Garms v. Comanche Cnty., 11-19-00015-CV
| Decision Date | 18 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-19-00015-CV,11-19-00015-CV |
| Parties | JASON GARMS, Appellant v. COMANCHE COUNTY, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 220th District Court Comanche County, Texas
Appellant, Jason Garms, appeals pro se the trial court's order granting Comanche County's (the County) plea to the jurisdiction under the Texas Tort Claims Act (the TTCA). Because the County is entitled to immunity, we affirm the order of the trial court.
On January 3, 2017, Appellant was an inmate in the Comanche County Jail. Appellant claimed that, during his confinement, he notified the jailers that he was ill and needed medical assistance. The jailers checked Appellant's blood pressure, but failed to notify the duty nurse that the readings indicated that Appellant's blood pressure was high. Appellant also claimed that his high blood pressure condition caused him to lose consciousness and sustain a serious head injury. According to Appellant, he was left unattended during his state of unconsciousness, and his head injury ultimately resulted in a permanent loss of memory, brain damage, and other unspecified injuries. Appellant further alleged that his "injury and neglect" were caused by (1) a "faulty motorized camera" located in the Comanche County Jail and (2) the jailers failure to monitor him, provide proper medical care, and comply with applicable County policies.
Appellant originally filed suit in the 220th Judicial District Court of Comanche County. At the time, Appellant's operative pleading purported to assert claims for negligence under the TTCA and constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Appellant's Section 1983 claims created a basis for removal, the County removed this suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division. Appellant's suit was later remanded to the 220th District Court after Appellant amended his pleadings to abandon the federal constitutional claims.
After remand, the County filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the 220th District Court alleging that Appellant's negligence claims under the TTCA were barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity, thereby depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellant's suit. After a hearing, in which all parties participated, the trial court granted the County's plea. This appeal followed.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. First, Appellant contends that he was not afforded adequate time to prepare for the hearing on the County's plea to the jurisdiction because he did not receive proper notice of the hearing date. Second, heclaims that the County's immunity was waived and that the trial court erred in granting the County's plea because his injuries were caused by the County's (1) negligent use of motor-driven equipment, i.e., a faulty motorized camera, and (2) failure to monitor him, provide proper medical care, and comply with its policies.
In his first issue, Appellant contends that he did not receive proper notice for the hearing on the County's plea to the jurisdiction and, therefore, was not able to sufficiently prepare for the hearing. Appellant raises this issue for the first time on appeal.
To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party (1) must make a timely request, objection, or motion in the trial court stating the specific grounds for the ruling sought, unless the specific grounds are apparent from the context, and (2) either obtain a ruling from the trial court or object to the trial court's refusal to rule. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Ad Villarai, LLC v. Chan Il Pak, 519 S.W.3d 132, 137 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam). Appellant did neither, even though he participated at the hearing. Therefore, he failed to preserve this complaint for our review.
Nevertheless, even if preserved, Appellant's complaint is without merit. If a party intends to schedule a hearing on a motion for the purpose of obtaining an order from the trial court, the moving party must serve notice of the hearing date on all interested parties at least three days before the hearing commences, unless the rules provide otherwise or the notice period is reduced by the trial court. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 21(b); Zewde v. Abadi, 529 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); Cotten v. Briley, 517 S.W.3d 177, 185 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.). Moreover, if the hearing date is rescheduled, Rule 21(b)'s three-day notice requirement no longer applies if all parties to the proceeding had proper notice of the original hearing date. Magnuson v. Mullen, 65 S.W.3d 815, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
Here, the record does not support Appellant's contention that he did not receive proper notice of this hearing. Initially, the trial court set the hearing date on the County's plea for December 6, 2018. As an accommodation to Appellant, on December 5, 2018, the trial court cancelled the original hearing date. The trial court thereafter reset the hearing date to December 14, 2018. Appellant received notice of the rescheduled hearing date on December 11, 2018, three days before the rescheduled hearing date. Clearly, Appellant received proper notice of the hearing date. As such, he had adequate time to prepare. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant's first issue.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in granting the County's plea to the jurisdiction. Before a court may dispose of a case, it is essential that the court possess subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553-54 (Tex. 2000). A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea and a proper method by which to challenge a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 554. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Ector Cty. v. Breedlove, 168 S.W.3d 864, 865 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2004, no pet.).
A plea to the jurisdiction can take two forms: (1) a challenge to the plaintiff's pleadings regarding his allegation of jurisdictional facts or (2) an evidentiary challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex. 2012); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226-27. The plea may challenge the pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 770 (Tex. 2018); City of Merkel v. Copeland, 561 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. denied).As such, the purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to defeat a pleaded cause of action without reaching the merits. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
Here, the County's plea only challenged Appellant's pleadings. Because a pleadings challenge is before us, Appellant bore the burden of alleging facts that affirmatively demonstrated the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. Therefore, we must accept as true all factual allegations in Appellant's pleadings, construe them liberally in his favor, and look to his intent. Klumb v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2015); Cty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. City of Abilene, 551 S.W.3d 337, 342-43 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018, pet. dism'd). Furthermore, we review and evaluate pro se pleadings by less stringent standards than we do when considering pleadings drafted by lawyers. Thomas v. Collins, 860 S.W.2d 500, 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
At the hearing on the County's plea, neither party presented evidence. Therefore, it was Appellant's burden to plead sufficient facts to affirmatively show that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction of the case. Consequently, our review is limited to the factual allegations in Appellant's pleadings.
Sovereign immunity and its counterpart, governmental immunity, exist to protect the State and its political subdivisions from lawsuits and liability for money damages. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006); Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 853 (Tex. 2002). Governmental immunity is derived from the State's sovereign immunity. Therefore, the political subdivisions of the State, such as a county, are afforded the same immunity protections as the State. City of Houston v. Williams, 353 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Tex. 2011).
Governmental immunity embraces two concepts: immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Reata, 197 S.W.3d at 374; Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). Immunity from suit deprives courts of subject-matter jurisdiction and completely bars actions against governmental entities unless the State has expressly consented to suit. Id.; Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Tex. 2003); Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Immunity from liability is an affirmative defense, not a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction; however, this immunity must still be waived by the State. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224. Because immunity from suit defeats a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction, it is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 225-26. In the matter before us, we are concerned only with immunity from suit.
The term "sovereign immunity" applies to the State and the divisions of state government. Goodson v. City of Abilene, 295 S.W.3d 692, 694 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2009, no pet.). Although the terms "sovereign immunity" and "governmental immunity" are often used interchangeably, "governmental immunity" is the proper term to use when referring to political subdivisions of the State, such...
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