Galindo v. City of Flagstaff

• Decision Date: 01 November 2019
• Docket Number: No. 20180346,20180346
• Citation: 452 P.3d 1185
• Parties: Tamara Monica GALINDO, Appellant, v. CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, Arizona and Jerolyn Byrne, Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

452 P.3d 1185

Tamara Monica GALINDO, Appellant,

v.CITY OF FLAGSTAFF, Arizona and Jerolyn Byrne, Appellees.

No. 20180346

Supreme Court of Utah.

Heard September 18, 2019

Filed November 1, 2019

Shane D. Gosdis, Murray, for appellant

Terry M. Plant, Stewart B. Harman, Matthew D. Church, Salt Lake City, for appellees

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

On Direct Appeal

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 Can a Utah resident, injured in Utah by an Arizona municipal employee, file a claim against that employee and the municipality after the time to do so has expired under Arizona law but not under Utah law? The answer lies in principles of comity, which create a rebuttable presumption that in circumstances like these, our courts enforce our sister states’ laws unless they violate Utah public policy.

¶2 Arizona’s law is not so violative. Therefore, we agree with the district court that comity should be extended and hold that the district court properly dismissed Galindo’s claim for failure to timely file a notice of claim.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On September 9, 2016, Tamara Galindo, a Utah resident, and Jerolyn Byrne were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Orem, Utah. The parties stipulated that at the time of the accident, Byrne was acting in the course and scope of her employment with the City of Flagstaff, Arizona (City).

¶4 Three hundred and sixty-four days after the accident, on September 8, 2017, Galindo served a notice of claim on the City, complying with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah’s one-year notice of claim period that applies in suits against Utah municipalities. UTAH CODE § 63G-7-402. The City and Byrne moved to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Galindo did not serve her notice of claim within six months as required by Arizona’s Actions Against Public Entities or Public Employees Statute (Statute or Arizona Statute)—Arizona’s governmental immunity statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821.01. The City argued that the district court should apply the Statute as a matter of comity. The district court agreed, applying the Arizona Statute and ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Galindo failed to comply with the Statute’s six-month notice of claim requirement. Galindo appealed.

¶5 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Generally, "we review a motion to dismiss for correctness. However, in applying principles of comity," we have traditionally afforded the district court "broad discretion." See Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 2001 UT 101, ¶ 18, 37 P.3d 1093 (internal citations omitted).

¶7 We recognize, however, that courts around the country differ on what standard of review applies in comity decisions. Most courts review comity decisions for abuse of discretion, as we have done. See, e.g. , In re Sealed Case , 932 F.3d 915, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2019) ; Derr v. Swarek , 766 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2014) ; Univ. of Iowa Press v. Urrea , 211 Ga.App. 564, 440 S.E.2d 203, 204 (1993) ; First Midwest Corp. v. Corp. Fin. Assocs. , 663 N.W.2d 888, 890–91 (Iowa 2003). But others apply mixed standards or review such decisions de novo. See Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren , 361 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2004) ("This is an intermediate level of scrutiny, more rigorous than the abuse-of-discretion or clear-error standards, but stopping short of plenary or de novo review." (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis omitted)); Montaño v. Frezza , 393 P.3d 700, 704 (N.M. 2017) ("We apply a mixed standard of review to questions of comity. While a district court’s decision to extend comity in a given case is subject to de novo review, we also analyze any fact-intensive aspects of the district court’s comity analysis under a more deferential abuse of discretion standard." (internal citation omitted)); Gesinger v. Gesinger , 531 N.W.2d 17, 19 (S.D. 1995) ("Comity is a question of jurisdiction which is reviewed de novo.").

¶8 The arguments for a stricter standard of review are far from meritless, chiefly because comity involves issues of law and is not merely a fact-driven decision. See Montaño , 393 P.3d at 704. However, as the parties have not briefed this issue, and because we would reach the same outcome regardless of the standard applied, we leave this matter for a future, appropriate case. See Mobley v. Arkansas , No. W2017-02356-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 117585, at *24 n.6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 2019) (surveying the different approaches but deciding not to reach the issue).

