Philippides v. Bernard
| Decision Date | 22 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 74098-4., No. 73736-3, No. 73239-6, No. 73603-1 |
| Citation | 88 P.3d 939,151 Wash.2d 376 |
| Parties | Zoe PHILIPPIDES, as personal representative of the Estate of Yianni Philippides, Deceased, and Kathryn and George Philippides, wife and husband, Respondents, v. Robert BERNARD, and Wolverine World Wide, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Appellants, and Robert Johns, Defendant. Gary Anderson and Amelia Anderson, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Galvin Flying Service, Inc., a Washington corporation, Respondent. John D. Carlisle (deceased), single man by and through Delbert D. Carlisle as the personal representative of his estate; and Delbert D. Carlisle and Myrna Carlisle, individually, Appellants, v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound and Unknown John Does, Respondents. Nancy Loomis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. City of Puyallup Police Department, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Thorsrud Cane & Paulich, Russell Love, Mark Nels Thorsrud, Seattle, Clausen Miller, James Ferrini, Chicago, II., Andrew Dimmock, Bellevue, for Appellants.
G. Val Tollefson, Katherine See Kennedy, Barbara Mahoney, Danielson Harrigan Leyh & Tollefson LLP, Arnold R. Hedeen, Hedeen & Caditz, Stewart Andrew Estes, Keating Bucklin & McCormack, David Merritt Beninger, Paul Nicholas Luvera, Patricia E. Anderson, Luvera Barnett Brindley Beninger et al, Michael Thomas Pfau, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, Seattle, Lewis Lynn Ellsworth, Gordon Thomas Honeywell, Tacoma, for Other Party, Counsel from Consolidated case.
Philip Albert Talmadge, Talmadge Law Group PLLC, Tukwila, William Scherer Bailey, C. Steven Fury, Fury Bailey, Seattle, Gary Neil Mclean, City of Puyallup Legal Dept., Puyallup, Mary H. Spillane, William Kastner & Gibbs, Rando Berry Wick, Robin Jan Mar, Johnson Graffe, Keay Moniz & Wick LLP, Seattle, for Respondents.
Timothy R. Gosselin, Tacoma, for Amicus Curiae Association of Washington Cities & City of Tacoma.
Michael Simpson Rogers, Reed McClure, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae Washington Defense Trial Lawyers.
Bryan Patrick Harnetiaux, Debra Leigh Williams Stephens, Spokane, for Amicus Curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association Foundation.
In these four consolidated cases the court must determine whether the legislature has eliminated the requirement that parents of an adult child must be financially dependent on the adult child in order to recover for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24.010, the child injury/death statute. We hold that RCW 4.24.010 requires such financial dependence.
Ianni Philippides was a 22-year-old unmarried man when he was struck by a car and killed. His sister, as personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death action under RCW 4.20.010. Philippides' parents brought an action for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24.010. Defendants and plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the parents, who had not been financially dependent on their deceased adult son, could recover damages. The trial court ruled that the parents had a loss of consortium claim under RCW 4.24.010. The jury awarded economic damages of $891, 809 to the estate, and $900,000 to each parent for loss of consortium. Defendants Bernard seek direct review of the trial court's ruling on the parents' eligibility to recover under RCW 4.24.010. They also seek review of the trial court's decision to allow testimony by the plaintiffs' vocational rehabilitation expert witness.
Jon Anderson was 37 years old when he died in a plane crash. The plane allegedly malfunctioned because of faulty preflight service done by Defendant Galvin. Anderson's wife and children recovered damages under RCW 4.20.010, .020. Anderson's parents' claim for damages for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24.010 was dismissed pretrial. Anderson's parents appeal the dismissal of their claim. Anderson's parents also appeal the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence certain documents relating to the investigation of the accident.
John Carlisle was a 39-year-old unmarried man when he died from an aortic aneurysm, two days after he was examined and discharged by Group Health with instructions to follow up with his regular doctor. John Carlisle had cerebral palsy and lived with his parents.
John's parents sought damages for loss of consortium under RCW 4.24.010, the wrongful death and survival statutes. The trial court dismissed the Carlisles' claims. The Carlisles sought review in this court.
