Gaskin v. Collins
| Decision Date | 12 December 1983 |
| Citation | 661 S.W.2d 865 |
| Parties | Stephen GASKIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David A. COLLINS, State Coordinator of Elections; Mae Weeks, Lewis County Registrar of Voters; and William M. Leech, Jr., Attorney General of the State of Tennessee, Defendants-Appellants. 661 S.W.2d 865 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Albert Bates, Summertown, for plaintiff-appellee.
William P. Sizer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for defendants-appellants; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Nashville, of counsel.
The primary issue before us on appeal is whether the retroactive application of certain amendments in 1981 to the Election Code, which amendments disenfrancised convicted felons, violates the state constitution. More specifically, we are asked to determine whether T.C.A. Secs. 2-2-139(d) and 2-19-143(4) violate Article I, Sec. 5 of the Tennessee Constitution.
The Appellee, Stephen Gaskin, was convicted on November 11, 1971, of the felony of "manufacturing marijuana." At that time, it was not an infamous crime. In 1975, Appellee Gaskin completed his term of incarceration and returned to society with all of his former rights, privileges and immunities restored. On May 18, 1981, two bills became law which had the effect of expanding the definition of infamous crimes to include all felonies, and disenfranchising all felons regardless of when they were convicted. Chapter 342 of the Public Acts of 1981 amended what was then T.C.A. Sec. 40-2712 and redefined infamous crime to include all felony offenses. That provision is now found at T.C.A. Sec. 40-20-112. Chapter 345 of the Public Acts of 1981 amended the election code to provide that the right of suffrage shall be denied those persons convicted of infamous crimes as defined in T.C.A. Sec. 40-20-112. The relevant portion of Chapter 345, Section 8 thereof, now codified in T.C.A. Secs. 2-2-139(d) and 2-19-143(4), is as follows:
The provisions of this section, relative to the forfeiture and restoration of the right of suffrage for those persons convicted of infamous crimes, shall also apply to those persons convicted of crimes prior to May 18, 1981, which are infamous crimes after May 18, 1981.
On September 21, 1982, Appellee Gaskin was informed by Appellant Mae Weeks, Lewis County Registrar of voters, that his voter registration was revoked. This action was taken pursuant to instructions from Appellant, David Collins, State Co-ordinator of Elections, advising all county registrars-at-large to revoke registration and purge the voter rolls of names of any person known to have committed a felony crime. Following a denial of his request that his registration be reinstated, Appellee Gaskin filed suit in Chancery Court for Lewis County seeking to have certain sections of the statutes in question declared unconstitutional. Appellee further asked that his voter registration be reinstated and that the suit be maintained as a class action. The parties later agreed that the action not be certified as a class action. By judgment entered March 16, 1983, the Chancellor held that "Section 8 of Chapter 345 of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1981, as codified at T.C.A. Sec. 2-2-139(d) and Sec. 2-19-143(4), is declared to be unconstitutional in that it violates Article I Sec. 5 of the Tennessee Constitution." The Chancellor found that the remaining sections of Chapter 345 were not affected because of the severability clause found in Section 9 of the Act.
The determinative issue before us is whether Article I, Section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution has been violated by the statutes in question. Article 1, Section 5 provides:
The election shall be free and equal, and the right of suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon conviction by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis added)
The meaning of the phrase, "previously ascertained and declared by law" is decisive in resolving this question. The Appellants argue that this section, construed along with Article IV, Sections 1 and 2, require only that the legislature act before a person can be disenfranchised. Article IV, Section 1 provides in relevant part All such requirements [to vote] shall be equal and uniform across the state, and there shall be no other qualification attached to the right of suffrage.
The General Assembly shall have the power to enact laws requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.
Article IV, Section 2 provides: "Laws may be passed excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes." We agree that these provisions are not self-executing.
It is true that the declaration of the right of universal suffrage is self-executing in that any citizen may rely upon it independently of any legislative enactment. However, the exception to universal suffrage is expressly dependent upon legislative action. That is, the legislature is empowered to deprive convicted criminals of the right to vote under the limitations set out in Article 1, Section 5 and Article IV, Section 2, but it is not reasonable to interpret the exception as self-executing.
Crutchfield v. Collins, 607 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tenn.App.1980).
We do not agree, however, with Appellants' position that these provisions only require that the legislature act in order that a person be disenfranchised. This interpretation ignores the ordinary meaning of the words "previously ascertained and declared by law" read within the context of the provision. When construing a constitutional provision we must give "to its terms their ordinary and inherent meaning." State v. Phillips, 159 Tenn. 546, 21 S.W.2d 4 (1929). The phrase "previously ascertained and declared by law" modifies the words "infamous crimes." It qualifies the words "infamous crimes" in the sense that it places a time limitation on when an act shall be declared infamous; that is, before conviction of the crime by a jury.
We must also "give effect to the intent of the people" who adopt a constitutional provision, and their intent should be derived from the language as it is found in the instrument. Hatcher v. Bell, 521 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn.1974); Shelby v. Hale, 200 Tenn. 503, 292 S.W.2d 745 (1956). The language is "clear and unambiguous" and the intent of the framers is easily derived therefrom. Hatcher v. Bell, supra....
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...We must give the words used in a constitution their usual and ordinary meaning unless the context requires otherwise. Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn.1983). We must also consider these terms with reference to what the people who ratified the provision thought they meant. State ......
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