Fuller v. Nassau County Dept. of Social Services

Decision Date22 February 1974
Citation77 Misc.2d 677,352 N.Y.S.2d 978
PartiesHennie FULLER et al., Petitioners, For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules, v. NASSAU COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Leonard S. Clark by Carl Jay Nathanson, Hempstead, of counsel, Nassau County Law Services Committee, Inc., for petitioners.

Joseph Jaspan, County Atty., Nassau County, for respondents Nassau County Dept. of Social Services & Joseph D'Elia by Vincent M. Esposito, Mineola, of counsel.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. of N.Y. for respondent Lavine by Joseph J. Vicinanza, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel.

BERTRAM HARNETT, Justice.

Our poverty stricken aged, blind, and disabled, asking for their next welfare check as their financial breath, hear in horror each of the giant bureaucracies of the county, state, and nation blithely reply, 'who, me?' Unfortunately, this current version of a great American game falls with harsh impact on a most vulnerable segment of our society. In the language of legal precincts, it is Exhibit 'A' in the mindless absorption of human beings into computerized oblivion.

No one disputes that these people are entitled to their money. The only question is who pays and when. But, this is vital, because without their subsistence allowances in hand, these people cannot pay for today's food and shelter. These are not commercial concerns maintaining lines of credit, or persons with resources to fall back upon; these are unfortunate citizens who by social principle and administrative determination have demonstrably immediate need for that next dollar.

The mess arose in January 1974 with a new changeover in the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled program. Where previously the states made the assistance grants in the first instance, now the federal government has assumed that responsibility. In the course of what is undeniably a massive administrative task, apparently large numbers of recipients failed to receive any January or February checks, or in many other instances, received sums significantly below their true entitlement. Whether this results from machine or programming inadequacy, improper input data, lack of intergovernmental cooperation, blown fuses, or files dropped between cabinets, the drastic facts remain that either no payment or underpayments have resulted on a large scale. These people need, want, and ask for their entitlement from Someplace.

This has not seemed to faze the federal mechanics. Although the federal government did not appear in this case, we gather the federal position is purely one of patience--someone else's patience to be sure--the matter will be corrected in due time. The state and the county, on the other hand, sympathize, but urge that the federal government has taken over and should pay. The also worry that if they make payments they will not be reimbursed by the federal government, and they are fearful the recipients will get double payments when the federal computers finally crank out the proper checks.

In the meantime, what about the people? We refer not to a number on the file, or to a place on a magnetic tape, but to the flesh and blood citizen whose eating and being are staked out on the imminency of assistance. If the bureaucrats are all correct, these people can get no relief, except that portended by the lapse of time and beneficient federal intention.

One thing is very plain to this Court. The needy aged, blind, and disabled Must receive assistance from someplace. No matter the genius employed to rationalize statutes, administrative schema, and public fiscal policy, the people and their problem simply do not go away. At the time of submission of the original pleadings of this case, with the county's cooperation, we directed interim continuance of payment by the county to AABD recipients who did not receive their full entitlements, until our conclusion could be reached. In this way, the people were protected during the legal disputation.

Now that we have had an opportunity to review the pleadings, oral argument, and memoranda of law, we will direct that the State and the County continue the monthly provision of December 1973 for all persons adversely affected by the changeover. We find that the State (and the County, its local agency) has residual responsibility.

New York has a number of possible alternatives, other than blanket denial of its duty of care, that will protect its legitimate fiscal concerns. If the State is concerned about duplicate payment, it can protect itself under existing provision allowing legal procedure against social service recipients where assets (in this case, one of the double payments) are located. 1 Indeed, it may condition its payment on assignment by the recipient of his claim to any duplicate benefit from the federal government. Immediate inter-agency communications may be established so that a due-but-late federal check can be intercepted and stopped after a state grant has been issued (with later negotiation between the government bodies as to which one is to bear the ultimate burden of such monies expended). Moreover, the State might treat with the federal government to solve the problem politically, administratively, or legislatively. 2 The people here cannot be put to the burden of suing the federal government in yet another forum. If there is more judicial recourse indicated, let those better equipped pursue it. At the bottom, the possibility of avoidable governmental mistake is no reason to let the afflicted become more afflicted.

Simple humanity and common sense require these results. Yet, the case offers a veritable panoply of technical points through which the Court and counsel have picked their way. For the record, the Court will indicate summarily its thoughts on the principal legal points raised.

Parenthetically, the Court must observe the effective representation of the petitioners here by the Nassau County Law Services Committee, a neighborhood law office project. The class here would have been helpless to dispute the manifest injustice posed without such assistance. In a time when social legal services are subject to much (and some deserved) criticism, it is heartening to see such a concrete example of good work and inherent systemic justification.

1. Added Parties

Four new people have requested leave to intervene as petitioners in addition to the three originally named. They are disabled, blind, or elderly persons whose January 1974 federal grants were drastically reduced below the amounts received from the County in December 1973. Since no one disputes their need, nor opposes the requested intervention, it is granted. CPLR 1013.

2. Class Action and Declaratory Relief

The essence of this Article 78 proceeding is to declare the rights of the parties. It is to determine what state and local responsibility lies after January 1, 1974 for the care of persons who were receiving AABD benefits in Nassau County in December 1973. The blanket state and local departmental denial of responsibility establishes a common policy affecting all members of the class, without need for individuation.

This proceeding may be treated as a declaratory judgment and class action pursuant to CPLR 103(c), 1005, and 3001; Matter of Young v. Shuart, 67 Misc.2d 689, 325 N.Y.S.2d 113, affd. 39 A.D.2d 724, 331 N.Y.S.2d 962; Matter of Cisco v. Lavine, 72 Misc.2d 1009, 1087, 340 N.Y.S.2d 275. The avoidance of multiple lawsuits raising the same issue, and the need for clarification of the various relationships involved in the new assistance programs, commend this course. Moreover, the controversy involves no real factual disputation.

3. Absence of Federal Agency

The State seeks to dismiss this proceeding for lack of a necessary party, the Social Security Administration, the federal agency in charge of administering the new program. The primary issue here--the responsibilities of state and local authorities to its own residents under residual state law, if any,--can be effectively determined by the parties before the Court and complete relief accorded, regardless of any additional federal responsibilities which may exist. Weinstein-Korn-Miller, New York Civil Practice, 1001.05. The federal agency is not a necessary party to the state law resolution. In any event, the federal agency could not likely be joined without its consent.

The Court will, therefore, exercise its discretion under CPLR 1001(b) and proceed to the merits of the state law controversy.

However, there is one separate claim stated which is not passed upon here because it does necessarily involve the federal government. Petitioners contend that, under the doctrine of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required that prior notice and opportunity to be heard be afforded before any regular assistance entitlements were reduced in the January 1974 federal changeover. It does not appear that state prior notice and hearing procedures, 18 NYCRR Part 358, apply independently to reductions in monthly entitlements that are now provided in the first instance by the Social Security Administration under federal law. Regardless, this issue of prior notice directly and substantially affects the Social Security Administration, since its determination must include an examination and evaluation of federal procedures for grant issuance and for hearing grievances concerning denial or reduction of the recurring federal grant. The Court cannot and does not decide this point without having the federal agency joined as a party. Cf. China Sugar Refining Co. v. Anderson, 6 Misc.2d 184, 152 N.Y.S.2d 507.

4. Background of the New Program

Title XVI of the Social Security Act, entitled 'Supplemental Security Income For The Aged, Blind And Disabled' (SSI),...

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