Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Authority v. Metzger, FULTON-D

• Decision Date: 12 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. A91A1460,FULTON-D,A91A1460
• Citation: 417 S.E.2d 163,203 Ga.App. 595
• Parties: eKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY v. METZGER.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 163

417 S.E.2d 163

203 Ga.App. 595

FULTON-DeKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY v. METZGER.

No. A91A1460.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 12, 1992.

Reconsideration Denied April 1, 1992.

Certiorari Denied July 6, 1992.

Arrington & Hollowell, Stephanie Getter, W. Ray Persons, Robert J. Routman, Atlanta, for appellant.

Davis & Sissel, Kenneth M. Sissel, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Alston & Bird, Joseph W. Crooks, Mary C. Gill, Atlanta, amici curiae.

COOPER, Judge.

Appellee was employed by appellant as a paramedic on December 18, 1988, when he sustained an injury while on the job. At the time appellee was hired, appellant's Personnel Policies & Practices handbook ("handbook") provided that if an employee were unable to work as a result of an on- the-job injury, he would receive his regular rate of pay while disabled. In December 1986, the handbook was revised to read that on the job injuries would be governed by Georgia workers' compensation laws. Despite the revision of the handbook, appellee was paid his full salary of $485.30 per week from the date of his injury until February 18, 1990. On that date, appellant changed its practice of paying full salaries to workers injured on the job to payment of full salary for only four months and payment of weekly workers' compensation benefits thereafter, which was $175 per week in appellee's case. Appellee brought this action to recover the difference between his full salary and the workers' compensation payments, asserting a vested property interest in a contract of employment with appellant which included, as a condition of employment, payment of full salary in case of injury on the job. Denying the existence of such a contract, appellant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that appellant is not contractually bound by the handbook, that appellee is an employee at will; and that appellee failed to set forth a claim cognizable under Georgia law. The trial court determined that although there was no written contract of employment, the version of the handbook in effect when appellee was hired, which authorized payment of full salary, constituted a binding contract between the parties, in accordance with Fletcher v. Amax, Inc., 160 Ga.App. 692, 288 S.E.2d 49 (1981). We granted appellant's application for interlocutory appeal to consider the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss.

1. We initially call appellant's attention to Court of Appeals Rules 14 and 27 which require that enumerations of error, as well as briefs, be filed within 20 days after the case is docketed. Despite appellant's failure to file an enumeration of error, we have exercised our discretion to nevertheless consider the merits of this appeal.

2. Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding a binding contract between the parties in view of express language in the revised handbook which provides: "This employee handbook is intended to acquaint you with the policies, procedures and benefits of working at The Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority. It is not intended and shall not constitute terms or conditions of employment or a contractual agreement or arrangement. The Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority subscribes to the contents of this handbook, but reserves the right at any time, with or without notice, to modify, suspend or eliminate any of the matters set forth in this handbook." The record demonstrates that while appellee was given a copy of the revised handbook in 1987, which contained the above quoted language, the version of the handbook distributed by appellant at the time appellee was hired did not contain such language. Appellant contends that it did not intend to be bound by the policies recited in the earlier handbook and that its payment of full salary after the revision was a gratuity.

Although the handbook does not specify a definite period of employment and bestow upon appellee the status of permanent lifetime employee, it, nevertheless, can be considered a contract with respect to the employment benefits provided therein. See Georgia Ports Auth. v. Rogers, 173 Ga.App. 538, 327 S.E.2d 511 (1985). Appellee was not suing in regard to his employment status, but his claim was based upon appellant's extension of certain benefits to appellee which were payable in the event of a compensable...