Gagne v. Berry, 5956
| Decision Date | 28 April 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 5956,5956 |
| Citation | 112 N.H. 125,290 A.2d 624 |
| Parties | Leona M. GAGNE v. Ashman L. BERRY, Sr. Napoleon Paul GAGNE v. Ashman L. BERRY, Sr. Ashman L. BERRY, Jr. v. Ashman L. BERRY, Sr. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Flynn, Powell & McGuirk, J. Christopher McGuirk and Raymond P. Blanchard, Portsmouth, for plaintiffs.
Calderwood, Silverman & Ouellette and William B. Cullimore, Dover, for defendant.
The sole issue to be determined is whether the rights of guests in automobiles are to be decided by the law of Massachusetts under which a host is liable only if the injuries are caused by gross negligence or by the law of New Hampshire under which a guest may recover if the injuries are caused by the host's lack of ordinary care under the circumstances. The issue presents a true conflict. Taylor v. Bullock, 111 N.H. 214, 279 A.2d 585 (1971).
On March 11, 1968, the defendant Ashman L. Berry, Sr., of Northboro, Massachusetts, was the operator of an automobile which was in collision in Rochester, New Hampshire, with a car operated by Lucille A. Seaman of East Rochester. Plaintiffs Ashman L. Berry, Jr., Leona M. Gagne and Napoleon Paul Gagne, all of Massachusetts were passengers in the Berry automobile as was his wife Dorothy who is not a party to this appeal. The accident happened during the course of a trip from Massachusetts to Maine where the parties planned to attend the funeral of a friend after which they intended to return home. Defendant filed a motion that the rights of the plaintiffs against their host be determined by the laws of Massachusetts. The Trial Court (Leahy, C.J.) granted the motion in regard to the case of Ashman L. Berry, Jr., subject to his exception, and denied the motion with regard to the cases of the Gagnes subject to defendant's exception. The exceptions of the parties were reserved and transferred to this court.
Ashman is the emancipated son of the defendant. He was 30 years of age and lived in Marlboro, Massachusetts. Under Massachusetts law his rights against his father are of the same nature as those of the Gagnes, the other gratuitous guests. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child s. 157 (1971). This presents no conflict. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930).
This court has concluded that choice-of-law decisions such as the present one ought to be based directly upon five relevant considerations. Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 353-355, 222 A.2d 205, 208 (1966). They are 'predictability of results; (2) maintenance of reasonable orderliness and good relationship among the States in our federal system; (3) simplification of the judicial task; (4) advancement by the court of its own State's governmental interests rather than those of other States; (5) the Court's preference for what it regards as the sounder rule of law, as between the competing ones.' Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 3, 241 A.2d 372, 373 (1968).
The issue in Clark v. Clark, supra, was whether the guest statute of Vermont or the ordinary negligence law of this State should determine the rights of the parties, residents of New Hampshire on a trip for the evening which took them to Vermont where the accident happened. This court decided after analysis that the New Hampshire rule was the sounder rule and that its application in the case would be consonant with the relevant considerations which should influence the choice-of-law.
Defendant points out in his brief that like the Clark case the present parties are residents of Massachusetts on a journey which carried them briefly in this State, in both cases the parties resided outside of the State where the accident happened and that the host-guest relationship was created in the State of their residence where they were to return.
The method of arriving at a choice-of-law adopted by this court in Clark involves an analysis and evaluation of the aforementioned considerations which is to be made by the forum State. The significance of the factual and legal considerations present which motivated the result reached in that case can differ in the case which is now under consideration. It is to be noted that in this case the forum and the place of conduct and of the injury coincide, which was not so in Clark. Consequently when a set of facts leads to the application of the guest law of the residence of the parties (Clark) it does not necessarily follow that the reverse facts will lead to the same result. Conklin v. Horner, 38 Wis.2d 468, 479, 157 N.W.2d 579, 584 (1968).
This court has stated on prior occasions that the State of New Hampshire has an obvious interest in providing redress for injuries which occur on our highways. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 32, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (1966); Dow v. Larrabee, 107 N.H. 70, 72, 217 A.2d 506, 508 (1966); see Purcell v. Kapelski, 444 F.2d 380, 383 (3rd Cir. 1971). This is especially true when, as in this case, the collision which gave rise to these actions was with an automobile operated by a resident of this State. Our legislature has evidenced this same concern when it enacted RSA ch. 268 requiring motor vehicle insurance and financial responsibility for motor vehicles registered in New Hampshire. Farm Bureau & etc. Ins. Co. v. Garland, 100 N.H. 351, 126 A.2d 246 (1956). It manifested a reemphasized and broadened interest in this direction by Laws 1957, 305:8 (now RSA 268:15) which provides that motor vehicle liability policies cover for accidents with uninsured motor vehicles.
This State also has a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct of motorists within its territory. Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d 578, 601, 151 N.W.2d 664, 674-675 (1967). It is generally agreed that when a conflict of laws exists, the laws of the State where the conduct and injury occur will be applied to determine whether the actor's conduct has satisfied the required standards of behavior. Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 89, 193 A.2d 439, 441 (1963); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, ss. 156, 157 (1971). Adoption of the Massachusetts law in this case would defeat the deterrent effect of our negligence laws by allowing negligent conduct to go undeterred. Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis.2d at 591, 151 N.W.2d at 669-670.
We are of the opinion that the standard of care to be invoked in the case of a hostguest situation involves considerations closely allied to those which govern the question of what law shall regulate the operator of a motor vehicle on our highways. See Leflar, 41 N.Y.U.L.Rev., 267, 293-94 (1966); 71 Col.L.Rev. 548, 561 (1971). This relationship differs materially from the issue of whether a wife can sue a husband for a tort which we have held to be governed by the law of the State of the latter relationship, the State of domicile. Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966); Schneider v. Schneider, 110 N.H. 70, 260 A.2d 97 (1969).
This court has expressed previously a not too favorable evaluation of guest statutes: 'Though still on the books, they contradict the spirit of the times.' Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 357, 222 A.2d 205, 210 (1966). We realize that the Massachusetts hostguest law is of judicial origin. Expressed in simple terms it is based on the following principle: '(W)hen A enters upon a gratuitous undertaking for the benefit of B, the duty of care which A owes to B is only the duty to refrain from gross negligence.' Bagley v. Burkholder, 337 Mass. 246, 248, 149 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1958); Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917). It gives no evidence of having been inspired by considerations of promoting safety on the highways and the principle is not limited to the operation of motor vehicles. Beaulieu v. Lincoln Rides, Inc., 328 Mass. 427, 104 N.E.2d 417 (1951).
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...the law hurts its resident and the state specifically wants to punish its resident in a case of this sort. 29. See, e.g., Gagne v. Berry, 290 A.2d 624 (N.H. 1972); Bray v. Cox, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (App. Div. 1972); Conklin v. Horner, 157 N.W.2d 579 (Wis. 1968). The issue of which rules should ......
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