ANALYSIS

¶9 The only issue presented in the district court and currently before us is whether we should extend comity to apply the Arizona Statute.¹ The parties dispute whether extending comity here—which will bar Galindo’s claim as untimely—violates Utah’s public policy. We hold that it does not. Therefore, comity was properly extended, and Galindo’s claim was rightfully dismissed for its untimeliness.²

¶10 Comity is "a principle under which the courts of one state give effect to the laws of another state ... not as a rule of law, but rather out of deference or respect." Trillium USA, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs , 2001 UT 101, ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1093 (alteration in original) (quoting Hawsey v. La. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 934 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) ); see also Nevada v. Hall , 440 U.S. 410, 426, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 59 L.Ed.2d 416 (1979).

¶11 We initially presume comity should be extended to our sister states’ governmental immunity acts.³ Other courts have taken a similar approach. See, e.g. , Sam v. Sam , 139 N.M. 474, 134 P.3d 761, 767 (2006) ("As a general rule, comity should be extended. Only if doing so would undermine New Mexico’s own public policy will comity not be extended."); Hyde v. Hyde , 562 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tenn. 1978) ("The rule of comity to be gleaned from these cases is that, where the law of another jurisdiction is applicable, Tennessee will enforce the substantive rights which litigants have under the laws of the other jurisdiction if such rights are not contrary to the policy of Tennessee."). The goals of this presumption include fostering cooperation, promoting harmony, and building goodwill among the states. Trillium , 2001 UT 101, ¶ 19, 37 P.3d 1093 ; see also Lee v. Miller Cty. , 800 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1986).

¶12 The party seeking to rebut this presumption must show that the extension of comity "contravene[s]" or "undermines" Utah’s public policy.⁴

Trillium , 2001 UT 101, ¶¶ 19–20, 37 P.3d 1093. And it must be "sufficiently offensive" to our public policy "to outweigh the principles of comity." Sam , 134 P.3d at 766.

¶13 Galindo offers two arguments in an attempt to rebut this presumption. First, she argues that the notice of claim time bar under the Arizona Statute, which is six months shorter than Utah’s respective time bar, violates Utah’s public policy. Second, she argues that applying comity to effectively bar a Utah plaintiff from recovery also violates our public policy. We are unpersuaded by either argument. We address them below in turn.⁵

¶14 First, in general, statutes do not reflect different policies merely because they have different time constraints on filing.⁶ Both Utah and Arizona have conditioned suits against the state and its political subdivisions by requiring timely filing of a notice of claim within a relatively short period.⁷ By doing so, they balanced competing policies. On the one hand, they allow residents to recover for injuries, even when those are committed by governmental entities. On the other hand, they permit government entities an opportunity to investigate claims, avoid payment of false claims, and protect the public treasury. See Sweet v. Salt Lake City , 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167, 1171 (1913) ("One of the principal objects of the statute is to prevent spurious claims from being paid, and, in order to fully accomplish that purpose, to give the city officials ample opportunity to examine into both the cause and extent of the injury and also to test the good faith of the claimant in presenting the claim."); Hall v. Dep’t of Corr. , 2001 UT 34, ¶¶ 14, 23, 24 P.3d 958 ; Lee v. Arizona , 218 Ariz. 235, 182 P.3d 1169, 1173 (2008) ("A notice of claim serves to give the government notice of potential liability, an opportunity to investigate claims, the chance to avoid costly litigation through settlement, and assistance in budgeting.").

¶15 Although both states waive governmental immunity to an extent, they differ in the time limit posed for notice of claim filing. Utah limits the time to submit a notice of claim against governmental entities to one year. UTAH CODE § 63G-7-402. Our courts treat this time restriction strictly and view the failure to timely file a notice of claim as a jurisdictional bar to a suit.⁸ See , e.g. , Wheeler v. McPherson , 2002 UT 16, ¶ 11, 40 P.3d 632 ; Hall , 2001 UT 34, ¶ 23, 24 P.3d 958. Arizona mandates a shorter period—six months (180 days). ARIZ. REV. STAT . § 12–821.01(A). But the Arizona courts view the period as more flexible, allowing for its waiver, forfeiture, and equitable tolling, when appropriate. See Pritchard v. State , 163 Ariz. 427, 788 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1990) (en banc) ("[T]he time element with respect to filing is essentially procedural in nature ... [and] is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling.").⁹ As a result, the Arizona notice of claim period may extend beyond six months, closing the gap between the two states’ time limitations.

¶16 This possibility, together with the small difference in the time restrictions to begin with, leads us to hold that the difference in the notice of claim periods does not violate Utah’s public policy.

¶17 Second, Galindo argues that other courts have declined to extend comity when the outcome of such an extension would deprive a...