Gatfield v. Gatfield, No. A03-1618.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. A03-1618.
• Citation: 682 N.W.2d 632
• Parties: Luella J. GATFIELD, petitioner, Appellant, v. Edward C. GATFIELD, Jr., Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

682 N.W.2d 632

Luella J. GATFIELD, petitioner, Appellant, v. Edward C. GATFIELD, Jr., Respondent.

No. A03-1618.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

July 6, 2004.

Stephen J. Beseres, New Hope, MN, for appellant.

Daniel L. Giles, Marshall, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by KALITOWSKI, Presiding Judge; SCHUMACHER, Judge; and HUSPENI, Judge.¹

OPINION

ROBERT H. SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Appellant-wife Luella J. Gatfield challenges the district court's denial of her motion to either enforce the stipulated provisions of the judgment dissolving her marriage to respondent-husband Edward C. Gatfield, Jr. that addresses husband's military retirement benefits or to have husband pay her permanent maintenance. Wife argues that Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), does not deprive the district courts of the ability to enforce the stipulated provision of a dissolution judgment in which a veteran agrees not to waive military retirement pay in favor of disability pay and to pay 50% of the gross military pay if retirement pay is waived in favor of disability pay.

Wife also argues the district court erred in denying her motion for spousal maintenance by not taking into account the change in circumstances of the parties caused by husband's unilateral act of breaching the parties' agreement. We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Husband and wife were married in 1972. In that same year, husband joined the United States Navy. In December 1995, a Virginia circuit court dissolved their marriage. The decree specifically incorporates the parties' stipulation. The stipulated provision of the judgment regarding husband's military retirement benefits provides

as an obligation ... commencing November 1, 1993, and continuing on 1st day of each month thereafter (as to the monthly annuity) there shall be paid directly to wife, by government allotment, as a direct obligation of the government plan administrator by direct assignment to wife from the plan administrator, fifty percent (50%) of the total (as the same may vary hereafter) monthly disposable U.S. military retired pay, retirement benefits of husband to which husband is entitled under the laws administered by the Secretary of the service from which he retired.

"Disposable" retired pay means disposable retired pay of a member subject to division under the Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (10 U.S.C. 1408).

For any months that wife does not receive a payment from the plan administrator and husband does, it shall be the duty of husband to make the payment promptly and directly to wife.

Husband covenants, represents, warrants and agrees that he will not waive any portion of any longevity retired, retirement or retainer pay in order to elect disability or other pension or lump sum or severance pay or other compensation in lieu thereof and agrees to renounce the right to make such waiver and election and to elect an alternative form of retirement. In the event husband does in violation hereof, he shall upon receipt pay to wife fifty percent (50%) thereof.

At some point, husband opted to receive military disability pay and waived an equivalent portion of his military retirement pay. In an affidavit submitted to the district court, husband states he has been receiving partial disability since November 1, 1993, and wife was aware he had waived part of his retirement pay in lieu of military disability pay before the parties entered into the stipulation. Wife denies any knowledge of when husband first opted to receive military disability pay.

Since the time husband initially waived his military retirement pay in favor of military disability pay, he has periodically undergone physical examination by the Veterans Administration to determine his level of service-related disability and thus the amount of military disability pay he is entitled to receive. At the time husband submitted his affidavit, the Veterans Administration had determined husband was 60% disabled by service related injuries and was entitled to $893 per month in disability pay.

In wife's affidavit, she states that her initial monthly share of husband's military retirement pay was $445. But the amount she receives has consistently decreased and she is currently receiving approximately $60 per month.

In 2001, wife moved the district court to order husband to abide by the terms of the stipulation, to compensate her for the reduced amount she had received as her share of husband's retirement pay since late 1993, and to award her permanent spousal maintenance. The district court denied wife's motions, concluding:

The Veteran's Administration Disability Benefits cannot be subject to a property claim by a spouse, and the ability of State Courts to award such benefits to a spouse has been preempted by Congressional Statute, and that preemption has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989).

The request for maintenance must also be denied at this time. There is not sufficient current information to indicate a need. The medical information is not current, and in fact is almost four years out of date. The Court is not satisfied that there has been a sufficient showing of attempts to seek work, or current proof of physical inability to perform work on the part of [wife]. Moreover, [husband] is currently on unemployment being laid off at Arteyson Technologies, and is not in a current position to pay maintenance unless the disability benefits were used.

ISSUE

Did the district court err in determining that it could not address the merits of wife's request to enforce the stipulated provisions of the dissolution judgment addressing husband's military retirement benefits?

ANALYSIS

Wife argues the district court erred in determining that the application of Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), to the facts of the present case prevented it from considering her motion to require husband to pay her one-half of his military disability pay based on the stipulated provision of the judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. Whether federal law preempts a state court from addressing the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong is a jurisdictional question. State v. R.M.H., 617 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn.2000); see also In re Trusteeship created by City of Sheridan, 593 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Minn.App.1999) (stating subject-matter jurisdiction is "court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class or category to which proceedings in question belong"). This court reviews questions of jurisdiction de novo. McLain v. McLain, 569 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. App.1997),review denied (Minn. Nov. 18, 1997).

We note wife argues that if this court concludes Minnesota law prevents enforcement of the stipulated provisions of the dissolution judgment, we should also consider the law of Virginia in place at the time the parties agreed to the stipulation. The stipulated provisions of the dissolution judgment explicitly provide that any dispute concerning the stipulated provision of the judgment shall be resolved in accordance with Virginia law. But the sole question before us is whether the district court had jurisdiction. To the extent wife is arguing Virginia law should apply to our resolution of the jurisdictional question, we disagree. Whether a Minnesota court has jurisdiction to hear a case is determined by Minnesota law and by binding federal precedent. See, e.g., Stanek v. A.P.I., Inc., 474 N.W.2d 829, 832 (Minn.App. 1991)

(stating personal jurisdiction depends on Minnesota's long-arm statute and federal due process concerns), review denied (Minn. Oct. 31, 1991). On remand, however, the district court will need to apply Virginia law to resolve any conflicts regarding the stipulated provisions.

The United States Supreme Court in Mansell was asked to determine whether under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, state courts "may treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay waived by the retiree in order to receive veterans' disability benefits." 490 U.S. at 583, 109 S.Ct. at 2025. The Supreme Court held "that the Former Spouses' Protection Act does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits." Id. at 594-95, 109 S.Ct. at 2032.

Husband argues that the Supreme Court's holding in Mansell deprives state courts of jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a stipulation regarding military disability benefits and points to the existence of a stipulation in Mansell. Although the Supreme Court in Mansell did note the existence of a stipulation between the parties, we agree with other states that have addressed this issue that the Supreme Court's holding is narrow. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mansell, 217 Cal.App.3d 219, 265 Cal.Rptr. 227, 232 (1989) (stating "Supreme Court's holding was quite narrow: FUSFSPA does not alter, with regard to non-disposable retired or retainer pay (including the pay at issue herein), the already-existing federal statutory structure which, according to [McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981)] preempts state community property law"), review denied (Cal. Mar. 29, 1990).

Neither the Supreme Court's holding in Mansell nor the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act precludes a veteran from voluntarily entering into a contract whereby he or she agrees not to waive retirement pay in favor of disability benefits and to indemnify a former spouse for any loss the spouse might incur should the veteran choose to waive any portion of retirement pay. See, e.g., Krapf v. Krapf, 439 Mass. 97, 786 N.E.2d 318, 326 (2003)

("Nothing in 10 U.S.C. § 1408 or in the Mansell case precludes a veteran from voluntarily entering into a contract whereby he agrees to pay...