Goodwin v. State

Decision Date24 February 1976
Docket NumberNo. 30587,30587
Citation223 S.E.2d 703,236 Ga. 339
PartiesTerry Lee GOODWIN v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

H. P. Austin, Jr., Michael R. Jones, Monroe, for appellant.

John T. Strauss, Dist. Atty., Covington, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harrison Kohler, Atlanta, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

This is a death case. The defendant, Terry Lee Goodwin, was indicted by the Walton County grand jury for the offenses of murder and armed robbery occurring on April 9, 1975. Following his plea of not guilty, he was tried by jury, found guilty in a general verdict and sentenced to death. The jury found as aggravating circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of another capital felony. The case is here for review of enumerated errors and of the sentence of death.

The States presented evidence from which the jury was authorized to find the following facts: The victim, Brad Studdard, 17 years old, worked at the Snack and Rack Recreation Parlor and owned a 1969 Buick Skylark. Two weeks before the murder, defendant told Ed Mitchell, 'I oughta kill somebody and take their car.' The defendant mentioned this matter to Mitchell on two later occasions. Sometime prior to the slaying, defendant was with Clinton Foster and took out a butcher knife and showed Foster how to use it. That knife was similar to the murder weapon. Defendant asked Foster if he would help rob a 'boy at the poolroom.'

On Wednesday, April 9, 1975, the victim left home at about 6:50 p.m. and drove to work at the poolroom. Later that same evening, about 10:00 p.m., the defendant entered the Snack and Rack Recreation Parlor and played several games of pool with the victim.

When they left the poolroom, they went in the victim's car to a convenience food store where the defendant bought a six pack of beer. As they drove around, they talked, drank beer, and according to the defendant, smoked marijuana. After they finished the beer, the victim stopped the car near Good Hope Road in order to urinate. The defendant also got out of the car, pulled the butcher knife out of his pocket, and demanded the automobile.

When the victim refused, the defendant marched the victim into the woods and again demanded the car. When the victim attempted to flee, the defendant chased and caught him. With the victim on the ground, the defendant began stabbing him. After being stabbed several times the victim begged not to be stabbed anymore, but the defendant continued to stab him a total of about 18 times.

The defendant threw the butcher knife across the road and drove away in the victim's car. He abandoned the automobile not far from his house but he removed the victim's alarm clock and senior key from the car.

Upon waking the next morning, Thursday, the victim's father learned that his son had not come home and began looking for him. Late that afternoon the abandoned car was found. On Friday, April 11, 1975, defendant phoned the victim's home and, without identifying himself, asked if there were any news and whether any reward had been offered. He was told that money could be raised for information concerning the boy's whereabouts. Later that same day defendant phoned again and asked if the reward had been raised. Claiming to be 'John Smith,' defendant said he had heard something about Good Hope Road.

On that same day, a disc jockey at a local radio station received several calls from a man claiming to be 'John Smith' who said that it would be advisable to look for the missing boy near Good Hope Road.

Acting on a tip from a woman who overheard defendant admitting to a murder, a deputy sheriff went to the defendant's house late Friday and brought him to the police station shortly after midnight. The defendant was advised of his rights and thereafter he admitted being the person who had called the victim's home on two occasions since the disappearance. On Saturday morning, April 12, 1975, the defendant was again advised of his constitutional rights and he signed a waiver. Defendant said that a friend had told him Brad's body was near Good Hope Road and he thought he could find about where it was. Defendant went with the officers to the Good Hope Road location. After the body was found, the defendant was returned to jail while the scene was investigated. The officers found a shoe tassle that had come from the defendant's shoe.

On Saturday afternoon, the officers secured a search warrant and searched the defendant's house. They found a blood-stained corduroy coat with the victim's alarm clock and senior key in a pocket. The keys to the victim's car were found under a rug.

Saturday evening the officers again advised defendant of his constitutional rights and obtained a signed waiver. When confronted with the physical evidence against him, defendant confessed to the murder and robbery. On Sunday, April 13, officers found the murder knife across the road as the defendant's confession had indicated.

The defense presented the testimony of a school psychometrist who had administered an intelligence test to the defendant which showed he had an IQ of 58 and his mental age was 9 years, 6 months, whereas he was in fact 18 years old.

Thereafter the State presented two doctors who testified that the defendant was examined at Central State Hospital over a period of 82 days. One psychiatrist testified that defendant had an IQ of 81, only three or four points below normal, and no serious psychiatric problems, although defendant was diagnosed as being on the border line of mental retardation. In the opinion of the other doctor at the same hospital the defendant displayed no evidence of psychosis.

The jury returned a general verdict of guilty and thereafter fixed the punishment of death.

1. In his first enumeration of error, defendant urges that the court erred in admitting into evidence his alleged confession for the reason that, due to mental retardation, he was incapable of understanding and effectively waiving his rights against self-incrimination. selfincrimination.

The defendant was advised of his constitutional rights in connection with these crimes each time before he gave any statement and had been so advised three times before he confessed. The evidence that his statements and confession were voluntary is uncontradicted by competent evidence.

Following a Jackson-Denno hearing, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the court admitted the confession into evidence. To admit a confession in evidence, the trial court must determine from the preponderance of the evidence that the confession was freely and voluntarily given, after being advised in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1965); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); High v. State, 233 Ga. 153, 154, 210 S.E.2d 673 (1974); Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58, 209 S.E.2d 629 (1974).

Here, however, the defendant urges that he was mentally incapable of understanding and waiving his right against self incrimination. However, judged by the foregoing standards, we find that the evidence supports the trial judge's ruling upon this issue.

The decisions relied upon by defendant are inapplicable. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1947), the defendant, a 15-year-old boy, was questioned In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961), the defendant, a 19-year-old retarded youth without prior criminal record was in custody of the police for a week, during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times, vomited blood on the floor of the police station, and was twice taken to the hospital on a stretcher. During that week he was questioned incessantly, seldom fed, had no formal charge placed against him and was confined practically incommunicado. On the contrary, this defendant had a prior criminal record, was fed when the deputies ate, was not ill, and there is no suggestion of brutality except that the psychiatrist testified that the defendant told him that he was beaten and confessed because he was afraid.

by 5 or 6 police officers in relays of 2 officers continuously for 5 hours until he confessed. There was some indication that he had been beaten while in custody [236 Ga. 343] and he was held incommunicado for three days after his confession while his lawyer attempted to see him.

In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1961), the defendant was a 14-year-old boy. The crucial evidence introduced at the trial was a formal confession which he had signed after he had been held for five days without seeing a lawyer, parent or other friendly adult, although his mother had attempted to see him.

In the case before us the trial court found the confesson to be admissible and that finding was not erroneous. High v. State, supra; Johnson v. State, supra.

2. In his second enumeration of error the defendant asserts that, regarding the charge of armed robbery, the verdict and sentence are contrary to law and to the evidence.

Defendant's confession, heretofore found to be admissible, and the other evidence in the case were sufficient to authorize the jury to find that the defendant planned to take the victim's car, that he asked the victim for the use of the car, that he stabbed the victim when the use of the car was refused, and...

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