Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers

Decision Date11 February 1970
Docket NumberNo. 23,23
Citation172 S.E.2d 19,276 N.C. 279
Parties, 41 A.L.R.3d 1062 GASTONIA PERSONNEL CORPORATION v. Bobby L. ROGERS.
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Joseph B. Roberts, III, Gastonia, for plaintiff-appellant.

T. Lamar Robinson, Jr., and Henry M. Whitesides, Gastonia, for defendant-appellee.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Under the common law, persons, whether male or female, are classified and referred to as Infants until they attain the age of twenty-one years. 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants § 3: 43 C.J.S. Infants § 2.

'By the fifteenth century it seems to have been well settled that an infant's bargain was in general void at his election (that is voidable), and also that he was liable for necessaries.' 2 Williston, Contracts § 223 (3rd ed. 1959).

An early commentary on the common law, after the general statement that contracts made by persons (infants) before attaining the age of twenty-one 'may be avoided,' sets forth 'some exceptions out of this generality,' to wit: 'An infant may bind himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell, necessary physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards.' (Our italics.) Coke on Littleton 13th ed. (1788), p. 172. The italicized portion of this excerpt from Coke on Littleton was quoted by Pearson, J. (later C.J.), in Freeman v. Bridger, 49 N.C. 1 (1856). It appears also in later decisions of this Court: Turner v. Gaither, 83 N.C. 357 (1880); Cole v. Wagner, 197 N.C. 692, 150 S.E. 339, 71 A.L.R. 220 (1929); Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826 (1942). If the infant married, 'necessaries' included necessary food and clothing for his wife and child. Freeman v. Bridger, supra.

In accordance with this ancient rule of the common law, this Court has held an infant's contract, unless for 'necessaries' or unless authorized by statute, is voidable by the infant, at his election, and may be disaffirmed during infancy or upon attaining the age of twenty-one. Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580 (1916), and cases cited; Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corp., supra, and cases cited; Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).

In Freeman v. Bridger, supra, the opinion, referring to 'such other necessaries,' states: 'These last words embrace boarding; for shelter is as necessary as food and clothing. They have also been extended so as to embrace schooling, and nursing (as well as physic) while sick. In regard to the quality of the clothes and the kind of food &c., a restriction is added, that it must appear that the articles were suitable to the infant's degree and estate.'

In Freeman, the Court held that timber for the construction of a house on an infant's land was not a 'necessary' and therefore the infant could disaffirm his contract for the purchase thereof.

In Turner, the Court held that money for a professional (medical) education was not a 'necessary' and therefore the infant could disaffirm his contract to repay money he had borrowed and used for that purpose. In this connection it is noted: (1) In the excerpt from Coke on Littleton, it is stated that 'necessaries' for which 'an infant may bind himselfe' included 'good teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards.' (2) The 1969 statute, now codified as G.S. § 116--174.1, authorizes all minors in North Carolina of the age of seventeen years and upwards to enter into written contracts of indebtedness and to execute unsecured notes evidencing such indebtedness '(f)or the sole purpose of borrowing money to obtain post-secondary education at an accredited college, university, junior college, community college, technical institute, industrial education center, business or trade school provided, however, that none of the proceeds of such loans shall be used to pay for any correspondence courses.'

In Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N.C. 45 (1872), it was held that an infant, who had purchased a stock of goods for use in carrying on a mercantile business, had the right to disaffirm his contractual obligations with reference thereto. The thrust of this decision was to preserve fully the infant's common-law right to disaffirm contracts involving business transactions. Accord: McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152. In McCormick, it was held that the defendant, a minor, who had purchased 'One Superior Machine complete and Snaplite Lens' for use in the Garden Theatre at Biscoe, N.C., was entitled (1) to disaffirm all his contractual obligations with reference to payment of the purchase price, and (2) to recover all amounts he had previously paid to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was adjudged entitled to the possession of the machine in its used and depreciated condition.

