Fumo v. PA. PUBLIC UTILITY COM'N

• Decision Date: 24 September 1998
• Citation: 719 A.2d 10
• Parties: Vincent J. FUMO, individually as a taxpayer, and in his official capacity as a State Senator, Consumers Education and Protective Association, and Tenant Action Group, Petitioners, v. The PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, and John M. Quain, Chairman Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Respondents.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

719 A.2d 10

Vincent J. FUMO, individually as a taxpayer, and in his official capacity as a State Senator, Consumers Education and Protective Association, and Tenant Action Group, Petitioners, v. The PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, and John M. Quain, Chairman Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Respondents.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 18, 1998.

Decided September 24, 1998.

As Amended September 29, 1998.

Philip A. Bertocci, Philadelphia, Christopher B. Craig, Harrisburg, for petitioner.

Howard G. Hopkirk, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for respondent.

Maxine M. Woelfling and Linda J. Shorey, Harrisburg, for intervenor.

Before COLINS, President Judge, and DOYLE, McGINLEY, PELLEGRINI, FRIEDMAN, FLAHERTY and LEADBETTER, JJ.

DOYLE, Judge.

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission and its Chairman, John M. Quain, (collectively, PUC) to a Petition for Review filed by Senator Vincent J. Fumo, both individually and in his official capacity as a state senator.

On April 27, 1995, House Bill 1509 (Bill), printer's number 1762 was introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. The Bill, which at that time consisted of two pages, proposed to amend the Public Utility Code by increasing the maximum number of years that a taxi cab may be operated from six to eight years, and was referred to the House Consumer Affairs Committee.

On May 23, 1995, the Bill was reported out of committee as committed in its original form and was immediately referred to the House Appropriations Committee. The Bill was then reported out of that committee, still in its original form on June 5, 1995, for consideration by the entire Pennsylvania House of Representatives. The Bill was passed by the House by a vote of 203-0 and was sent to the Senate.

In the Senate, the Bill was referred to the Senate Consumer Protection and Professional Licensure Committee. After remaining in that committee for approximately seventeen months, the Bill, still in its original form, was reported out of that committee on November 18, 1996, and was referred to the Senate Rules and Executive Nominations Committee. While in that committee, the Bill underwent substantial modification, further amending the Public Utility Code to include the addition of 84 pages of amendments relating to the deregulation of the generation of electricity. On November 20, 1996, the Bill was reported out of the Rules and Executive Nominations Committee and was referred to the Appropriations Committee. On November 25, 1996, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out the Bill. Following debate, as well as proposed amendments to the Bill, it was passed by the entire body of the Senate by a vote of 40-10¹ and was then sent to the House for concurrence in the Senate amendments. Following discussion and some debate of the Bill in the House, that chamber did concur in the Senate amendments on November 25, 1996, by a vote of 171-40. House Bill 1509, printer's number 4282, was subsequently signed into law by Governor Ridge on December 3, 1996 and became Act 138 of 1996 (Act 138).

On March 18, 1997, Senator Fumo filed a Petition for Review challenging the enactment of Act 138 on the grounds that it was enacted in violation of Sections 1, 3, and 4 of Article III, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Those Sections of Article III provide as follows:

§ 1. Passage of laws

No law shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so altered or amended, on its passage through either House, as to change its original purpose.

....

§ 3. Form of bills

No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.

§ 4. Consideration of bills

Every bill shall be considered on three different days in each House. All amendments made thereto shall be printed for the use of the members before the final vote is taken on the bill and before the final vote is taken, upon written request addressed to the presiding officer of either House by at least twenty-five per cent of the members elected to that House, any bill shall be read at length in that House. No bill shall become a law, unless on its final passage the vote is taken by yeas and nays, the names of the persons voting for and against it are entered on the journal, and a majority of the members elected to each House is recorded thereon as voting in its favor.

Pa. Const. art. III, §§ 1, 3, 4. Based on these averments, Senator Fumo has requested a declaration from this Court that the enactment of Act 138 violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, and was thus void, as well as an order permanently enjoining the Chairman of the PUC from taking any action pursuant to Act 138. On April 17, 1997, the PUC filed Preliminary Objections to the Petition for Review. Specifically, the PUC argued that Senator Fumo lacked standing to bring the claim and that the claims set forth in the Petition for Review involve non-justiciable political questions pursuant to the Enrolled Bill Doctrine.

