Garcia v. Strong Trucking, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 66743-2-I,66743-2-I
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: JONE R. GARCIA, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of FELICIA R. GARCIA, deceased, Appellants, v. STRONG TRUCKING, INC., a domestic corporation; and JACOB L. YANEZ, Respondents.

JONE R. GARCIA, individually and as the personal representative of the Estate of FELICIA R. GARCIA, deceased, Appellants, v. STRONG TRUCKING, INC., a domestic corporation and JACOB L. YANEZ, Respondents.

No. 66743-2-I

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION ONE

FILED: July 16, 2012

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Appelwick, J. — Jone Garcia, as personal representative for his mother's estate, appeals from the trial court's judgment awarding him and his sister $75,000 each for their wrongful death claim against the defendants responsible for their mother's death. He argues, contrary to established law, that adult children should be entitled to recover for grief, mental anguish and suffering as wrongful death beneficiaries, and that the low award reflects juror passion or prejudice. He also argues that there was juror misconduct meriting a new trial. Because a juror presented prejudicial extrinsic evidence during deliberations and because there is a reasonable doubt as to whetherthat misconduct affected the verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

Felicia Garcia was killed when her vehicle collided with a truck driven by Jacob Yanez. Yanez was working for Strong Trucking, Inc. at the time of the accident. Garcia was 78 years old when she died and had a life expectancy of 10.5 years. Her husband passed away in 1985. She is survived by her two children, Jone and Marie, both of whom are in their mid to late forties and lived independently. When Jone sued as the personal representative of Garcia's estate, the defendants admitted liability and trial proceeded solely on the issue of damages. During closing, plaintiff's counsel requested $2,500,000 for each child on the wrongful death claim, while defense counsel asked the jury to award between $50,000 to $100,000 per child. The jury awarded each child $75,000.

Jone moved for a new trial based in part on evidence of juror misconduct. One juror allegedly told the jury that families of soldiers who die in Afghanistan get $100,000, and that no one should receive more for the death of a family member. The trial court found that this constituted improper extrinsic evidence, but that it was not prejudicial. It denied the motion for a new trial. Jone appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Admissibility of Jone and Marie's Grief

In response to Strong Trucking's motion in limine, the trial court ruled that evidence of Jone and Marie's grief was inadmissible, and it ultimately gave jury instructions on damages that did not allow the jury to consider grief as a factor. Jone argues this constitutes an error of law and that the jury should have been entitled toconsider his and Marie's grief, mental anguish, and suffering.

Causes of action for wrongful death are provided for statutorily, rather than in the common law of Washington. Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wn.2d 376, 390, 88 P.3d 939 (2004). The general wrongful death statute provides:

Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, state registered domestic partner, child or children, including stepchildren, of the person whose death shall have been so caused. If there be no wife, husband, state registered domestic partner, or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents, sisters, or brothers, who may be dependent upon the deceased person for support, and who are resident within the United States at the time of his or her death.

In every such action the jury may give such damages as, under all circumstances of the case, may to them seem just.

RCW 4.20.020 (emphasis added). While Jone argues that adult children should be entitled to recover for their grief, mental anguish, or suffering, he can cite no case that has so held. Indeed, at trial, his counsel explicitly admitted that RCW 4.20.020 does not allow for such a recovery, stating: "[T]here's no question that's the law, but I'd like to see it overturned."

In Walker v. McNeil, 17 Wash. 582, 593-94, 50 P. 518 (1897), over a century ago, the Washington State Supreme Court expressly construed the wrongful death statute as not allowing for recovery for grief: "[T]he jury cannot allow anything as a solace for the grief and anguish of the plaintiffs." Id. In the intervening years, this holding has been relied upon and reaffirmed. See e.g., Davis v. N. Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash 576, 584, 295 P. 921 (1931) ("'[D]amages by way of solace to the affections of a wife or children cannot be allowed.'") (quoting Walker v. McNeill, 17 Wash. 582, 593, 50 P. 518 (1897))); Pancratz v. Turon, 3 Wn. App. 182, 188-89 n.5, 473 P.2d 409(1970); Bowers v. Fibreboard Corp, 66 Wn. App. 454, 460, 832 P.2d 523 (1992); Chapple v. Ganger, 851 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (1994).

