Ganim v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 11 August 1987
• Docket Number: No. 12937,12937
• Citation: 204 Conn. 760,529 A.2d 194
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 56 USLW 2162 Raymond W. GANIM, Guardian Ad Litem for Leslie Nicole Martin v. Pat ROBERTS, Jr., Administrator (ESTATE OF Pat ROBERTS III).

Page 194

529 A.2d 194

204 Conn. 760, 56 USLW 2162

Raymond W. GANIM, Guardian Ad Litem for Leslie Nicole Martin v. Pat ROBERTS, Jr., Administrator (ESTATE OF Pat ROBERTS III).

No. 12937

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 5, 1987.

Decided Aug. 11, 1987.

William A. Pelletreau, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph C. Ventricelli, Norwalk, for appellant (defendant).

David J. Laudano, for appellee (plaintiff.)

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, SPALLONE and SPEAR, JJ.

SPALLONE, Associate Justice.

This case concerns the inheritance rights of a putative father in the estate of a deceased child. The dispositive issue is whether a putative father may establish his paternity under General Statutes § 46b-172a after the child dies. Because we conclude that § 46b-172a, when read in its entirety, contemplates that an adjudication of paternity take place during the lifetime of the child in question, we hold that a putative father cannot rely on this statute to establish paternity after the death of the child. We further hold that such an interpretation of § 46b-172a does not impermissibly discriminate against unwed fathers in violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal or state constitutions. We thus hold that, under our present statutory scheme, a man claiming to be the father of a child must establish his paternity during the lifetime of the child if he is to inherit from the estate of the deceased child.

The following facts are not in dispute. On January 19, 1983, Edith Martin and her son, Pat Roberts III, were simultaneously killed in an automobile accident. At the time of his death, Pat Roberts III was approximately eight months old, and he died intestate. Before their deaths, Martin and her son had been living with the defendant, Pat Roberts, Jr. The defendant had been living with Martin since 1974 but the couple never had been legally married. The defendant had contributed to the support of Pat Roberts III throughout the child's life, and he was acknowledged as the child's father on the child's birth certificate. No legal determination of paternity, however, had been made during the child's lifetime. The child was survived by a half-sister, Leslie Nicole Martin, who had been born to Edith Martin and a man other than the defendant in 1971.

On March 4, 1983, the plaintiff, attorney Raymond Ganim, was appointed guardian ad litem for Leslie Nicole Martin. On March 9, 1983, the defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-172a, ¹ filed an application with the Probate Court, district of Stratford, seeking to be declared the father of Pat Roberts III. On May 24, 1983, the Stratford Probate Court adjudicated the defendant the father of the deceased child. On June 16, 1983, the defendant was appointed administrator of the estate of Pat Roberts III. Thereafter, the defendant, acting as administrator, petitioned the Probate Court for an advance distribution to himself as sole distributee of the estate. On January 14, 1985, the Probate Court approved the defendant's petition for an advance distribution but stayed its order pending an appeal by a proper party in interest.

On January 31, 1985, the plaintiff appealed from the decision of the Probate Court to the Superior Court, claiming that the defendant had no right to receive a distribution from the estate of Pat Roberts III because the defendant had failed to be adjudicated the father of the deceased child during the child's lifetime as required by General Statutes § 46b-172a. ² The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and sustained the appeal from probate. The defendant has appealed.

The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in construing § 46b-172a to require that a paternity action under this statute must be brought during the lifetime of the child. The defendant asserts that such a construction "amounts to a seamless web of statutory construction which flies in the face of reality." We disagree.

