Gaines v. Sayne
| Decision Date | 13 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. SC95134.,SC95134. |
| Citation | 764 So.2d 578 |
| Parties | Eugene F. GAINES, Petitioner, v. Lynn SAYNE, as personal representative of the estate of Chlodel H. Gaines, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
John B. Gibbons of Salem, Saxon & Nielsen, P.A., Tampa, Florida, for Petitioner.
Theodore J. Rechel and Donald A. Foster of Rechel & Associates, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent.
We have for review Gaines v. Sayne, 727 So.2d 351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in Johnson v. Feeney, 507 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), on the issue of whether the death of a party after entry of a final decree of dissolution of marriage but prior to a decision on a timely motion for rehearing automatically voids the dissolution, abates the dissolution proceeding, and deprives the court of jurisdiction to render any further orders in the matter. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we approve the decision below, which holds that the dissolution was not voided by the subsequent death of a party.
The Gaineses were married in 1982. In January 1996, Mr. Gaines filed for divorce on the ground the marriage was irretrievably broken. In April 1996, Mrs. Gaines filed an answer and a counterpetition seeking alimony and also affirmatively asserting that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered final judgment dissolving the marriage on October 25, 1996. The final judgment also distributed the property held by the parties and awarded alimony. Both parties subsequently sought rehearing, but only as to some of the financial issues resolved. Neither party challenged the dissolution of marriage. Mrs. Gaines raised two issues concerning the equitable distribution; the first involved funds in the parties' joint checking account and the second involved funds in the parties' joint savings account.2 Mr. Gaines, on the other hand, argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court erroneously awarded Mrs. Gaines temporary alimony and because the order was contrary to the findings of the court as reflected in the transcript of the proceedings. The trial court summarily denied Mr. Gaines's motion for rehearing,3 but granted a hearing on Mrs. Gaines's motion to be scheduled at a later date.
Before that scheduled hearing took place, Mrs. Gaines died on February 25, 1997. Lynn Sayne was appointed as the personal representative of Mrs. Gaines's estate. Subsequently, a hearing on Mrs. Gaines's motion for rehearing was held on September 15, 1997. At that hearing, Mr. Gaines argued that his wife's motion for rehearing should be dismissed on the ground that the personal representative had not been timely substituted of record. No assertion was made, however, that the proceedings should be dismissed on the theory that the court no longer had jurisdiction of the action because of the death of Mrs. Gaines. The trial court denied the request to dismiss, and entered an order on rehearing increasing Mrs. Gaines's equitable distribution by half of the amount in the joint checking account. See 727 So.2d at 352-53.
Mr. Gaines then appealed and asserted for the first time that the final judgment dissolving the marriage was void because Mrs. Gaines died while the divorce proceeding was pending on rehearing. The district court held that the issue was not preserved for review because Mr. Gaines had not made this claim in the trial court. See id. at 353. While recognizing that fundamental error need not be preserved below, the district court nevertheless declined to consider whether the alleged error was fundamental, because it concluded "that the marriage was dissolved with sufficient finality prior to the wife's death and that her death did not abate the divorce proceeding." Id.
Relying on Reopelle v. Reopelle, 587 So.2d 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), and Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So.2d 712 (Fla. 1995), the district court reasoned that a judgment of dissolution is actually a divisible two-part order: the first part dissolves the marriage, and the second part resolves all other financial and familial issues. See Gaines, 727 So.2d at 354
. Because neither of the parties in this case contested the portion of the order dissolving the marriage, the district court held that the death of one party to a dissolution proceeding after a judgment of dissolution, but before disposition of a motion for rehearing limited to property or other collateral matters, does not void the judgment of dissolution. See id. at 354.
Appellant argues that the decision below conflicts with the Third District's decision in Johnson v. Feeney, 507 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), which holds that the death of a party to a dissolution proceeding while such proceeding is pending on rehearing terminates the marriage by operation of law and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to make the judgment final. In Johnson, the wife died after the trial court had entered final judgment dissolving the marriage, but before the trial court had ruled on a timely motion for rehearing filed by the husband. The opinion offers very few facts and does not identify the issues raised in the motion for rehearing. Thus, it cannot be determined from the face of the opinion whether the motion challenged the dissolution or was limited to other issues. Nevertheless, the district court held that the final judgment dissolving the marriage was void and should have been vacated upon proper motion by the husband alerting the court to the wife's death. See id. at 723.
In so holding, the court noted two general principles of law. First, it stated that the "death of a party to a marriage dissolution action before a final judgment is entered terminates the marriage relationship by operation of law and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to issue a final decree." Id. (citing Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So.2d 105 (1944); Price v. Price, 114 Fla. 233, 153 So. 904 (1934); Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McKendree v. McKendree, 139 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962)). Second, the court noted that a judgment of dissolution is not final while a motion for rehearing is pending. Id. (). Considering these rules together, the court concluded that the death of one party to a marriage dissolution action after the entry of judgment, but before the trial court rules on a pending motion for rehearing, terminates the marriage by operation of law and divests the trial court of jurisdiction to make the judgment final. See id.
We now conclude that Johnson's reliance on the abatement rule as announced in Sahler and its progeny was misplaced.4 Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So.2d 105 (1944), was decided under the Florida divorce law in existence prior to the enactment of the statutory "no fault" dissolution scheme now prevailing. The facts in that case reflect that at a final hearing on July 12, 1943, the judge orally pronounced that a divorce should be granted but did not state in whose favor the decree of divorce would be awarded. Instead, the chancellor asked both parties to submit a proposed order on the dissolution of marriage concerning the division of the parties' property. Before this was done, however, the husband died on July 28, 1943. On August 17, 1943, the chancellor entered a divorce decree nunc pro tunc to the date of the hearing.
On appeal, the wife challenged the entry of the nunc pro tunc divorce decree. This Court reversed the decree, holding that an oral pronouncement is not effective until it has been reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and duly recorded. See id. at 210, 17 So.2d at 106.5 The Court held that the trial court erred in entering the decree nunc pro tunc where one of the parties to the divorce proceedings died before rendition of the written decree. See id., 17 So.2d at 107.
Sahler, 154 Fla. at 210, 17 So.2d at 107. The Court further reasoned that marital relationships are purely personal in nature and, therefore, a marriage dissolution proceeding is a personal action which cannot survive the death of one of the parties. Id. Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concluded that the chancellor erred in entering a divorce decree where one of the parties had died after the hearing on the divorce suit but before the chancellor had reduced his findings to writing and signed and recorded the decree. Hence, Sahler stands for the proposition that the death of one of the parties prior to the entry of a judgment of dissolution precludes the trial court from exercising any further jurisdiction over the matter. Accord Messana v. Messana, 421 So.2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
; Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So.2d 1164, 1166 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); McKendree v. McKendree, 139 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962); ...
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