Gordon v. Kramer

• Decision Date: 25 October 1979
• Docket Number: CA-CIV,No. 2,2
• Citation: 124 Ariz. 442,604 P.2d 1153
• Parties: Wynell E. GORDON, a single woman, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Robert D. KRAMER, a single man, and Shirley Kramer, a single woman, Defendants/Appellees. 3263.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1153

604 P.2d 1153

124 Ariz. 442

Wynell E. GORDON, a single woman, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Robert D. KRAMER, a single man, and Shirley Kramer, a single woman, Defendants/Appellees.

No. 2 CA-CIV 3263.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 2.

Oct. 25, 1979.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 12, 1979.

Review Denied Jan. 3, 1980.

Fred T. Scanlan, Tucson, for plaintiff/appellant

Chandler, Tullar, Udall & Redhair, by D. B. Udall, Tucson, for defendants/appellees.

OPINION

HOWARD, Judge.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment. The sole issue is whether the guest statute of the State of Utah, Sec. 41-9-1, U.C.A.1953, precludes recovery in this personal injury action. ¹ We conclude that it does not and reverse.

In July of 1975, the plaintiff and defendant Robert Kramer were residents of Arizona. The automobile involved in the accident was purchased by Robert Kramer for cash in North Dakota, however, it was registered in North Dakota in the name of his mother, defendant Shirley Kramer, who was, and is, a resident of North Dakota. Robert also paid for the automobile insurance which was issued in North Dakota.

Robert Kramer and another Arizona resident, Kathy Brown Estes, planned a vacation which started, and was to end, in Tucson. They went to Texas, Iowa, North Dakota, Wyoming and Utah. On August 15, 1975, they left Salt Lake City. En route to Tucson, near the town of Nephi, Utah, Robert fell asleep at the wheel. The car went into a ditch and plaintiff was injured. She stayed in a Utah hospital for approximately 11/2 months. At the time of the filing of this action, plaintiff and defendant Robert Kramer, were still residents of Arizona. Arizona has no guest statute, however, the trial court applying Utah law, ruled that plaintiff was barred from suing the defendants. This was clearly incorrect.

In conflict of laws cases, Arizona is committed to the principle that the local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities and follows the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1960); Moore v. Montes, 22 Ariz.App. 562, 529 P.2d 716 (1975). ²

There are three sections of the Restatement which are applicable here. The first is Sec. 145 which states a principle applicable to all torts and to all issues in tort:

"(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contracts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue."

The second applicable section is Sec. 6 which is referred to in Sec. 145. It sets forth choice-influencing factors which a court should consider in choosing the applicable law. ³

" § 6. Choice-of-Law Principles

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied."

The third, Sec. 146, deals specifically with personal injury actions. It states:

"In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied."

Comment C to Sec. 146 states:

"The law of this Section calls for application of the local law of the state where the injury occurred unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. Whether there is such another state should be determined in the light of the choice-of-law principles stated in § 6. In large part, the answer to this question will depend upon whether some other state has a greater interest in the determination of the particular issue than the state where the injury occurred. The extent of the interest of each of the potentially interested states should be determined on the basis, among other things, of the purpose sought to be achieved by their relevant local law rules and of the particular issue (see § 145, Comments C-d )."

As pointed out in Sec. 145, the contracts set forth under paragraph 2 of that section are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. The problem is not resolved simply by the numerical weight of the contacts. It also should be pointed out, that we are not concerned here with the doctrine of forum non conveniens but rather with a choice-of-law problem. Defendants suggest that some weight be given to the fact that the accident was investigated in the State of Utah and plaintiff incurred sizable medical expenses in Utah. The comment to subsection (1) of Sec. 145 states that the principle stated in Sec. 6 underlying all rules of choice-of-law are used in evaluating the significance of a relationship, With respect to the particular issue, to the potentially interested states, the occurrence and the parties. The particular issue in this case is whether a guest can recover damages from his host. Investigation and the incurring of medical expenses in the State of Utah have no relevance to this particular issue. Defendants also suggest that we give significance to the fact that the mother is a North Dakota resident, the car was registered in North Dakota and covered by a policy of insurance issued in North Dakota. First of all, since we are concerned with a choice of law between Utah and Arizona, the North Dakota "contacts" are irrelevant. Furthermore, North Dakota has declared its guest statute unconstitutional. Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974).

We shall now analyze the facts of our case in terms of the choice-influencing factors set forth in Sec. 6. Interstate relationships in the federal system, including interstate travel by residents of various states will not be appreciably affected whichever law is applied. Certainty, predictability and uniformity of results are of particular importance in areas where the parties are likely to give advance thought to the legal consequences of their transactions, but since automobile accidents are not planned, these considerations are largely irrelevant. For the same reason, protection of justified expectations is of little importance.

As for ease in the determination of the law to be applied and its application, an Arizona court can apply Utah's law or its own with about equal ease.

The basic policies underlying the particular field of law are of particular importance in situations where the policies of the interested states are largely the same but where there are nevertheless minor differences between their local rules of law. In such instances, there is good reason for the court to apply the local law of the state which will best achieve the basic policy or policies underlying a particular field of law involved. ⁴

The basic policy in the law of torts is to deter tortious conduct and provide compensation for the injured victim. This purpose is not furthered by guest statutes. Prosser, The Law of Torts, 4th ed. Sec. 34 at 187 (1971) remarks:

"Such statutes have been the result of persistent and effective lobbying on the part of liability insurance companies. The chief argument advanced in support of them has been that in guest cases the insurer, who is required to pay the damages, is peculiarly exposed to collusion between the injured guest and a host anxious to see compensation paid, so long as he does not have to pay it so that the truth does not come out in court, and there is a resulting increase in insurance rates. Essentially, however, the theory of the acts is that one who receives a gratuitous favor in the form of a free ride has no right to demand that his host shall exercise ordinary care not to injure him. The typical guest act case is that of the driver who offers his friend a lift to the office or invites him out to dinner, negligently drives him into a collision, and fractures his skull after which the driver and his insurance company take refuge in the statute, step out of the picture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. If this is good social policy, it at least appears under a novel front."

Furthermore, in addition to North Dakota in Johnson v. Hassett, supra, other states have declared their guest statutes to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the law. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388, 506 P.2d 212 (1973); Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Primes v. Tyler, 43 Ohio St.2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975); Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 91 Nev. 506, 538 P.2d 574 (197...