Fulton County v. Lord
| Decision Date | 25 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | A13A1605.,Nos. A13A0694,A13A0695,s. A13A0694 |
| Citation | 323 Ga.App. 384,746 S.E.2d 188 |
| Parties | FULTON COUNTY v. LORD, et al. Lord, et al. v. Fulton County. Fulton County v. Lord, et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Lanna Renee Hill, James J. Thomas II, Robert David Ware, Kaye Woodard Burwell, Jerolyn Webb Ferrari, for Fulton County.
Larry Hugh Chesin, Atlanta, Regan Emory Keebaugh, Allan Leroy Parks Jr., for Lord, et al.
In 2006, Georgia Lord and twenty two other Judicial Staff Attorneys (“law clerks”) employed by the Superior and State Courts of Fulton County filed a grievance against Fulton County, pursuant to the County's civil-service policies, claiming that they were unfairly paid less than the staff attorneys employed by the County Attorney's office (“CASAs”), despite performing similar work. Ultimately, the grievance was submitted to arbitration, also pursuant to the County's policies, in which the law clerks prevailed and were awarded injunctive relief and back pay. A superior court confirmed the award, and the County now appeals.
In Case No. A13A0694, the County contends that the superior court erred in confirming the arbitration award, arguing that the award of back pay was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The County further contends that the court erred in denying the County's request for relief from a stipulation as to damages. In Case No. A13A0695, the law clerks cross-appeal, arguing that the court erred in stating that the County had to achieve pay parity between the law clerks and the CASAs as of the date of the court's confirmation order instead of the date of the arbitration award. And in Case No. A13A1605, the County contends that the trial court erred in granting the law clerks' motion for sanctions under OCGA § 9–15–14.
For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm in Case Nos. A13A0694 and A13A1605. However, because we agree that the superior court's confirmation order should have stated that the County had to achieve pay parity as of the date of the arbitration award, in Case No. A13A0695, we vacate that portion of the order and remand the case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The record shows that in 1995, the County hired a consulting firm to perform an in-depth “job and pay classification study” in order to assist the County in developing a comprehensive compensation system. In 1997, the consulting firm's study and classification system was adopted by the County Commission. Under this system, CASAs and judicial law clerks received an identical pay grade (C–42) and job classification code (Attorney, Staff–606022). Also pursuant to the study, the County adopted a concept designated as “premium pay” to address situations in which particular job classifications received less compensation than similar positions outside of County employment. But while the consulting firm's study found that the 606022 classification as a whole was compensated 36 percent less than similar non-County positions, the County Commission awarded premium pay to CASAs but not to the law clerks. As a result, CASAs received significantly more in salary than the law clerks.
In 2005, the County Commission eliminated “premium pay” but created a new pay scale for licensed professionals, which it designated as “Schedule B.” Under Schedule B, CASAs continued receiving the 36 percent premium pay. And although Schedule B did not change the fact that CASAs and law clerks were designated with the same job classification and did not indicate any substantive changes in the job responsibilities of either position, the law clerks were not included in Schedule B and, thus, continued to receive approximately 36 percent less in salary than the CASAs.
In 2006, the law clerks filed a group-pay grievance pursuant to the rules governing the County's civil-service system. Specifically, the law clerks claimed that they were not receiving “equal pay for equal work,” as required by the County's personnel regulations, in light of the fact that the CASAs received approximately 36 percent (nearly $20,000) more in annual salary and despite being in the same job classification and performing equivalent duties. Consequently, the law clerks sought an end to this pay disparity, including back pay. For over two years thereafter, the law clerks' grievance was not heard, despite the fact that County Policy (“P & P”) § 100–24 provided that grievances may be filed to resolve “Classification and pay issues.” This policy notwithstanding, the County's Grievance Review Committee (“GRC”) claimed the issue was not subject to grievance procedures because the proper remedy was to seek a salary reclassification through the Personnel Board. However, the Personnel Board similarly refused to hear the law clerks' grievance. Ultimately, the law clerks filed a writ of mandamus in the Superior Court of Fulton County.1 The court granted the writ, ruling that the law clerks had a right to have their grievance heard, a right to appeal the GRC's decision to the County Manager, and a right to seek arbitration pursuant to County policies.
