Gantt v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp.
| Citation | 173 S.E.2d 658,254 S.C. 112 |
| Decision Date | 13 April 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 19042,19042 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Geraldine B. GANTT, Respondent, v. UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORPORATION, Appellant. |
Thomas D. Wise, of Way, Burkett & Wise, Charleston, for respondent.
The plaintiff brings this suit, alleging three separate causes of action: (1) for invasion of privacy; (2) for libel and slander; and (3) for conversion by defendant of plaintiff's personal property.
The defendant moved to require the plaintiff to elect between the cause of action for invasion of privacy, and the cause of action for libel and slander, on the ground that the two causes of action stated alternative remedies and are mutually exclusive, and that recovery on both cannot be had.
In addition, the defendant demurred to the first cause of action on the ground that 'mere oral declarations cannot afford a basis for an action based on an invasion of the right of privacy,' and 'a private communication of circulation for a restricted purpose is not a publication which invades a protected right of privacy,' and 'the allegations of the first cause of action fail to state a cause of action on any ground.'
Defendant also demurred to the whole complaint on the ground that the three causes of action are improperly united.
The lower court overruled the motion and the demurrers. Defendant has appealed. A brief summary of the nature of each cause of action will suffice for the purpose of our ruling.
(Invasion of Privacy)
The first cause of action alleges that plaintiff's husband purchased a Volkswagen in November 1966, and financed it by agreeing to make thirty-six monthly payments. The contract was assigned by the mortgagee to the defendant. Plaintiff alleges that during the latter part of 1966 and during the whole of 1967 the defendant, through its agents, contacted the plaintiff at her place of employment by telephone calls and by personal visits, and at her home by personal visits and telephone calls, night and day on numerous occasions, requesting and demanding delinquent payments. That the plaintiff was employed at a local mortgage banking concern and her desk was situated in a room with other employees such that it was impossible to discuss the matter over the telephone without other persons hearing the discussions, and that although plaintiff requested on
each occasion that defendant's agent not call her at work, or when calling, to allow her to get to another more private telephone, the agent of the defendant stated that the purpose of the call was to embarrass and humiliate her sufficiently that she would compel her husband to pay. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant's agent told individual co-employees that the plaintiff owed the defendant money and was delinquent in her account. Plaintiff says that she was distressed, embarrassed and humiliated and exposed to ridicule of her fellow employees to the extent that she quit her employment, and by reason of the defendant's acts experienced physical and mental anguish, necessitating psychiatric treatment and hospitalization.
(Libel and Slander)
Plaintiff alleges that on or about the 10th day of December, 1967 the defendant dispossessed her husband of the Volkswagen and maliciously reported to the credit bureau of Charleston that the automobile had been repossessed against both her husband and her, for the reason that the sales contract had not been fulfilled; that she was not obligated to pay the debt and that the report was false and malicious. Plaintiff further alleges that as a result of the alleged malicious report she has been denied a loan, and has been defamed and otherwise damaged.
(Conversion)
Plaintiff alleges that on or about December 10, 1967 the defendant repossessed the Volkswagen and refused to allow her husband to remove items of personalty owned by plaintiff of the value of $42, and though the plaintiff has demanded return of these items of personal property, defendant has refused, and on information still has plaintiff's personal property.
We first consider the demurrer to the first cause of action, alleging invasion of right of privacy. The defendant frames thirteen exceptions to the judge's ruling dismissing the demurrer, and reduces them to three questions in its brief. We think the questions to be treated by this court are only those raised by the demurrer and properly submitted to the lower court. Accordingly, we limit our consideration to the questions submitted to the judge.
There can be no doubt but that this court is now committed, along with a majority of the states, to the proposition that an action will lie for invasion of right of privacy. See Holloman v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940), and Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956). It is of no legal significance at this time, but it is of interest that a committee created by the General Assembly of South Carolina to study the constitution and make recommendations relative thereto, has recommended a new provision as follows: 'The right of the people to the secure from unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated.'
By demurrer the defendant submitted to the lower court that the first cause of action should be dismissed because (1) 'mere oral declarations cannot afford a basis for an action based on the invasion of the right of...
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...substantially, and unreasonably engaged in intrusive acts into Plaintiff's personal life. See Gantt v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 254 S.C. 112, 116, 118-19, 173 S.E.2d 658, 659-61 (1970) (holding the plaintiff pled an appropriate cause of action for invasion of privacy because she all......
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