A primary rule of statutory construction is that if the language of the statute is clear, it is presumed that the words express the intent of the legislature. Orticelli v. Powers, 197 Conn. 9, 13, 495 A.2d 1023 (1985); State v. Smith, 194 Conn. 213, 222, 479 A.2d 814 (1984); Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523, 526, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979). The court must interpret the statute as written; Muha v. United Oil Co., 180 Conn. 720, 730, 433 A.2d 1009 (1980); and it is to be considered as a whole, with a view towards reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation. Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 63, 491 A.2d 1043 (1985); Seaman v. Climate Control Corporation, 181 Conn. 592, 605, 436 A.2d 271 (1980). "Each word used by the legislature should be given effect and, as far as possible, the entire enactment is to be harmonized." State v. Parmalee, 197 Conn. 158, 162, 496 A.2d 186 (1985); State v. Grant, 176 Conn. 17, 20, 404 A.2d 873 (1978); Winchester v. Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations, 175 Conn. 349, 355-56, 402 A.2d 332 (1978). Words and phrases of a statute are to be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. Shieffelin & Co. v. Department of Liquor Control, 194 Conn. 165, 174, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984); Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan, 183 Conn. 566, 570, 440 A.2d 767 (1981).

Applying these principles to the statutory language of General Statutes § 46b-172a, we conclude that an adjudication of paternity under this statute can only be made during the lifetime of the child. Each subsection of the statute speaks in terms of a living child. Subsection (a) provides: "Any person claiming to be the father of a child born out of wedlock may ... file a claim for paternity with the court of probate for the district in which ... the child resides...." (Emphasis added.) Subsection (c) provides: "The child shall be made a party to the action. Said child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem...." (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, subsection (g) provides "[t]hereafter, disputes involving custody, visitation or support shall be transfered to the superior court ... except that the probate court may enter a temporary order for custody, visitation or support...." (Emphasis added.) Only a living child "resides" in a district, can be made a "party" to the action, can be represented by a guardian ad litem; see General Statutes § 45-54(e); or can be the subject of custody, visitation and support orders. The trial court correctly concluded that an adjudication of paternity, under General Statutes § 46b-172a, can only be made during the lifetime of the minor child. ³ Cf. Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 58-61, 480 A.2d 425 (1984) (paternity action under General Statutes § 46b-160 must be instituted during the lifetime of putative father).

The defendant contends, however, that the savings statute, General Statutes § 52-599, operates to preserve the defendant's right to establish his paternity under General Statutes § 46b-172a. General Statutes § 52-599 provides in part that "[a] cause or right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any person, but shall survive in favor of or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person." The defendant contends that a paternity action is a civil action and comes within the provisions of General Statutes § 52-599.

We find no merit in this contention. The savings provisions of § 52-599 do not apply to "any civil action or proceeding whose prosecution or defense depends upon the continued existence of the persons who are plaintiffs or defendants." General Statutes § 52-599(c)(2). Because § 46b-172a expressly requires that proceedings for an adjudication of paternity include a living child as a party, we find this exception to be applicable. See Hayes v. Smith, supra, 63-64, 480 A.2d 425.

The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to address his state and federal constitutional claims. The defendant asserts that had the trial court addressed these claims, it would have found that its construction of § 46b-172a violated the equal protection ⁴ and due process clauses ⁵ of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. We construe the plaintiff's claim as a claim that the trial court's construction of General Statutes § 46b-172a discriminates on the basis of sex in that it requires unmarried fathers to undergo a statutory legitimization procedure not required of an unmarried mother ⁶ in order to inherit from a deceased child. ⁷

We conclude that the case of Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979), controls this claim. In that case, a minor child and his mother were killed in an auto accident, and the biological father attempted to recover for the child's wrongful death in a Georgia state court. The father had never legitimized the child, although he had signed the child's birth certificate and contributed to his support. While Georgia law allowed a mother of an illegimate child to bring a wrongful death action, the father could bring a wrongful death action only if, inter alia, he had legitimized the child. Id. at 348-49, 99 S.Ct. at 1744. The father claimed that the Georgia statute violated the federal equal protection clause because the statute discriminated between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers by requiring only unmarried fathers to utilize the statutory legitimization procedure in order to bring a wrongful death action.

The United States Supreme Court disagreed, with a majority of the court holding that the gender classification in the Georgia statute did not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. A plurality of the court held that the statute did not invidiously discriminate based on gender, because the statute did not reflect any broad generalizations about men as a class, but rather distinguished between fathers who had legitimized their children and those who had not. Id. at...