Gambrill v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 2014
• Docket Number: Sept. Term, 2013.,No. 42,42
• Citation: 85 A.3d 856,437 Md. 292
• Parties: Michael GAMBRILL v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

437 Md. 292

85 A.3d 856

Michael GAMBRILL

v.STATE of Maryland.

No. 42, Sept. Term, 2013.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 27, 2014.

Daniel Kobrin, Assistant Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Jessica V. Carter, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Douglas F. Gansler, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BARBERA, C.J., HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS, JJ.

BATTAGLIA, J.

We confront here the question of whether a trial judge had a duty to engage in a Rule 4–215(e) colloquy ¹ with Michael Gambrill, Petitioner, when his public defender, on the day of trial, stated: “Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I'd request a postponement. He indicates that he would like to hire private counsel in this matter.” We shall determine that the judge could have reasonably concluded from these statements that Gambrill wanted to discharge his attorney and, thus, erred in failing to permit Gambrill to explain the reasons for his request to discharge counsel, as required by Rule 4–215(e). We explain.

Gambrill was charged with one count of misuse of telephone facilities, pursuant to Section 3–804 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code, ² and one count of harassment, pursuant to Section 3–803 of the Criminal Law Article, Maryland Code,³ in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore City. After Gambrill requested a jury trial and his case had been transferred to the circuit court, two joint requests for postponement were granted before the case eventually was called for trial. Prior to the start of trial, a discussion took place among the trial judge, the Assistant State's Attorney, and the Assistant Public Defender representing Gambrill, during which the judge was informed that Gambrill, if convicted, was facing a potential violation of probation for which he was “looking at backing up fourteen years.” Gambrill's counsel, in the following exchange, informed the court that Gambrill was contemplating hiring a specifically named attorney, “if we can't work his case out”, whereupon the judge referred the parties to another judge in the circuit court to discuss the disposition of the probation violation case to which the other judge was assigned:

[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: And the other thing is I already told Mr. Gambrill if we can't work his case out and he wants a postponement to hire Jerry Tarud (inaudible). So that would be his request (inaudible).⁴

THE COURT: Well let's take this a step at a time.

[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But I mean my suggestion is, because in a lot of these cases where you've got this huge sentence that they're facing, some of the judges are not comfortable, and I don't blame them, I wouldn't be either, you know, transferring over a fourteen year sentence to a, it's a time served, or something similar. So I think it's better maybe if you can maybe get into see Judge Cox to see what he might be inclined to do.

[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, and that way we can just do this here and then we indicate on the record what Judge Cox said he'll do in (inaudible).

[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor.

When the parties returned to the courtroom, approximately two hours later, and the case again was called, what happened, if anything, before the judge assigned the probation violation was not referenced, but a pivotal colloquy ensued:

[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Roland Harris, Assistant Public Defender on behalf of Mr. Gambrill. Your Honor, on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I'd request a postponement. He indicates that he would like to hire private counsel in this matter.

THE COURT: All right. Postponement is denied. All right, we're going to call for the jury at two o'clock. We'll have a four and four. And we'll start the case today and we'll finish it tomorrow. Okay. Madam Clerk, we're down until two.

The trial ensued, and Gambrill was convicted of both counts after a jury trial and was subsequently sentenced to three years' incarceration, with all but six months suspended, and two years' probation. Gambrill appealed, and before the Court of Special Appeals, argued, inter alia, that reversal was required because the court denied Gambrill's request to obtain private counsel without complying with the requirements of Rule 4–215(e). The Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, concluded that Rule 4–215(e) was not implicated, because Gambrill did not express a “clear intent” to discharge or replace his attorney:

Like Henry [ v. State, 184 Md.App. 146, 964 A.2d 678 (2009) ] and unlike [State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 997 A.2d 780 (2010) ], appellant never expressed a clear intent to discharge his attorney nor expressed any dissatisfaction with his attorney during any stage of the proceedings.... As was the case in Henry, it was unclear as to whether the appellant sought a postponement to retain private counsel as co-counsel or replacement counsel. Davis, 415 Md. at 34 n. 5 (citing Henry, 184 Md.App. 146 ).