In November 2009, the GRC heard the law clerks' grievance and denied the claim five months later. The County Manager upheld that decision, and, thereafter, the law clerks commenced arbitration. The parties then agreed to an arbitrator, who directed the law clerks to file a demand for arbitration and the County to file an answer. In their demand, the law clerks alleged that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the matter and sought relief for the County's violation of law and breach of contract ( i.e., an end to the pay disparity and a recovery of back pay). The County answered, and discovery ensued.
After discovery concluded, the arbitrator scheduled a hearing on whether the County was liable for the pay disparity, pursuant to an earlier agreement between the parties that liability would be determined in phase one of the proceedings and damages would be determined, if necessary, in phase two. The hearing was held on June 13 and 14, 2011, during which the arbitrator heard evidence regarding the County's job classification and compensation system, as well as evidence regarding the CASAs and law clerks' job duties. And on August 25, 2011, the arbitrator issued an award in favor of the law clerks, ruling that the County had violated its own policies and ordinances by paying the law clerks less than it paid CASAs.
A few weeks later, at a status conference that had been scheduled to discuss various aspects of the damages issue, the County announced that it was considering whether to assert that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the law clerks' claim for back pay. The arbitrator ordered the parties to brief the issue and ultimately scheduled a hearing for December 2, 2011. Prior to this hearing, the parties apparently resolved the damages issue by agreement and stipulation to the method for calculating back pay, benefits, and interest. Thereafter, the hearing on the County's sovereign-immunity defense was held, and a few weeks later, on December 29, 2011, the arbitrator issued an order ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar the law clerks' claim for back pay. On that same day, the arbitrator issued a final award in favor of the law clerks, which included $4,354,692.90 for back pay and prejudgment interest from the date of the award to the entry of judgment.
On January 11, 2012, the law clerks filed a motion to confirm the arbitration award in the superior court. Approximately one month later, the County filed a motion to dismiss the award, or in the alternative, to vacate it, arguing that the law clerks' claim for back pay was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On July 24, 2012, after holding a hearing one month earlier, the superior court denied the County's motion and confirmed the arbitrator's award. Shortly thereafter, the law clerks filed a motion for entry of judgment, in which they argued that, in addition to the arbitrator's award, they were entitled to back pay that accrued during the time period between the entry of the award and the entry of the superior court's judgment. In opposing that motion, the County—for the first time—argued that the calculations for back pay, to which they had previously agreed and stipulated to during the arbitration proceedings, were “grossly inflated.” And during a hearing on the matter, the County argued that the stipulation was the result of a mistake.
Nevertheless, on August 30, 2012, the superior court entered judgment on the confirmed award but did not include the accrued post-award back pay that the law clerks requested. Not long thereafter, the law clerks filed a motion seeking attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9–15–14. The superior court granted the motion and awarded the law clerks $94,557.50 in attorney fees. These appeals follow.
At the outset, we note that the purpose of Georgia's Arbitration Code is to allow participating parties “to obtain an expeditious and final resolution of disputes by means that circumvent the time and expense associated with civil litigation.” 2 To achieve that purpose, our Arbitration Code “places strict limits on the scope of a trial court's review of an arbitrator's award and on any subsequent review by an appellate court.” 3 In fact, the Code “requires courts give extraordinary deference to arbitration awards and commands that a trial court shall confirm an award upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to the party, unless the award is vacated or modified by the court as provided in the Arbitration Code.” 4 Toward that end, OCGA § 9–9–13(b) “lists five grounds for vacating arbitration awards, and these statutory grounds provide the exclusive bases for vacatur.” 5 Specifically, that statute provides as follows:
The award shall be vacated on the application of a party who ... participated in the...
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