Loomis v. City ofPuyallup, No. 73736-3
Kelly Loomis was a 34-year-old unmarried man who suffered from schizophrenia. Loomis died following a struggle with the police during a schizophrenic episode. Plaintiffs alleged the police used excessive force.
Loomis's parents filed causes of action against defendants in federal district court under RCW 4. 24.010, and also under the wrongful death and survival statutes, RCW 4.20.020 and RCW 4.20.060. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims. The federal district court stayed the matter and certified to this court the following question: "Must a parent of an adult child have been financially dependent upon that child as a condition precedent to commencing suit for the child's injury or death pursuant to Washington's wrongful death and survival statutes: RCW 4.24.010; RCW 4.20.010; RCW 4.20.020; and/or RCW 4.20.060?" Order of Certification at 2.
1. Does RCW 4.24.010 permit the parent of an adult child to recover damages for loss of consortium when the parent was not financially dependent on the child?
2. Should this court recognize a common law cause of action for loss of consortium on behalf of parents of an adult child injured or killed by a negligent defendant?
3. Does RCW 4.24.010's requirement of dependency for parents of adult children violate the equal protection clause of the United States constitution or the privileges and immunities clause of our state constitution?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony of the plaintiffs' vocational rehabilitation expert?
The plaintiffs below—Philippides, Anderson, Loomis, and Carlisle—argue that the legislature's 1998 amendment to RCW 4.24.010 redefined who can bring a cause of action under that statute and that the amendment allows the parent of an adult child to recover upon a showing of emotional support upon the child.
The defendants below, on the other hand, contend that the 1998 amendment only affected RCW 4.24.010's requirement regarding parental support for minor children, and left unchanged the long-standing requirement in the statute of financial dependence for parents of adult children in order to recover. First we examine the language of the statute and its legislative history.
Statutory interpretation is a matter of law reviewed de novo. State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001). The goal of statutory interpretation is to carry out the intent of the legislature. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wash.2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d 1 (1986). When the statutory language is unclear and ambiguous, the court may review legislative history to determine the scope and purpose of the statute. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 98 Wash.2d 677, 684-85, 658 P.2d 634 (1983).
RCW 4.24.010, as amended in 1998, provides, in part:
A mother or father, or both, who has regularly contributed to the support of his or her minor child, and the mother or father, or both, of a child on whom either, or both, are dependent for support may maintain or join as a party an action as plaintiff for the injury or death of the child.
The legislature also added an intent section to RCW 4.24.010 in 1998. That section reads in full:
It is the intent of this act to address the constitutional issue of equal protection addressed by the Washington state supreme court in Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash.2d 660, 940 P.2d 642 (1997). The legislature intends to provide a civil cause of action for wrongful injury or death of a minor child to a mother or father, or both, if the mother or father has had significant involvement in the child's life, including but not limited to, emotional, psychological, or financial support.
The intent section plainly indicates that the amendment is limited to minor children. The intent section specifies that the parent of a minor child must have "significant involvement" in the child's life in order to recover. The section then goes on to identify what constitutes "significant involvement." Rather than defining "support," the intent section provides a definition of "significant involvement." Emotional support is one form of the significant involvement required of parents of minor children in order to bring a civil action for wrongful injury or death of a minor child.
Moreover, the intent section states that the "legislature intends to provide a civil cause of action for wrongful injury or death of a minor child." Laws of 1998, ch.237, § 1. There is no mention of adult children in the intent section.
However, the plaintiffs argue that the intent section contains a new definition of the word "support," which applies to both minor and adult children. They argue that the intent section defines "support" as meaning significant involvement in the child's life, which can be established by emotional support. This definition, they argue, must apply to both minor and adult children because when the same word is used in different parts of the same statute, it is presumed that the legislature intends the word to have the same meaning. Welch v. Southland Corp., 134 Wash.2d 629, 636, 952 P.2d 162 (1998) (...
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Table of Cases
...State v., 100 Wn.2d 508, 671 P.2d 1212 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77.12[7][c] Philippides v. Bernard, 151 Wn.2d 376, 88 P.3d 939 (2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75.06[2][d] Phillips v. Richmond, 59 Wn.2d 571, 369 P.2d 299 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......
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