Because there was no clear indication that appellant wished to discharge his attorney and no indication that appellant was dissatisfied with his attorney, a Maryland Rule 4–215(e) inquiry was not triggered. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not err when it denied appellant's request for a postponement to hire private counsel without first conducting a Maryland Rule 4–215(e) inquiry.

We granted certiorari, Gambrill v. State, 432 Md. 211, 68 A.3d 286 (2013), to consider the following question:

Did the trial court err in denying petitioner's request for a postponement without complying with the requirements of Maryland Rule 4–215(e)?

We answer the question in the affirmative, because the statements, “on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I'd request a postponement. He indicates that he would like to hire private counsel in this matter”, implicated Rule 4–215(e) and its attendant duty to permit Gambrill to have explained his reasons for requesting to discharge his public defender.

Rule 4–215(e) provides:

(e) Discharge of counsel—Waiver. If a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel; continue the action if necessary; and advise the defendant that if new counsel does not enter an appearance by the next scheduled trial date, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds no meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court may not permit the discharge of counsel without first informing the defendant that the trial will proceed as scheduled with the defendant unrepresented by counsel if the defendant discharges counsel and does not have new counsel. If the court permits the defendant to discharge counsel, it shall comply with subsections (a)(1)-(4) of this Rule if the docket or file does not reflect prior compliance.

Gambrill argues that the statements of his public defender, “on behalf of Mr. Gambrill, I'd request a postponement. He indicates that he would like to hire private counsel in this matter”, was a request to discharge counsel pursuant to Rule 4–215(e), rather than merely a postponement query and that the trial judge erred by failing to allow Gambrill an opportunity to explain the reasons for his request to discharge his attorney. Gambrill asserts that at the very least, his attorney's request was ambiguous so that the trial judge had a duty to inquire further of Gambrill, pursuant to Rule 4–215(e).

The State, on the other hand, asserts that Gambrill's demand was really one for a postponement, not implicating Rule 4–215(e). Gambrill, according to the State, “on the very day that his trial was to begin, after it had been postponed twice before, was requesting yet another postponement from the administrative court,” so that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the postponement. The State asserts, “[i]n any event, here, where defense counsel's statements to the court comprise at best only eight lines of transcript, there was no request to ‘change’ counsel. There was a last-minute request for a postponement and that Gambrill ‘had indicated he would like to hire private counsel in this matter.’ ”

Aside from the asserted lack of clarity in Gambrill's assertions, the State also contends that Rule 4–215(e) was not implicated,because there was no mention of whether Gambrill had actually hired or made arrangements to hire private counsel. This, the State asserts, citing State v. Taylor, 431 Md. 615, 66 A.3d 698 (2013), indicates that the “statements were of future intent and not statements that Gambrill had already hired or made arrangements to hire or retain private counsel, or even that he could afford or had the means to hire or retain private counsel.”

At the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), Rule 719 ⁵ already had codified the right to counsel in Maryland in criminal cases; subsequently it was amended in 1972 with the addition of section c, which specified the questioning and determination that a judge must undertake to ascertain a defendant's understanding should he or she have indicated a desire or inclination to waive counsel.⁶See Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 121–22, 486 A.2d 163, 168 (1985) (noting that our recognition of the constitutional implications of the right to counsel and right to self-representation “was evidenced in Maryland Rule 719, the precursor to Rule 723 c”). In 1977, Rule 719 was amended and re-numbered as Rule 723,⁷which in 1984, was re-designated as Rule 4–215. See Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 86 n. 3, 46 A.3d 413, 418 n. 3 (2012). Added also was section (d), in 1986 re-designated as section (e), Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 590 n. 1...