In Jordan v. Coffield, 70 N.C. 110 (1874), the plaintiff recovered for articles sold an infant 'just before her marriage, consisting of her bridal outfit, and among other things a suite of chamber furniture costing $55; all of which articles were received and used by defendants, and still are in their service and use, except such of the same as are worn out.' Settle, J., for the Court, said: 'There is an exception to the general rule that an infant is incapable of binding himself by a contract made, not in favor of tradesmen, but for the benefit of the infant himself, in order that he may obtain necessaries on credit. As is well said in Hyman v. Cain, 48 N.C. 111, 'infants had better be held liable to pay for necessary food, clothing, etc., than for the want of credit, to be left to starve.' Nor are we to understand by the word necessaries only such articles as are absolutely necessary to support life, but it includes also such articles as are suitable to the state, station and degree in life of the person to whom they are furnished.' The thrust of this decision is to expand slightly the concept of 'necessaries' and to enable some infants to contract for somewhat more than the bare or minimum necessities of life.

When an infant purchased a motor vehicle, whether for pleasure or as necessary for use in his occupation or employment, the ancient rule of the common law was applied with full vigor. Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923); Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929); Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corp., supra; Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co., supra.

In Greensboro Morris Plan Co., the defendant purchased a truck and by using it (hauling lumber) made a substantial amount of money. Later, the finance company repossessed and sold the truck. When he purchased the truck and executed a note and chattel mortgage for the purchase price, the defendant was emancipated, married, had the appearance 'of a man of full age' and represented falsely that he was over twenty-one. Notwithstanding, the defendant was permitted to disaffirm his contractual obligations and to recover the full amount of the payments he had made to the automobile dealer and to the finance company.

In Collins, the plaintiff, a minor, traded a Chevrolet truck for a Dodge sport roadster and gave the defendant a note and mortgage on the Dodge for the balance of the purchase price. The Dodge was destroyed in a wreck. The plaintiff elected to disaffirm his contract. In an action in his behalf by his general guardian, the plaintiff was permitted to recover from the defendant the fair market value of the Chevrolet truck and in addition the amount he had paid on the balance purchase price note.

In Barger, the plaintiff, when a minor, bought a Graham-Paige car and paid a portion ($38.45) of the purchase price therefor. He traded this car for a Nash and agreed to pay a difference of.$257.00. The papers evidencing this additional obligation were purchased by a finance company. The plaintiff paid $116.50 and then defaulted. The finance company repossessed the Nash. When he became twenty-one, the plaintiff disaffirmed these contractual obligations and was permitted to recover from the dealer and the finance company, respectively, the sum he had paid to each of them. The opinion concludes: 'The evidence in the instant case tends to show that the ownership of an automobile was advantageous to the plaintiff and that he would not have been promoted without an automobile available for his use. Nevertheless it does not appear that an automobile was necessary for him to earn a livelihood. Hence we are of opinion and hold that an automobile is not among those necessaries for which a minor may be held liable.'

In Fisher, the plaintiff, a minor, bought a 1953 Oldsmobile. The purchase price was $750.00, of which $600.00 was provided by the plaintiff. This car, while operated by the plaintiff, was involved in a wreck. Its value, after the wreck, was $50.00. The plaintiff elected to disaffirm his contract. In an action instituted in his behalf by a next friend, the plaintiff recovered $550.00 (the $600.00 he had paid less the value of the wrecked car).

The basis of decision in the cases considered in the four preceding paragraphs is stated by Stacy, C.J., in McCormick v Crotts, supra, as follows: 'The case may seem to be a hard one, as the plaintiff was not aware of the defendant's minority at the time of the sale * * * but the dominant purpose of the law in permitting infants to disaffirm their contracts is to protect children and those of tender years from their own improvidence, or want of discretion, and from the wiles of designing men.'

Decisions in other jurisdictions which hold that a motor vehicle, under particular circumstances, may be a 'necessary' for a minor, are reviewed in an article, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for Reappraisal and Realistic Adjustment? Mehler, 11 University of Kansas Law Review 361, at 370 et seq. (1963).

In addition to G.S. § 116--174.1, discussed above, modifications of the common-law rule by our General Assembly include those set forth below.

1. G.S. §...

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  • Parkes v. Hermann
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • December 18, 2020
    ...needs of the times have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument of injustice. Gastonia Pers. Corp. v. Rogers , 276 N.C. 279, 287, 172 S.E.2d 19, 24 (1970) (quoting State v. Culver , 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957) ). Thus, it in no way threatens the separation of......
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