We will first address the PUC's objection relating to the justiciability of this claim, finding that dispositive of the litigation.

The starting point of our analysis is the presumption of constitutionality that all legislative enactments enjoy under both the rules of statutory construction and decisions of the courts. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(3); Common Cause of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 668 A.2d 190 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), aff'd, 544 Pa. 512, 677 A.2d 1206 (1996); Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 436 A.2d 593 (1981). Under the Enrolled Bill Doctrine, a court will not look beyond the certified enactment of the legislation to the process by which the law came to be passed. The rationale of this principle of judicial restraint was explained as follows:

[W]hen a law has been passed and approved and certified in due form, it is no part of the duty of the judiciary to go behind the law as duly certified to inquire into the observance of form in its passage.... The presumption in favor of regularity is essential to the peace and order of the state.

Common Cause, 668 A.2d at 195 (quoting Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa. 401, 412 (1877)).

The deference afforded by the courts under the purview of the Enrolled Bill Doctrine is not mandatory, of course, but rather is discretionary in nature. Therefore, in limited and compelling circumstances, courts of this Commonwealth have not followed the general rule of abstention, but have looked beyond the certified law to the enactment process. See Common Cause; Consumer Party v. Commonwealth, 510 Pa. 158, 507 A.2d 323 (1986)

.

In Consumer Party, Senate Bill 270, the bill at issue in that case, began as legislation to fill vacancies in third through eighth class counties. Specifically, the title of that bill read as follows:

An act amending the act of August 9, 1955 (P.L. 323, No. 130), entitled `an act relating to counties of the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight classes; amending, revising, consolidating and changing the laws relating thereto' further providing for the filling of vacancies in certain circumstances.

Consumer Party, 507 A.2d at 325.

After several considerations, the bill was passed and referred to the House of Representatives for approval. While in the House, the bill was amended, but retained the same title. However, the Senate refused to concur in the amendments made by the House. Therefore, the bill was sent to a Committee of Conference where members of both chambers sought to achieve a compromise of the content of the bill. The version of the bill that was reported out of the Committee of Conference was significantly different than the original bill and was entitled:

An act establishing salaries and compensation of certain public officials including justices and judges of Statewide courts, judges of courts of common pleas, judge of the Philadelphia Municipal Court, judges of the Philadelphia Traffic Court, district justices and the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the State Treasurer, the Auditor General, the Attorney General and certain other State officers and the salary and certain expenses of the members of the General Assembly; and repealing certain inconsistent acts.

Id. at 326. On September 28, 1983, both chambers adopted the Committee's bill, and the bill was signed by then-Governor Thornburgh on September 30, 1983.

Subsequently, the Consumer Party commenced an action in this Court seeking to void Senate Bill 270 on the grounds that it violated Article III of the Pennsylvania Constitution. This Court sustained the Preliminary Objections of the Commonwealth.² This Court noted that "absent a clear violation of the Constitution, this Court will defer to the legislative judgment of the General Assembly." Consumer Party, 475 A.2d at 854. The Consumer Party appealed to our Supreme Court which affirmed our decision. The Supreme Court, citing its decision in Scudder v. Smith, discussed the purpose behind Article III, Section 1:

"The purpose of the constitutional requirements relating to the enactment of laws was to put the members of the [General] Assembly and others interested on notice... so they might vote on it with circumspection."

Consumer Party, 510 Pa. at 179, 507 A.2d at 334 (quoting Scudder v. Smith, 331 Pa. 165, 170-71, 200 A. 601, 604 (1938)). Thus, the principle behind Article III, Section 1, and indeed, Section 3 of that same article, is to ensure that interested parties, and especially members of the General Assembly charged with representing the citizens of the Commonwealth, are on notice of the contents of a bill and are not misled by the title or general contents of a bill. Thus, at bedrock, these two sections of Article III ensure that those charged with representing the citizens of the Commonwealth know the type and content of legislation for...