State v. Graves

• Decision Date: 22 April 2016
• Docket Number: No. 57, Sept. Term, 2015.,57, Sept. Term, 2015.
• Citation: 447 Md. 230,135 A.3d 376
• Parties: STATE of Maryland v. Jeriko GRAVES.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

447 Md. 230

135 A.3d 376

STATE of Maryland

v.Jeriko GRAVES.

No. 57, Sept. Term, 2015.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 22, 2016.

Gary E. O'Connor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for petitioner.

Daniel Kobrin, Asst. Public Defender (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for respondent.

Argued before BARBERA, C.J., BATTAGLIA,^* GREENE, ADKINS, McDONALD, WATTS and HOTTEN, JJ.

HOTTEN

, J.

In this case, we decide whether the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County (“circuit court”) satisfied Md. Rule 4–215(e)

, which requires the court to “permit the defendant to explain the reasons for [a] request” to discharge counsel. We shall hold that, where an assistant public defender (“defense counsel”) indicated that Jeriko Graves (“Respondent”) wished to obtain a postponement to hire private counsel that Respondent had retained in the past, Md. Rule 4–215(e) required that the circuit court seek an explanation for the request to discharge counsel from the defendant, or ensure that the defendant agreed with the reasons proffered by defense counsel. We explain.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. Proceedings in the circuit court

Respondent was charged by criminal indictment in the circuit court with two counts of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”), one count of possession of CDS with intent to distribute, and one count of second-degree assault.¹ On November 9, 2012, defense counsel entered his appearance on behalf of Respondent. On February 22, 2013, Respondent and defense counsel appeared for a motions hearing, and defense counsel moved for a postponement:

[Defense Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor. This is defense request for a postponement.

The Court: All right, go ahead.

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, thank you very much. I have had the opportunity to speak to [Respondent]. [Respondent] has informed me that he would prefer to have John Robinson represent him in this matter as opposed to myself.

In speaking to [Respondent], apparently Mr. Robinson has represented him in several cases in the past and he has been satisfied with Mr. Robinson's services as his attorney in the past.

In terms of [Respondent's] situation right now, Your Honor, I would tell you, obviously, we are here for a motions hearing today. We have the trial date that is set. It is my understanding that Hicks ^[2] runs from an arraignment that was held on October 1st. So we are becoming close to Hicks.

[Respondent] is being held now on—he anticipates being held for another 20 days. It is his hope to postpone this case both the motions hearing as well as the trial date. I have spoken to him about Hicks and the ramifications of that.

He would be willing to waive his rights under Hicks but he would like to postpone the motions hearing and the trial date to have the opportunity to essentially become removed from the incarceration and hire John Robinson to represent him in this matter, both for the motions as well as in the trial.

The following exchange between Respondent and the court ensued:

The Court: Okay, Well, I have to hear him if that is what he is requesting. Sir, state your name for the record?

[Respondent]: Jeriko Graves.

The Court: Mr. Graves, if you would like to fire your Public Defender, then I must explain to you that before I could allow you to do that, I would have to continue the case if there is a meritorious reason. If there is no meritorious reason, then the case is going to go forward. Do you understand that?

[Respondent]: Yes, sir.

The Court: Did you at some point in time receive a copy of the charges in this case?

[Respondent]: Yes, I have.

The Court: And you understand how important counsel is, how an attorney can assist you, protect your constitutional rights whether you want to plead guilty or not guilty, an attorney can help you. Do you understand that?

[Respondent]: Yes, sir, I do.

The Court: You are charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine. It carries 20 years in jail, $25,000 fine. You are charged with possession of cocaine. It carries four years in jail, $25,000 fine. You are charged with possession of marijuana. It carries a year in jail, a $1,000 fine. You are charged with second-degree assault. It carries 10 years in jail, $2,500 fine. Do you understand that?

[Respondent]: Yes, I do.

The Court: Are there any subsequent mandatory?

[Petitioner]: Yes, he is mandatory.

The Court: From what?

[Petitioner]: He is mandatory on the possession with intent.

The Court: If you are convicted of Count 1, possession with intent to distribute cocaine, you may face a mandatory sentence of 10 years in prison without parole. Please indicate mandatory penalties advised.

