Garmon v. Health Group of Atlanta, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 74242,74242
• Citation: 183 Ga.App. 587,359 S.E.2d 450
• Parties: , 111 Lab.Cas. P 56,031 GARMON v. HEALTH GROUP OF ATLANTA, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 450

359 S.E.2d 450

183 Ga.App. 587, 111 Lab.Cas. P 56,031

GARMON v. HEALTH GROUP OF ATLANTA, INC. et al.

No. 74242.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

July 8, 1987.

John J. Goger, Atlanta, Michelle B. Rapoport, for appellant.

Rush S. Smith, Jr., John E. Hall, Jr., Atlanta, for appellees.

BEASLEY, Judge.

A nurse appeals from summary judgment to her former employer Health Group of Atlanta, Inc. d/b/a Doctors Memorial Hospital, and to her supervisor, in an amended suit for wrongful termination by the hospital and tortious interference with her employment by the supervisor.

The nurse was employed by the hospital from November 1972 to November 1973, and from September 1978 through September 1984, as an administrative head nurse and alternate to the director of nursing. Following some dispute and dissatisfaction with scheduling changes in the nursing department, employment was terminated by the supervisor for what the hospital termed "insubordinate, unprofessional, and unacceptable" actions and behaviors consisting of "[u]nyielding and belligerent attitude toward colleagues, ... [r]efusal to comply with a reasonable request made by the employee's supervisor to work collaboratively with peers to achieve a goal within a specific time frame, ... [u]se of abusive language toward peers, ... [and] [r]efusal to support the goals and objectives necessary for the continued operation of the Nursing Department."

The nurse acknowledged that she had no formal written contract of employment, but she alleged that she understood that the hospital's policies and past practices with regard to employer-employee relations as well as her job description provided the terms of her employment contract; that according to the hospital's policy statement with regard to conduct, discipline, and termination of employment, she could only be terminated by joint decision of her immediate supervisor and the hospital's personnel director, subject to approval by the divisional vice president or president and the hospital administrator if the discharge was for cause; that if such review had occurred, it would have been apparent that the discharge was improperly motivated and executed and not in the "best interests of the Hospital" as required by the written policies; that the discharge was in breach of the procedural safeguards guaranteed employees by virtue of the hospital's policy statements and of her "employment contract"; that the hospital was under a duty, pursuant to its stated policies and to the law regarding fair employment practices, to investigate the validity of the accusations made against her, which duty the hospital failed to perform or performed inadequately; and that she was therefore discharged completely without cause and in knowing and reckless disregard for the fact that accusations made against her in the scheduling conflict were unwarranted and false. The nurse further alleged that the supervisor wrongfully, maliciously, and recklessly interfered with the employment relationship by wrongfully procuring her discharge based upon false accusations of unprofessional and insubordinate conduct.

Both the hospital and the supervisor moved for summary judgment which was granted, specifically finding that inasmuch as no written contract of employment was executed, employment was terminable at will and did not give rise to a cause of action against the hospital for wrongful discharge. The court further determined that the supervisor both hired and discharged plaintiff with authority, so that no cause of action existed for wrongful interference either.

The nurse claims that the court erroneously failed to consider and rule upon her claim that the hospital's policies regarding termination of employees were enforceable and that the hospital failed to comply with these policies in discharging her. She also claims that the court erroneously found as a matter of law that the supervisor acting alone had authority to discharge her, making the latter's motive irrelevant.

1. The nurse does not now dispute the court's finding that she was an at-will employee, but she maintains that her case presents an issue of first impression unaddressed by the trial court: "whether an employer's policies and procedures manual containing express provisions pertaining to discipline and termination of employees as well as employee conduct is enforceable, and whether an employer's failure to comply with the terms of such a manual can give rise to an action for wrongful termination by an at-will employee."

This argument was raised before the trial court, and inasmuch as the court's order recites that the entire record as well as oral argument was considered, it is apparent that the court did consider such position prior to reaching its determination. Although it was under no obligation to make specific findings as to each argument raised in its grant of summary judgment (OCGA § 9-11-52; Karsman v. Portman, 173 Ga.App. 108, 109(3), 325 S.E.2d 608 (1984)), the court implicitly ruled on the point when it held that where employment is terminable at will, the employer may discharge the employee without liability.

Appellant asks this court to hold that the hospital policies regarding employee termination are legally enforceable in her circumstances so that failure to comply with such policies would support a claim for wrongful termination even though she concedes that the policies cannot be relied upon to transform an at-will employee into a contract employee. See Burgess v. Decatur Fed. Savings, etc., Assn., 178 Ga.App. 787, 345 S.E.2d 45 (1986); Miles v. Bibb County, 177 Ga.App. 364(1), 339 S.E.2d 316 (1985); Georgia Ports Auth. v. Rogers, 173 Ga.App. 538(1), 327 S.E.2d 511 (1985). The bases of her argument are that there have been decisions granting an at-will employee relief pursuant to the employer's policies and procedures, citing Fletcher v....