULTZ, CARTER, NEUMAN and ANDREASEN, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The issue presented is whether the district court must appoint counsel for a pro se applicant for postconviction relief when the petition shows on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss and did not rule on the applicant's pending motion requesting the appointment of counsel. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the court's action was proper.

On January 23, 1976, applicant Joachim Siegfried Fuhrmann was convicted of the crimes of first degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated robbery, resulting in sentences of life, thirty, and twenty-five years in prison, respectively. These convictions were affirmed on appeal. See State v. Fuhrmann, 257 N.W.2d 619 (Iowa 1977).

On July 29, 1987, applicant filed a pro se postconviction relief application. He also requested the appointment of counsel, stating three grounds for relief. First, he claims ineffective assistance of counsel by asserting that his trial court attorney did not represent him in his best and direct interest. Second, applicant raises a due process argument that he was not afforded representation of his peers on the jury. Third, he maintains that he was not represented by laws of international judiciaries.

The State filed a motion to dismiss based on the applicant's failure to file the postconviction relief application within the applicable three-year limitation period as set forth in Iowa Code section 663A.3 (1987). Applicant resisted the motion, emphasizing his need of counsel for the motion to dismiss hearing. Relying on the statute of limitations, the court dismissed the action without addressing the motion for counsel.

The absence of a written ruling may indicate that the court did not exercise its discretion in determining whether the appointment of counsel was required. See State v. Grady, 367 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Iowa App.1985). Regardless, we strongly disapprove of the court's failure to prepare a written ruling in response to applicant's request for appointed counsel. Whether the court's failure to exercise discretion is reversible error requires further examination respecting the legal and factual requirements for the appointment of counsel however. First, we detect no state or federal constitutional grounds for counsel in such a proceeding. It should be noted that applicant makes no such claim. Indeed the United States Supreme Court has clearly announced the right to appointed counsel for a convicted criminal extends only to the first appeal of right, not to a collateral appeal on a conviction that has long since become final upon the exhaustion of the appellate process. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 552, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 1991, 95 L.Ed.2d 539, 545-46 (1987). We would construe our own constitution likewise.

We next examine statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel in postconviction proceedings. Our legislature has provided that the cost of legal services shall be made available to an indigent applicant. Iowa Code § 663A.5 (1987). In construing this section, we have observed that "an attorney need not always be appointed to represent an individual postconviction applicant." Furgison v. State, 217 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1974) citing State v. Mulqueen, 188 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Iowa 1971). We noted in Furgison that trial judges would ordinarily be well-advised to appoint counsel for indigents and instructed that such applications must be considered in the light most favorable to the applicant. Id. at 615. We additionally stated that if it "appears a substantial issue of law or fact may exist, then counsel should be at once appointed." Id. at 615-16. We also referred to the A.B.A. Standards, Post-Conviction Remedies, section 4.4, commentary at 66 (Approved Draft 1968) which states in part:

If an application, in light of the state's response, raises no claim cognizable in a post-conviction proceeding, it is wasteful to appoint counsel to determine solely if the applicant has some grounds for relief not stated in his original application.

Id. at 615. Therefore, the trial court's failure to appoint counsel must be reviewed by examining the application in a light most favorable to the applicant to determine whether a substantial issue of law or fact may exist. If such an issue is present, the refusal or failure to act is prejudicial error.

In this case the issue grows out of the dismissal of the application. We must decide whether the application on its face is barred by the statute of limitations....