We adhere to that longstanding interpretation of RCW 4.20.020. In the intervening century, the legislature has had ample opportunity to change the statute if it intended adult children to be able to recover for grief in a wrongful death case, or if it believed the courts had reached the wrong conclusion. The legislature's silence signals its support for the current interpretation of RCW 4.20.020. See, e.g., Tipsworth v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 52 Wn.2d 79, 83, 323 P.2d 9 (1958) ("[T]he case was decided in 1946 and has been consistently followed since then. The legislature has convened in six regular and two extraordinary sessions since . . . and has not seen fit to correct the interpretation. Therefore, we must assume that it was in accord with the legislative intent." (citing D'Amico v. Conguista, 24 Wn.2d 674, 167 P.2d 157 (1958))).

Jone compares RCW 4.20.020 with a similar statute, RCW 4.24.010, which provides, in relevant part, for an action by a parent for the wrongful death of a child. In a 1967 amendment to RCW 4.24.010, the legislature added the following language, which remains in effect today:

In such an action, in addition to damages for medical, hospital, medication expenses, and loss of services and support, damages may be recovered for the loss of love and companionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all the circumstances of the case, may be just.

Laws of 1967, Ex. Sess., ch. 81, § 1. Following that amendment, the Washington State Supreme Court interpreted RCW 4.24.010 to allow recovery by a parent for grief and mental anguish resulting from the loss of a child. Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wn.2d 91, 99, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971). Jone argues that courts' interpretation of RCW 4.24.010 (andwhat parents may recover for the loss of a child) necessitates the same interpretation of RCW 4.20.020 here (and what adult children may recover for the loss of a parent).

While the jury instruction given by the trial court in Jone's case did not provide for the award of damages for Jone or Marie's grief, mental anguish, or suffering, it did provide that the jury should consider the loss of their mother's "love, care, companionship, and guidance." Other cases applying RCW 4.20.020 have given similar instructions. See Kramer v. Portland-Seattle Auto Freight, Inc., 43 Wn.2d 386, 397, 261 P.2d 692 (1953); Pancratz, 3 Wn. App. at 188 n.5 (instructing jurors to consider the support, love, care, guidance, training, instruction, and protection that a parent would have provided to a child); Bowers, 66 Wn. App. at 460. Jone argues that the inclusion of "love" as a factor in the instruction provides the jury the opportunity to consider damages for grief, mental anguish and suffering, despite the longstanding interpretation to the contrary.

We reject Jone's argument. While the reference to "love" appears in the jury instruction, it is not contained in the statutory language of RCW 4.20.020, as it is in RCW 4.24.010, following the 1967 amendment. The legislature could have amended both statutes at the same time, but declined to do so, indicating its intent to allow for differing recoveries in the differing scenarios. Again, the fact that the legislature has not changed RCW 4.20.020 demonstrates that it is satisfied with the longstanding construction of that statute as precluding recovery for grief. To the extent that Jone makes policy arguments for why RCW 4.20.020 should provide for recovery for grief, those arguments are a matter for the legislature to address. We decline to overturn the longstanding interpretation of that statute.

II. Passion or Prejudice

Jone next argues that the jury's award to him and his sister Marie is so unmistakably low that it indicates the jury was motivated by passion or prejudice, warranting a new trial. At trial, he requested an award of $2,500,000 to each of the wrongful death beneficiaries. Strong Trucking requested an award between $50,000 to $100,000 for each of the beneficiaries. The jury ultimately awarded $75,000 each, for Jone and Marie.

Juries have considerable latitude in assessing damages, and a damage award will not be lightly overturned. Palmer v. Jensen, 132 Wn.2d 193, 197, 937 P.2d 597 (1997). Although courts have discretion to grant a motion for a new trial if a damage award is not based on, or is at odds with, the evidence, the motion must be denied if the verdict is within the range of the credible evidence. Robinson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 113 Wn.2d 154, 161, 776 P.2d 676 (1989); Wooldridge v. Woolett, 96 Wn.2d 659, 668, 638 P.2d 566 (1981). In reviewing a court's exercise of discretion on such motions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Palmer, 132 Wn.2d at 197-98.

An award for loss of love, care, companionship, and guidance is extremely subjective and difficult to calculate with any certainty. Here, the award of $75,000 to each beneficiary is the midpoint in the range proposed by Strong Trucking's counsel at trial, and that figure is within the range of the evidence presented. Accordingly, Jone cannot overcome the presumption that the jury's award was valid. We hold that the award does not independently indicate the jury was motivated by passion or...