Now, sir, if I find that you do not have a meritorious reason to discharge counsel, then the trial will proceed as scheduled. Do you understand that?

[Respondent]: Yes, I do?

The Court: All right. Have you hired John Robinson?

[Respondent]: No, sir, I haven't hired him.

The Court: Have you paid John Robinson?

[Respondent]: Sir?

The Court: Have you paid him?

[Respondent]: No, sir.

The Court: All right. Have you personally spoken to him about this case?

[Respondent]: Yes, I was incarcerated and my fiancé, Jodi Johnson, went and got a figure from him what he would represent me for.

The Court: Okay.

[Respondent]: And I was trying to get that together as soon as I got out of here.

The Court: All right. The Court will deny your request to postpone the motions hearing. The case is set here today for a motions hearing. This motions hearing has been scheduled for quite some time. There was originally a trial date of January 8, it was postponed. It was rescheduled until today's date.

This had to do with the fact that the case is in trial posture and there was a motions hearing agreed upon. [Your public defender] filed for it, it was granted on the 28th day of January. The case is set today.

[Respondent] may wish to hire Mr. Robinson but there is nothing to indicate that he has paid Mr. Robinson, met with Mr. Robinson or has hired Mr. Robinson. I will deny the request.

If you want to fire the Public Defender, you can ask me to do that. Otherwise, [the public defender] is in your case. Do you want me to fire [your public defender]?

[Respondent]: I will keep him on.

The motions hearing then proceeded as scheduled.

On March 21, 2013, Respondent was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine.³ He was sentenced to ten years' incarceration with all but eighteen months suspended, and five years' supervised probation.

II. Proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals

On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Respondent argued, inter alia, that the circuit court “failed to comply with [Md.] Rule 4–215(e)

by never asking [Respondent] why he wished to replace his counsel.” The Court of Special Appeals agreed.

The Court observed that, under Md. Rule 4–215(e)

, “[i]f a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.” (emphasis omitted).

According to the Court of Special Appeals, a request to discharge counsel triggering Md. Rule 4–215(e)

, is “ ‘any statement from which a court could conclude reasonably that the [accused] may be inclined to discharge counsel.’ ” (quoting Gambrill v. State, 437 Md. 292, 302, 85 A.3d 856, 862 (2014) ). Thus, defense counsel's request for a postponement required that the circuit court permit Respondent to explain the reasons for the request. The Court held that this requirement was not satisfied at the motions hearing:

At no point during the hearing did the court permit [Respondent] to explain why he wanted to obtain private counsel. Although [Respondent's] counsel did provide some explanation regarding why [Respondent] desired to be represented by private counsel, [Respondent] was never asked if that was an accurate or complete statement. Compare State v. Taylor, 431 Md. [615, 625, 66 A.3d 698, 705 (2013)

] (accused was given the opportunity to explain his reason for desiring to discharge counsel where his current counsel stated the relevant reasons and the accused asserted “that pretty much sums it up,” adding that he did not see “eye-to-eye” with his current counsel). Accordingly, because the court failed to engage in a colloquy with [Respondent] regarding the reason for his request, the circuit court erred, and a new trial is required. See

State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 31, (2010) (“The failure to inquire into a defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel when the proper request has been made to the court is reversible error.”).

(parallel citations added). The State of Maryland (“the State”) filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on August 7, 2015, and we granted that petition to determine whether the circuit court complied with Md. Rule 4–215(e)

.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In addressing the circuit court's compliance with Md. Rule 4–215(e)

, we apply a de novo standard of review. Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80–81 (2004) (“Because our interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Constitution, provisions of the Maryland Code, and the Maryland Rules are appropriately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulings on these matters.”) (citation omitted); Cole v. State, 378 Md. 42, 56, 835 A.2d 600, 607 (2003) (observing that the application of the Maryland Rules to a particular situation is reviewed de novo ).

We also adhere to the familiar principles of statutory interpretation. Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co., 445 Md. 213, 221, 126 A.3d 55, 60 (2015)

(“[T]he principles applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Maryland Rules.”). We abide by the plain meaning of Md. Rule 4–215(e), “[w]hen the plain meaning of the language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with ... the broad...